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Abstract 
Dietary Pacifism: 
Animals, Nonviolence, and the Messianic Community 
by 
Matthew Andrew Barton 
 
This thesis uses relational theology, in conversation with the nonviolent 
communitarian ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, to construct a new theology of 
how humans relate to other animals. I argue that at least some other 
animals should be perceived as relational creatures of God; and that 
understanding our animal brothers and sisters in this way raises new 
questions for ethics and ecclesiology. The relationality we share with 
nonhuman animals – in individual relationships and the interwoven 
networks of relationship that make up creation – means that Christians can 
hope for relationships between humans and other animals to be sanctified 
by God’s grace. If we have this hope, and accept that theology is ethics 
(and eschatology not solely future-oriented), there is a clear impetus for 
individual Christians and church communities to look with reflective and 
prayerful eyes at how we relate to other animals. This will include thinking 
seriously about how our dietary choices impact upon them. 
I make two methodological shifts in the course of the thesis: from 
theology to ethics, and from there into ecclesiology and ethnography. 
These shifts are justified on the ground that theology is ethics: just as faith 
without works is dead (Jm. 2:17), so must theology be ethical. The use of 
ethnography and social-scientific methodology situates my discussion of 
church casuistry on animal and dietary ethics in the context of real, situated 
churches and church experiences. A theological ethic of diet which does 
not examine how churches think about eating, and the eating practices their 
members are formed in, would be incomplete. 
After outlining my aims and methodology in chapter 1, in chapter 2 I 
critique theological models of ‘stewardship’ (popular for thinking about 
human-animal relationality). Chapter 3 provides a short systematic theology 
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of human-animal relationality which seeks to amend for stewardship’s 
limitations. In chapters 4-5, I consider the dietary implications of chapters 2-
3, arguing that vegetarianism (theologically understood as dietary pacifism) 
is a valid ethical practice for followers of Christ. Chapters 6-8 look at ethical 
dialogue and discernment in church communities, arguing – partly via 
conversation with ordinary Christian vegetarians – that there is a 
theological impetus on individual Christians and the church to engage 
seriously with all ethical topics, including diet. In chapter 9, I draw the thesis 
together with a relational framework which emphasises radical inclusivity – 
the call for the church to be a community of human animals, in and for the 
wider community of creation. 
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1. God, Humans, and Other Animals
1
 
Introduction and Methodology 
 
“And should I not be concerned about Nineveh, that great city, in 
which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand people 
who do not know their right hand from their left, and also many 
animals?” (Jon. 4:11, NRSV2) 
Animals (more accurately, nonhuman animals3) are important to God. As is 
so often the case in our compromised world, however, their importance to 
God is less often reflected in how they are viewed and related to by 
humans. This thesis employs a relational theological framework to explore 
how Christians are called to respond to nonhuman animals in creation. The 
ethical and ecclesiological implications of this will be considered, with a 
view to thinking about how (and what) the church should eat, as a 
community of human creatures in the wider community of creation. In short, 
in this thesis I develop a theological framework for Christian vegetarianism 
(called dietary pacifism), talking to Christian vegetarians in the process. 
Why animals? Why food? For as long as there have been humans, 
we have coexisted with our fellow animals. This existence alongside 
nonhuman animals – who are also creatures of God, who also depend 
ultimately on God’s sustaining and amazing grace – has not been standard 
through history but has changed over time. The Hebrew Bible and the New 
Testament present us with images of human-animal relationality which are 
                                                          
1
 This chapter’s title is taken from the excellent anthology edited by David Clough and 
Celia Deane-Drummond, Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans, and Other Animals 
(London: SCM, 2009). 
2
 All quotations from scripture, unless otherwise mentioned, are from the NRSV 
translation. 
3
 The relational theological framework employed in this thesis, wherein I argue (in chapter 
3) that nonhuman animals should be understood as relational creatures of God, to and 
with whom humans are called to relate, means that “nonhuman animals” is more useful 
and descriptive language than (for example) “living creature”. This is so because “living 
creature” will include plants, which are non-relational creatures of God: humans are called 
to view them with reverence and work to sustain them, but not to relate to them in the 
way they are with nonhuman animals. I recognise that the boundary line between 
nonhuman animal and non-relational creature is a hazy one – are insects sentient? – but 
am not so much concerned to define this boundary line (a fruitless task in any case) as I 
am to articulate the theological-ethical argument that how humans relate to nonhuman 
animals is an aspect of our creaturely life which can, should, and will be transformed by 
grace. 
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neither monolithic nor consistent but which offer new wisdom and insight 
concerning our nonhuman fellows. Questions about other animals – about 
what they are, whether and how they matter to God, what our obligations to 
them are, and so on – might then be answered by directing our attention to 
scripture; as well as to tradition, reason, and experience. And questions 
about animals, in a world subject to humanity, will inevitably become tied up 
with questions about food – about what we can or should eat, and the 
impact of our food’s production on other humans, nonhuman animals, and 
the environment we share. 
 Food is important. At the biological level, it is vitally important, as 
something necessary for the life of all animals; nonhuman as well as 
human. For Christians, creatures who are called to be disciples, food is 
also theologically important. Take Psalm 104, which praises God for giving 
food and drink “to every wild animal” (Ps. 104:11 – Isaiah prophesies that 
the wild animals will honour God for this4), causing “grass to grow for the 
cattle” and bringing forth “food from the earth, and wine to gladden the 
human heart” (Ps. 104:14-15). Or take Jesus’ caution against worrying 
about what we will eat or drink, coming during the Sermon on the Mount in 
Matthew 6:25-26. Jesus affirms that “life is more than food” – certainly true 
– but grounds this in the infinite and eternal providence of the Father. The 
example Jesus points to, of creatures of God who trust that their Creator 
will provide, is “the birds of the air” – they do not worry or store up their 
goods, because they know that through God they will have enough. Jesus 
affirms food’s biological importance while pointing to its theological 
importance, as a part of creation for which (like everything) we ultimately 
depend on God. 
These bible passages, briefly cited, illustrate food’s theological 
significance, but they also emphasise a truth which lies at this thesis’ 
foundation: nonhuman animals are creatures of God, are important to God, 
and their lives are bound up with the lives of God’s human creatures. This 
much is easy to acknowledge, but its theological and ethical implications 
are less clear. Reflection on nonhuman animals and dietary ethics are rare 
enough in the Christian traditions, and also in contemporary theology; and 
the relative novelty of the field can give rise to unsystematic and non-
reflective claims about animals and diet – particularly within the churches. 
                                                          
4
 Isa. 43:20 – “The wild animals will honour me, the jackals and the ostriches; for I give 
water in the wilderness, rivers in the desert...” 
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Talking around the dinner table in my home town church, my explanation 
that I saw vegetarianism as part of my discipleship was answered with an 
(out of context) quote from Romans 14. “The weak eat only vegetables” 
(14:2), I was informed; but my conversation partner was not so ready and 
willing to accept the conclusion of that chapter, that “It is good not to eat 
meat or drink wine or do anything that makes your brother or sister 
stumble” (14:21). Another popular proof-text among Christians keen to 
avoid reflection on diet, Acts 10:13 (“Get up, Peter. Kill and eat”), was 
employed without awareness of the distinction between declaring 
something ritually pure and declaring it morally unproblematic.5 
 Stanley Hauerwas, a major conversation partner in this thesis, is a 
proponent of the simple but powerful claim that theology is ethics;6 a claim 
that grounds both my attempt to treat the theological ethics of food 
seriously, and my call for situated church communities to do the same. 
What we believe about God should be mirrored in our lives; and 
conversely, how we act in the world conveys our beliefs to those we 
interact with. In accordance with this claim, this thesis aims to produce a 
theology of human-animal7 relationality which is practical. For this to be the 
case, I need to consider the relationality of human and nonhuman animals: 
this will involve thinking about the capacity of animals for relationship, their 
involvement in relational networks (which may or may not be trans-species 
and/or include humans), and the question of how they relate to God; as well 
as reflecting on what manner of relationships are proper for the humanity of 
the human and the animality of the animal (which may differ for different 
times and places and species). I am concerned to consider human-animal 
relationality through the lens of the dinner table, open to the possibility that 
the relationships underlying the everyday status of animal flesh and milk as 
products for human consumption might stand in need of God’s 
transformative power and grace. This can and does lead to the suggestion 
                                                          
5
 These two passages, among others, will be explored in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
6
 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), chapter 6. 
7
 N.B. Throughout this thesis, I use human-nonhuman and human-animal interchangeably. 
In both cases, I actually mean human animal-nonhuman animal – I alternate between the 
two more readable phrases to emphasise that humans are animals and both are part of 
creation. Unless stated otherwise, human-nonhuman never refers to a relationship 
between a human and a non-animal member of creation (such as a tree). 
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that the most appropriate Christian dinner table might be one without dead 
animals on it.8 
Within Christian theology, ecclesiology and ethics there exist foci 
which, although not always deemed orthodox or relevant by the majority of 
Christians, remain present within minority representations of the tradition. 
Christians concerned to think about animals (as well as those concerned to 
think about food, including Christian vegetarians) have almost always 
formed a minority within their respective traditions. The reasons suggested 
for this relatively peripheral status range widely. Is it simply that some 
churches are wary of movements which appear to derive from 
methodologically non-Christian contexts – such as the animal welfare 
movement? Or is it as Michael Northcott says, that “secular modernity... 
disrupt[s] and corrode[s] harmonious human relations with nature”9 – has 
the church’s apparent aversion to dietary ethics been shaped by the world? 
Or is there more credence in the scripturally-grounded notion that the early 
Christian response to the triumph of grace over law10 rendered dietary 
regulation highly contentious?11 It is not this chapter’s purpose to consider 
the historical reasons for the extra-traditional status of dietary ethics; but 
Andrew Linzey (a dialogue partner in chapter 2) claims that it is because 
animals “make a mess of anthropocentric philosophy and theology” that 
“they have been relegated to the periphery of moral thinking.”12 I am in 
agreement that this is part of what is happening when Christians decline to 
reflect on animal and dietary matters; but it will only continue to be so if we 
continue to claim that there are aspects of our creaturely existence (such 
                                                          
8
 Note that the dietary pacifist ethic advanced within this thesis is deliberate advocacy of 
an under-represented position, giving Christian vegetarians voice by systematising their 
experiences and locating their ethics within a theological framework, in order to 
encourage an open debate which is not currently present within most churches and 
church communities. This thesis is an effort to change the default position, which is 
currently (in the church as outside it) that factory-farmed meat is not a major ethical issue; 
and this effort is made by looking theologically at animals, at humans, and at how the 
church thinks and practices as a community of people attempting to live consistent with 
the Christian narrative (a narrative which, I argue, renders vegetarianism a legitimate 
practice of contemporary discipleship). 
9
 Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 84. 
10
 Paul’s epistle to the Romans is key to understanding the sovereignty of grace over law. 
In chapter 5, I engage in particular with Rom. 14, arguing that this is an application of 
Paul’s theology of grace to a specifically dietary question.  
11
 See for example Rom. 14; Mt. 15:11; Acts 10:13. 
12
 Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37. 
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as how we relate to other animals) which need neither justification nor 
sanctification by grace. The first part of this thesis aims to dispel this notion. 
None of this is to deny that there has been a great deal of work 
done in recent years in building up theological support for the value of 
animals; for their place in God’s creation, and for revising human 
perceptions of (and responsibilities to) them. The work of Andrew Linzey, 
Michael Northcott, Richard Bauckham, Willis Jenkins, Christopher 
Southgate, David Clough, David Cunningham, Rachel Muers, Stephen 
Webb, Norman Wirzba, Carol Adams, John Berkman, and David Grumett 
has all contributed to the expanding field of theological reflection on 
nonhuman animals (and/or dietary ethics). All are engaged with in the 
course of this thesis – their work has been hugely important in bringing 
animal and dietary matters onto the theological stage, and highlighting 
areas in need of further reflection. Theological and ethical engagement with 
the language of rights, the environmental responsibility advanced by 
stewardship theologies, and liberation theology’s concern for the other are 
the most prevalent motifs in animal and dietary theology at present: with the 
recent exception of David Clough,13 systematic theological reflection on 
nonhuman animals is thin on the ground. 
One facet which has been relatively unexplored by so-called animal 
theologians – a neglect which is interesting, given its prominence in 
Trinitarian theology – is that of relationality, central to the constructive 
theological work done in chapters 2-3. If relationship is at the heart of divine 
and human life – and resultantly, central to the Incarnation and ministry of 
Jesus Christ – then how we understand ourselves to be in relationship with 
other animals (indeed, whether we believe them to be capable of 
relationship at all) is key to the question of our responsibilities to them. 
How, as relational creatures of God, called to respond to our Creator and 
be transformed by grace, should we view and respond to those other 
relational creatures of God, whose flourishing is coincident with ours and 
yet over whom we have been placed in a position of relative power? 
Building upon the theology of human-nonhuman relationality, chapters 4-5 
explore the dietary implications of how we relate to nonhuman animals, 
before chapters 6-8 move in an ethnographic and ecclesiological direction. 
                                                          
13
 See David L. Clough, On Animals: Volume One: Systematic Theology (London and New 
York: T&T Clark, 2012). 
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Here I dialogue with a number of ordinary14 Christian vegetarians to the end 
of unpacking where questions about animals and diet sit in the daily life of 
local church communities (which also serves the twinned purposes of 
testing the ordinary theological methodology employed in analysing the 
data gathered and testing the constructive work of the thesis as a whole). 
Chapter 9, being the thesis’ conclusion, brings the theological, ethical, and 
ecclesiological work together into a conclusion which looks to answer the 
question: how should the church live and eat as a community which attends 
seriously to the all-pervasiveness of sin in creation, in the hope of 
sanctification by grace and the ultimate hope of the kingdom? I now move 
to provide a more thorough overview of this thesis’ chapters and the 
progression of its argument, in the course of which the methodological 
moves taken are also outlined in more detail. 
 
Thesis Overview 
The first move taken in this thesis, in chapter 2, is taken to outline one 
thing this thesis is not. It is not a model of stewardship; stewardship being 
understood as a scripturally-based theological ethic which emphasises 
human responsibilities to creation, as an act of service and fealty to God.15 
Although by this thesis’ end an outline for ‘redeemed stewardship’ will have 
been constructed, I begin my constructive theological work with a relational 
critique of stewardship’s classical formulations. I do this for two reasons – 
the first is that stewardship is the most common theological framework for 
thinking about how we relate to other animals;16 the second is that, within a 
relational reading, stewardship fails to challenge or even examine how 
humans perceive other animals. 
                                                          
14
 The definition of “ordinary” I use here, and throughout this thesis, is derived from Jeff 
Astley, Ordinary Theology: Looking, listening and learning in theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2002). Broadly speaking, Astley means by “ordinary theology” the theology of those 
individuals without any formal academic theological education. See chapters 6-8 for 
further discussion along these lines. 
15
 The formulations of stewardship outlined by Willis Jenkins and Richard Bauckham are 
the primary sources used in this chapter. See Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: 
Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Richard Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology: Rediscovering the Community of Creation 
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010). 
16
 This is at least partly because animals are so often and so unreflectively subsumed into 
the category of ‘environment’; something Daniel Miller addresses in Animal Ethics and 
Theology: The Lens of the Good Samaritan (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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 Stewardship is not to be discounted out of hand: the explicit 
recognition of the commonality between humanity and the rest of creation, 
and resultant recognition that our dominion is not mastery but service, are 
to be valued. The dangers of stewardship models lie in two major problems 
identified in chapter 2. The first of these is that stewardship is 
problematically anthropocentric, recognising the significance of the wider 
created order (including nonhuman animals) only in as much as it provides 
the stage and material for humans to act as stewards. In this way, the 
particularity (which is to say, the individuality) of nonhuman animals is 
neglected. This is a theoretical obstacle to considering animals in their 
relationship to humanity: we cannot talk meaningfully about the 
relationships of an individual without first recognising their individuality. 
 Stewardship’s second major problem is tied to its first: it is 
relationally monodirectional, inasmuch as the only relationships it affirms as 
significant are those between God and humans. Our relationship with God 
– which includes the acts of service bound up in stewardship – is not seen 
to shape and transform how we relate to other animals as it is with humans. 
I do not mean by this that human-animal relationality and human-human 
relationality are the same, but it is theologically dangerous to assume that 
human distinctiveness or superiority within creation means that other 
animals are not distinctive, nor capable of relationship, nor valuable. Too 
often, anthropomonist worldviews are defended and justified by means of 
grave insults to others of God’s creatures, including the denial of our 
shared mutuality with them. In considering criticisms of ecotheology 
alongside Andrew Linzey (primarily the complaint that it is arrogant about 
the capacity of humanity to manage or control the environment), I construct 
a critique of environmentalist stewardship. 
Having concluded that stewardship is not the most appropriate 
model for thinking through how humans relate to other animals, I move in 
chapter 3 to construct and outline a theology of human-animal relationality. 
This framework, intended to provide a way to theologically consider how we 
‘fit’ alongside other animals, is not such easy prey to anthropomonism (as 
stewardship is). This theology is constructed in a systematic manner: I 
consider creation, image, Trinity, Incarnation, sin, grace, covenant, and 
eschatology. The model constructed has no one doctrine as its 
cornerstone: rather, the doctrines of image, Trinity, and Incarnation 
(pertaining to God’s relational nature, the creation of humans in God’s 
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image, and God’s cosmic, redemptive, and relational revelation in Christ) 
are central. Chapter 3 is a theological affirmation of the particularity and 
relationality of nonhuman animals: they are other to us, and they are other 
theologically as well as biologically, but we can speak of relating to them 
and we are called to recognise their particularity. The claim made is not that 
relationality itself is inherently good: many of our current farming practices 
are distinctly harmful forms of relationship with animal others, and 
relationships such as these, by denying the animality of the animal and our 
shared mutuality with them, are as a result destructive of the humanity of 
the human. My humanity – understood in light of creation, image, Trinity, 
Incarnation, sin, grace, covenant, and eschatology – is at stake in how I 
relate to other animals. How we relate to other animals can and should be 
transformed by grace, bringing us towards a fuller realisation of the (loving, 
relational, other-concerned) image of God. 
Chapter 4 makes the first significant methodological shift of the 
thesis, moving from the theological work of chapters 2-3 into ethics. This 
shift is necessary to consider the dietary implications of chapter 3’s 
theological outline: I do this in the first place through an analysis and 
application of the theology of Stanley Hauerwas, with a particular focus on 
the centrality of nonviolence to his model for discipleship. In other words – if 
other animals are relational beings, to whom we are called to respond in 
the light of the image of God, to what extent can the claims of Hauerwas 
and others about interhuman violence be extended to the interspecies 
violence humans perpetrate? My answer, given as a model and suggestion 
(as opposed to an imperative or commandment), is that human nonviolence 
towards nonhuman animals should be practiced as far as is possible. 
Indeed, it is suggested that for those of us with the freedom to eat how, 
when, and what we like, Hauerwas’ pacifist theology might be expanded 
into a dietary pacifism. 
In the course of this chapter, an overview of Hauerwas’ work is 
provided, with particular attention to character formation and 
transformation, as well as nonviolence; to the lived example of Jesus of 
Nazareth; and to Hauerwas’ critics. This overview of Hauerwas – including 
the problems and areas for expansion identified within his work – is brought 
into conversation with the relational theology of chapter 3. The dietary 
pacifist ethic which arises from this critical conversation is further nuanced 
through reflection on Hauerwas’ treatment of abortion (a question where 
Page 19 of 287 
the involved parties are markedly different in capacities, including that for 
relationship), as well as his and John Berkman’s article concerning animal 
and dietary ethics. This article, “The Chief End of All Flesh”, made valuable 
steps towards recognising shared mutuality with nonhuman animals, laying 
a heavy condition of necessity on meat-eating consistent with Hauerwas’ 
truth-centred idealism. However, it leaves unquestioned the normative 
cultural practices of the writers’ contexts (that is, the assumed necessity 
and normality of flesh-eating in North America); and a brief concluding note 
about sacrifice, which fails to attend to the theological truth that Christian 
sacrifice is self-sacrifice, detracts from the conclusion (sympathetic to 
dietary pacifism) the article had been leading up to. Through constructive 
and critical engagement with Hauerwas and his critics in chapter 4, then, I 
construct a dietary pacifist theological ethic. 
In chapter 5, I nuance this dietary pacifist ethic, exploring its 
complexities in greater detail. A variety of questions are considered, all of 
which arise from attempting to put dietary pacifism into practice in different 
contexts and situations. In particular, questions about the relationship 
between idealism and realism are answered; including questions about 
whether there can be degrees of problematic animal-eating, or whether a 
certain diet can be ‘purer’ than another. Karl Barth’s accusation that 
vegetarians are engaged in wanton anticipation, and Norman Wirzba’s 
parallel criticism that the vegetarian view of creation is unsustainably 
romantic, are critiqued on the grounds that their arguments only work if 
dietary pacifism is an inflexible and deontological idealism (it isn’t). David 
Clough’s four-dimensional typology of pacifisms is employed in order to 
better conceptualise dietary pacifism and place it in relation to Hauerwasian 
nonviolence. Dietary pacifism is also considered alongside military 
pacifism, which has its own tensions between idealism and realism. A 
number of situated examples are viewed through the relational lens 
developed up to this point: among them are the questions of whether 
vegans should eat honey, and whether and when it is acceptable for 
Christians to engage in or support animal culls. Finally, Hebrew Bible rituals 
of animal sacrifice are contrasted with modern day practices of factory 
farming, in a relational critique of factory farming which also furthers 
chapter 4’s discussion of sacrifice. In concluding chapter 5, I argue that 
“dietary pacifism is not about personal purity but the living out of novel 
relationships in creation.” 
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Chapter 6 moves from ethics into ecclesiology, while maintaining 
the thesis’ relational focus. Having outlined a theology of human-animal 
relationality, and built an ethic of dietary pacifism upon it, I ask: how do 
churches, at the local level, talk about animal and dietary ethics? This 
question opens up reflection on theological and ecclesiological claims 
about communal discernment in Christian churches. Here I draw again on 
the work of Stanley Hauerwas, setting up the exploration of why and how 
animal and dietary matters are so often a casuistical blind spot within 
church communities. As well as Hauerwas, the ecclesiologies of John 
Howard Yoder and Dietrich Bonhoeffer are brought into the conversation, 
with a particular view to their thinking on matters of communal casuistry: 
Yoder’s nonviolent and communitarian theology influenced much of 
Hauerwas’ work, and Bonhoeffer’s pneumatological Christology is shown to 
underline Hauerwas’ call for churches to value their heretics; those outlying 
members of the community whose personal theology in some way deviates 
from the majority. In churches where questions about animal and dietary 
ethics are not discussed (or are even avoided), it might be the case that 
Christian vegetarians become ‘heretics’. 
In chapter 6 I also think about why casuistical blind spots exist. 
Issues around sociocultural identity are explored, and it is suggested that 
pseudo-sanctification of sociocultural practices can happen when 
Christians accept uncritically that the way something is is ‘the way it is 
done’ without asking whether it is how God wants it done. Carol Adams’ 
writing about the language of invisibility used on other animals – the way 
individual food cows are rendered invisible through use of the mass 
descriptor “beef”, for example – is considered, and I argue that recognition 
of other animals as relational individuals wards against such soporific 
misdirection. Again, I emphasise the need for every facet of our lives – 
including our relationships – to be transformed by grace: if we affirm, 
counter to this, that there are elements of our creaturely existence which 
fall outside this, are we not proclaiming that there are facets of our lives 
which do not need redemption? 
Proceeding from the ecclesiology of chapter 6, in chapter 7 I outline 
the methodological considerations behind my conversations with Christian 
vegetarians (analysed in chapter 8). These conversations took the form of a 
short series of semi-structured qualitative interviews, focusing on the 
personal theology, ethics, and ecclesiology of my interlocutors in a way 
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which allowed them to define their faith-diet connection (and how this 
connection is received by their local church) in their own language. The 
interview work in chapters 7-8 allows me to test and develop theological 
ethic of dietary pacifism constructed over chapters 2-5 and builds upon the 
ecclesiological hypotheses of chapter 6. One major contribution this work 
makes to the thesis as a whole is the circumnavigation of a common pitfall 
within constructive theological, ethical, and/or ecclesiological work: this is 
the often-too-hasty move from abstract theory to proclamations on situated 
practice. At the same time, it allows me to engage with two recent and 
significant shifts in academic theology. The first of these involves the 
“ordinary theology” of Jeff Astley, who calls academic theologians to take 
seriously the theologizing of individual Christians without formal theological 
education. By attending to the ordinary theology of twelve Christian 
vegetarians, I am able to test in a particular and situated way Astley’s 
claims about the validity and rigour of ordinary theology; claims which 
resound positively with theological notion of the priesthood of all believers, 
as well as the thesis’ relational framework more broadly. This process of 
testing offers a way to address some of the problems which arise when a 
church ostracizes its heretics. The second of these is the ethnographic shift 
in theology and ethics; a shift which Astley might be deemed a part of, 
along with the contributors to Pete Ward’s Perspectives on Ecclesiology 
and Ethnography17 and Christian Scharen’s and Aana Marie Vigen’s 
Ethnography as Christian Theology and Ethics.18 
 It will be noted that this thesis engages in two major methodological 
shifts; the first being that from theology to ethics, and the second being the 
move into ecclesiology and ethnography. The first shift is justified by 
Hauerwas’ claim that theology is ethics: just as faith without works is dead 
(Jm. 2:17), so must theology be ethical. I would suggest that ecclesiology is 
similarly symbiotic with both theology and ethics: to talk about the church 
without talking about God, or without thinking about how Christians are 
called to act, would produce an arid ecclesiology. Furthermore, when the 
focus is on questions around animal and dietary ethics, a theological ethic 
which does not extend into ecclesiology (i.e., which does not examine how 
churches think about eating, and the eating practices their members are 
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 Pete Ward (ed), Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2012). 
18
 See Christian Scharen and Aana Marie Vigen (eds), Ethnography as Christian Theology 
and Ethics (London: Continuum, 2011). 
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formed in) leaves the job unfinished. Take for example David Clough’s 
excellent first volume of On Animals, which deals with systematic theology. 
It is to be followed by a second volume dealing with ethics; it might be 
suggested that a third volume, dealing with ecclesiology, would allow the 
theological-ethical framework developed over two volumes to be situated in 
a church context, and in this way become praxis and resource the church. 
 In chapter 8, I engage with my Christian vegetarian conversation 
partners, looking at a number of issues raised both in the conversations 
themselves and through post-interview data analysis. In this way, my aim is 
to develop dietary pacifism; to consider in more detail the ecclesiological 
claims made about church casuistry; and to reflect upon the methodology 
behind doing constructive theology in conversation with ordinary 
theologians. In this way, the analytical and constructive work of this chapter 
necessarily functions as a test and comparison of both this thesis’ 
scholarship and that of the ordinary Christian vegetarians with whom I 
spoke. 
A number of relationships highlighted by the data analysis are 
explored. Reflection on the structure of individuals’ dietary theologies – and 
how the different motifs therein are related – gives rise to further 
exploration of stewardship (a common motif in the conversations) and 
relationality (interhuman and interspecies). In considering the relationship 
between why one first became a vegetarian and how one justifies it post 
facto, I draw on Hauerwas’ theology of character formation and 
transformation, and further emphasise the importance of the church being 
adequately resourced to discern about diet. The link between nonviolence 
and vegetarianism is emphasised by considering – in the light of chapters 4 
and 5 – whether and how my interlocutors connected dietary pacifism with 
other pacifisms. And I further the ecclesiological exploration of chapter 6 by 
considering whether the personal ecclesiology of my conversation partners 
has been affected by their situated church experiences vis their 
vegetarianism. That some vegetarians, feeling ostracized by their local 
communities, have moved away from the church towards alternative 
communities of character – and the cultivation of pride which can occur 
when individuals are rendered heretics – are also discussed, and the need 
for churches to engage in genuine casuistry further emphasised. 
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 In chapter 9, I draw together the theology, ethics, and ecclesiology 
of the thesis into a relational framework which emphasises radical 
inclusivity. This is the call for the church to live as a community of human 
animals in and for the wider community of creation; a community which 
includes non-Christian humans, and also nonhuman animals. I look at table 
fellowship, considering how our eating practices are our communal 
practices, and how we can spiritually bring animals to the table by not 
physically bringing them to the table. Chapter 9 also considers animal 
liturgies as a way of challenging non-reflective and anthropomonist 
worldviews, as well as being a way of bringing animal narratives into 
conversation with the church’s own story. Finally, the thesis comes full 
circle, as the possibility of redeeming stewardship is raised: this ‘redeemed 
stewardship’ ties together human relationships with and responsibilities to 
God, other humans, other animals, and the environment. Redeemed 
stewardship is relational stewardship; and, therefore, it champions dietary 
pacifism as a practice charitable to all creation. 
As we move now to chapter 2, and the relational critique of 
stewardship therein, it is worth keeping in mind the radically inclusive 
conclusion which this thesis moves towards. Remember, too, the question 
posed near the start of this chapter: how should the church live and eat as 
a community which attends seriously and holistically to the all-
pervasiveness of sin in creation, in the hope of sanctification by grace and 
the ultimate hope of the kingdom? The conclusion which answers this 
question is well-suited to the thesis’ own methodological structure, being 
theological and ethical, ecclesiological and embodied, and theoretical and 
practical. The conclusion, in short, is this: the church is “called to be a 
community of human animals, concerned with other humans and other 
animals, in and for the whole world because it is in and for God.” 
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2. Stewardship and Relationality 
Surveying Stewardship and Ecotheologies 
 
The notion of human stewardship within creation – arising from the doctrine 
of human election to dominion in Genesis 1:26-2819 – is a recurrent and 
presently popular one in the fields of theology and ethics concerned with 
animals and the environment. The language of stewardship is in common 
use in not only academic but also ecclesial and ordinary discourse: indeed, 
it could be said to be the default descriptor for any ethic of care involving 
nonhuman animals.20 Stewardship theology holds that humans, being 
special creatures, are entrusted to be stewards of God’s creation, 
responsibly managing the nonhuman creation as an act of faithfulness to 
God.21 This is tied to an understanding of God as King: much as household 
stewards would be responsible for overseeing the running of a house for a 
temporal master, humans are to oversee the running of creation for its 
Creator.22 In this way, stewardship is essentially a positive formulation, 
affirming our duties to nonhuman animals rather than our authority over 
them. Humans, created imago Dei and granted dominion, have a 
responsibility of stewardship to all creation, including (but not limited to) 
other animals. It is not surprising that the language of stewardship is 
popular; but is it theologically appropriate? In this chapter I will examine 
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 Gen. 1:26-28 – “Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our 
likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping 
thing that creeps upon the earth.’ So God created humankind in his image, in the image of 
God he created them; male and female he created them. God blessed them, and God said 
to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over 
the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves 
upon the earth.’” 
20
 This becomes apparent if we look at where and how animals are mentioned in the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church and the Lambeth Conference documents. In the 
Catechism, animals are treated in four clauses (2415-8) under the heading “Respect for 
the integrity of creation” – nonhuman animals are grouped with “plants and inanimate 
beings” (2415) and stewardship is directly cited as legitimating “reasonable” use of 
animals for human ends. In Lambeth 1998 (Resolution I.8), human responsibilities to other 
animals are mentioned as a sub-clause of human “responsibility for caring for the earth.” 
The excessive anthropocentrism that leads to nonhuman animals being collapsed into 
‘nature’ – in no way distinct from a tree or river – is well-served by stewardship theology. 
21
 See Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
22
 See Richard Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology: Rediscovering the Community of Creation 
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010). 
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some current models of stewardship, in the course of which I will highlight 
some potential problems that such models can raise for Christians 
concerned with nonhuman animals. In this way I intend to answer the 
question: do stewardship’s inherent problems outweigh the way in which it 
recognises a duty to (although not a relationship with) the nonhuman 
creation?23 
The two primary problems with stewardship examined here are 
anthropocentrism and monodirectionality. Within theologies of stewardship, 
anthropocentrism is often caught up with the exclusivist claim that one or 
more capacities is not merely unique to humans, but sets them apart from 
the rest of creation in a normative way. This can be seen in the near-
exclusive emphasis on human particularity, responsibility, and relationality 
within creation – nonhuman animals can be beneficiaries of human 
responsibility, but they are not recognised as relational individuals 
themselves and so how we relate to them, and our shared mutuality, are 
not treated seriously. This reduction of the animal can also be seen in 
stewardship models of ecotheology, with their focus on environmental 
sustainability: such models seem incapable of recognising other animals as 
individuals to whom humans might be responsible, as opposed to elements 
of a monolith which humans are called to manage. The rejection of animal 
relationality24 is tied to the second ‘problem with stewardship’: the 
monodirectional picture of relationality such models are built upon, wherein 
responsible human action within creation is an act of responsibility to God 
only – and not, it is argued, to fellow animals. 
From considering the problems associated with stewardship, I will 
move to reflect on the anthropomonism and claims about human 
distinctiveness which can become caught up with such theologies; before 
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 How, exactly, this duty of care is understood is one of the problems associated with 
arguing from a generalised understanding of “stewardship”. Does the responsibility to 
care mean only that humans are called to avoid unnecessary exploitation of other 
creatures; or that humans are to avoid exploiting other creatures under all circumstances; 
or that we have a duty to actively manage creation’s resources (ensuring biodiversity, 
etc.)? These are just three ways one could conceptualise a duty of care, and each will 
create significantly different ethical methodologies at the point where theology becomes 
praxis. 
24
 ‘Animal relationality’ refers to the ways, means, and meaning of nonhuman animals’ 
relationships within creation. To abrogate animal relationality, then, is to deny – implicitly 
or explicitly – that nonhuman animals have relationships in any way which is theologically 
meaningful. Such an argument is not to be rejected out of hand, but when it is made on 
the grounds that animal relationality is not fully comprehensible to humans – and so 
therefore must not be theologically meaningful – an arrogantly exclusive claim is made 
about human importance within creation. 
Page 26 of 287 
entering into a conversation with the work of animal theologian Andrew 
Linzey, whose account of human responsibility and theos-rights marries 
stewardship and anthropocentrism in a way intended to be sympathetic to 
nonhuman animals. In concluding the chapter, I propose that Linzey’s 
model, although more tenable for theologians concerned to think about 
other animals, retains a monodirectional drawing of responsibility which 
might undermine claims about human-animal mutuality: therefore, I argue, 
a more developed account is needed. 
 
Stewardship, Ecotheology, and Animal Particularity 
It might be suggested that one reason for stewardship’s predominance 
within theologies concerned with humanity’s place in creation is the 
common criticism levelled at the Christian doctrine of dominion. This is the 
allegation that the notion of human dominion over creation has created and 
normalised, whether in itself or via corruption of the doctrine in practice, an 
abusive human attitude to nature.25 By casting dominion in the language of 
service and responsibility, stewardship might in this way be seen as an 
answer to the critique of dominion-as-exploitation. This claim deserves to 
be taken seriously, if for no other reason than the historical prevalence of 
interpretations of dominion which read it as legitimating exploitation. I would 
argue, however, that this is not the whole picture – in fact, it does not need 
to be the picture at all. 
Michael Northcott, whose environmentally-focused theology is 
explored in this chapter, fashions an argument in defence of the doctrine of 
dominion. He argues that the focus on personal salvation which grew out of 
the Reformation (in some contexts), an essentially self-centred approach to 
faith, gave rise to self-oriented understandings of the world – including an 
instrumentalist view and treatment of nature.26 This moves the burden of 
blame from scripture to later interpreters, and is a valuable augmentation to 
any one-dimensional understanding of the causation behind 
anthropomonist attitudes to the environment. Attention to the subsequent 
and broader Enlightenment privileging of human rationality would also 
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 See for example Lynn Townsend White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”, 
Science 155.3767 (1967), 1203-7. 
26
 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 220.  
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provide nuance in this regard.27 Northcott’s claim that, “Whenever secular 
modernity encounters traditional culture and religion, it tends to disrupt and 
corrode harmonious human relations with nature, and the religious 
sensibilities and rituals by which these relations were traditionally 
sustained,”28 is a valid criticism of modernity, and a valuable warning about 
letting ‘progress’ override tradition, but in romanticizing the past Northcott 
neglects the reality pre-modern societies were not innocent of 
environmental exploitation: the deforestation of Europe, for example, was 
largely pre-modern.29 That said, Northcott is not aiming here to attribute 
blame for environmental exploitation anywhere but scripture: rather, he 
aims to complexify the picture of humanity’s distorted relationship with the 
environment, highlighting how anthropomonism can distort theological 
accounts of creation. 
Attempting to counter such distortions, Northcott’s environmentally-
conscious theology is concerned with the impact of human activity on the 
environment, understood either at the micro-level of local ecologies or the 
macro-level of creation-as-environment. This is valuable to Christian 
theology which desires to be praxis as well as theory, and which 
furthermore recognises the commonality of all God’s creatures. It should be 
noted, however, that Northcott is not concerned with the particularity of 
individual animals. With specific attention to the ethical question of 
vegetarianism, for example, his focus is on how abstention from farming 
and eating nonhuman animals might impact on environmental variables 
and problems like climate change. This is as far as Northcott takes his 
stewardship – management of the Master’s resources – and it remains 
unclear whether a stewardship model of ecotheology can ground concern 
for specific nonhuman animals. 
                                                          
27
 The legacy of Rene Descartes, who (in)famously proclaimed that nonhuman animals 
were automata – performing a logical fallacy based on the recognition of a profound and 
unbreachable epistemological distance between us and other creatures – should not be 
underestimated here. Clough argues that Descartes’ mechanistic and dualistic depiction of 
nonhuman animals appealed to Christianity not least because it fit in with the existing 
patterns of human-nonhuman relationality (including a growing appreciation of human 
science’s ability to dominate nature) and, furthermore, exculpated those who killed or 
otherwise abused animals. David Clough, On Animals: Volume 1; Systematic Theology 
(London and New York: T&T Clark, 2012), 138-40. Cf. Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering 
Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 45-9. 
28
 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 84. 
29
 Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages: A Completely Revised and 
Expanded Edition of Medieval History (London: HarperPerennial, 1994), 564. 
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Northcott draws attention to the scriptural understanding of nature 
as a divine gift: Jeremiah30 links ecological devastation with the 
abandonment of proper worship of YHWH, and Isaiah31 sees such 
devastation as “the consequence of the human rebellion against the 
created order and goodness of nature.”32 Returning to the book of Genesis, 
The story of the exile from Eden... affirms that the created order 
contains within it a potentiality for goodness and harmony despite 
the occurrence of so much natural evil, pain and suffering, and that 
humans are not fundamentally in conflict with the created order, nor 
with one another or God. The story also offers its hearers or readers 
grounds for resisting humanly originated evil and domination, both 
in its oppressive effects on human societies, and its destructive 
effects on the non-human world.33 
Elsewhere, the Sabbath of the land in Leviticus 25:1-7 extends the concept 
of a rest day to the land itself, protecting nature from human over-
indulgence. The fertility of the land is in this way portrayed as coming not 
through human manipulation but through God’s creative and sustaining 
love, to the extent that legislation is enacted insuring against the ill-effects 
of human enterprise. Humans take what God gives; but, just as the Lord’s 
Prayer teaches that we ought to pray only for our “daily bread” (Mt. 6:11), it 
might be that taking too much from creation undermines the creaturely 
effects of grace and providence, and can in this way be understood as an 
act of rebellion against God.34 There is, in short, an order to the biosphere 
that humans have a duty to preserve, despite being a part of that biosphere 
themselves. Problems arise, however, when ecotheologians reach definite 
                                                          
30
 Jer. 5:23-25 – “But this people has a stubborn and rebellious heart; they have turned 
aside and gone away. They do not say in their hearts, ‘Let us fear the Lord our God, who 
gives the rain in its season, the autumn rain and the spring rain, and keeps for us the 
weeks appointed for the harvest.’ Your iniquities have turned these away, and your sins 
have deprived you of good.” 
31
 Isa. 5:8-10 – “Ah, you who join house to house, who add field to field, until there is 
room for no one but you, and you are left to live alone in the midst of the land! The Lord 
of hosts has sworn in my hearing: 
Surely many houses shall be desolate, large and beautiful houses, without inhabitant. For 
ten acres of vineyard shall yield but one bath, and a homer of seed shall yield a mere 
ephah.” 
32
 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 170-1. 
33
 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 179. 
34
 In this way, claiming too much of God’s bounty for oneself can be understood in the 
language of sin-as-pride, seen in Israel’s rejection of manna in the desert (Num. 11), and 
decried by Augustine in his writings against Pelagius. See Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: 
Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 185. 
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conclusions about the shape of those duties (often involving ecosystem 
and/or biodiversity maintenance).35 Where, to take just one example, do we 
draw the line between efficient stewardship and technocratic intervention; 
even perversion? The most troubling confusion with regards to animals in 
particular is the respective weights placed on biodiversity and ecosystem 
maintenance in relation to the value of the life of the individual animal: the 
duty human stewards have towards their Creator can too easily become 
conceptualised as maintaining ecological balance. 
The emphasis on stewardship-as-environmental-management is a 
point at which Andrew Linzey has criticised ecotheology; particularly in its 
iterations which equate is with ought when it comes to observing nature, 
and so argue that the presence of predation among nonhuman animals 
means that eating other animals is morally unproblematic for humans.36 
Linzey’s criticism of environmental approaches to theological ethics – which 
share his understanding of humans as stewards but are concerned with the 
whole environment rather than individual animals – is not that they are 
anthropocentric, but that they are unrealistic in their portrayal of what 
human creatures (limited, sinful animals) are capable of. Although there are 
loci where we can identify human practices which definitely harm the 
environment – among the most potent of which is cattle farming37 – Linzey 
sees the majority of environmental concerns, such as ecosystem 
management and maintenance of biodiversity, as outside the realm of 
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 See for example the process theology of Sallie McFague, wherein the individuality of 
both human and nonhuman animals is challenged by the conception of creation as the 
body of God. McFague’s is a relational theology which subsumes particularity into 
relationality, while apparently subverting even God’s own body to human control – to 
leave part of creation free of human control is deemed a sinfully anti-relational act. Sallie 
McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1993),  viii, 44-55; see also the ecotheology of Richard Cartwright Austin – Beauty of the 
Lord: Awakening the Senses (Atlanta, GA:  John Knox, 1988). 
36
 Andrew Linzey, “So Near and Yet So Far: Animal Theology and Ecological Theology”, in 
Roger S. Gottlieb (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 348-61 at 352. Chris Southgate himself argues this: see Chris 
Southgate, “Protological and Eschatological Vegetarianism”, in Rachel Muers and David 
Grumett (ed), Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and 
Theology (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 247-65 at 249. Chapter 3 furthers 
Linzey’s criticism of ecotheology in the course of reflecting on the tensions present in the 
theological understandings of creation and nature. 
37
 See for example Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, “Livestock’s 
Long Shadow – Environmental issues and options” (2006). This UN report includes, to 
select just two statistics from the wealth of data therein, the facts that one acre of land 
used to farm cattle will produce 20lb protein, compared to 261lb if used to farm rice; and 
that 1921l water is needed to produce 1kg rice, compared to 100 000l needed to produce 
1kg beef. 
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human competence to secure.38 Particularly critical of instances where 
ecosystem management is seen to legitimate the culling of a specific 
species, Linzey points out that regardless of whether we believe ourselves 
to be acting in the interest of the whole environment, we manifestly do not 
know what the interests of the whole actually are; and neither are we 
capable of understanding the long-term impact of our actions.39 To de facto 
value the preservation of species diversity over individual animals despite 
these realities, then, is not simply hubristic but is a utilitarian denial of 
animal particularity: “Conservationists see species, but they fail to see 
individual animals that deserve our protection.”40 
It would appear, then, that the most gracious stance stewardship 
theologies can take towards nonhuman animals is to attend to them as 
species; valued for their environmental contribution but not as individuals 
with whom humans are called to relationship. In the words of Richard 
Bauckham, “Stewardship puts us in authority over, but not in community 
alongside and with other creatures.”41 For Jenkins, “deputyship, even if 
humble and accountable, still separates humanity from the rest of 
creation... Moreover it justifies interventionist, controlling dominion by 
appealing to a picture of God as a distant monarch.”42 Although it may be 
debatable as to whether stewardship accounts necessarily justify 
interventionist and controlling dominion by humans, their inherent 
anthropocentrism and monodirectional image of human responsibility – 
coupled with Christendom’s historical record in this regard – suggest this is 
not an unfair criticism for Jenkins to raise. Stewardship implies 
monodirectional responsibility to God, and we are to care for creation 
because God does. There is no impetus towards the extension of our 
responsibility-to-God into our creaturely relationships; no seeking for the 
transformation of ourselves, or of the relational networks within which we 
live and move. Further still, God is distanced from God’s own creation, by a 
model which transmits responsibility from God to humans and from there 
onto creation. 
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 Linzey, “So Near and Yet So Far”, 356. 
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To view the words of Augustine through a lens that admits more 
than the human to be our neighbour; “Whoever thinks that he understands 
the divine Scriptures or any part of them so that it does not build the double 
love of God and of our neighbour does not understand it at all.”43 Note the 
language used here: Augustine is not talking of love for God, as a result of 
which we seek to care for our neighbour, but of the love of God which 
human creatures can seek to live out in their relationships within creation. 
Stewardship can blunt this double love, and accompanying multidirectional 
responsibility, in the case of human-animal relationships. When we talk of 
Christian discipleship as the call to love God and our fellow humans, there 
is a clear relationship between these responsibilities: without the work of 
God’s grace, we could not escape the depths of sin which disorder our 
willing,44 and so we could not truly love other humans. When talk turns to 
the nonhuman creation, however – animals and inanimate creatures – 
stewardship models propose that we care for creation not because we are 
sanctified by grace and so propelled towards love of the nonhuman, but 
because our love of God means we cannot refuse the duty of care for 
God’s other creatures (who we are not called to love themselves). 
Multidirectional responsibility is conspicuously absent, as is any recognition 
of shared mutuality: stewardship as traditionally formulated divorces human 
creatures from creation, denying the possibility of theologically significant 
relationships outside the interhuman. 
Christopher Southgate offers a model of stewardship which draws 
more from New Testament ethics than from the environmental concerns of 
the Hebrew Bible. Stressing God’s concern for the entirety of creation,45 
Southgate outlines a theological ethic of “other-regard” drawn from the 
Pauline corpus: this is the imperative to do good beyond the boundaries of 
one’s community, involving potentially costly self-giving and a particular 
concern for the poor.46 Note that the poor here are not just those enduring 
fiscal difficulties but those suffering from illness or deprivation, physical or 
mental, and those whose future flourishing is threatened or negated. It is 
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this last category which most interests environmental or eco-theologies: 
both the animal creation and creation-as-environment might be said to have 
their future potential severely jeopardised by abusive and unreflective 
human practices. Southgate’s other-regarding model of stewardship is a 
fundamentally relational one, being interested not in macro-level 
management but in the needs of others: if nonhuman animals were 
recognised as relational individuals under such a model (which they are not 
under Southgate’s own formulation), stewardship’s problems of 
anthropocentrism and monodirectional responsibility could be mediated. 
Jürgen Moltmann, presenting a vision of stewardship as vocation 
and mediation, maintains multidirectional responsibility and human 
creatureliness by using the language of calling and priesthood: 
If human beings stand before God on behalf of creation, and before 
creation on behalf of God, and if this is their priestly calling, then in 
a Christian doctrine of creation human beings must neither 
disappear into the community of creation, nor must they be 
detached from that community. Human beings are at once imago 
mundi and imago Dei. In this double role they stand before the 
sabbath of creation in terms of time. They prepare the feast of 
creation.47 
Despite recognising human creatureliness and the real possibility of 
relationship with other animals, however, the notion of humans as priests 
for creation remains problematic. Like more conventional understandings of 
stewardship, it claims too much for human capacities within creation, as 
well as isolating the nonhuman creation from God by means of a 
procedural hierarchy. Even to say simply that humans articulate the praise 
of nonhuman animals is to arrogantly claim too much for ourselves, for our 
understanding of how God relates to God’s other creatures (and they to 
God), and for human distinctiveness within creation. How do humans 
articulate the praise of nonhuman animals? Is their praise taken up into 
ours? This would seem to claim more for human speech than it deserves; 
whereas, as Barth astutely recognised, “The human significance of speech, 
of the human mouth and human ear, depends absolutely upon the fact that 
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man and his fellow speak to one another and listen to one another.”48 Does 
God, Creator of all animals, really rely on human communication to 
understand when the wild animals honour God? The prophet Isaiah does 
not believe so.49 Such an understanding of humanity as ‘standing between 
God and creation’ denies the possibility of meaningful relationship between 
God and God’s nonhuman animal creatures, who are seen as requiring the 
human animal to perform for them what scripture attests they are capable 
of doing themselves.50 
If the church is to grow in its understanding of what Christians are 
called to be in the world, closer attention needs to be paid to the dynamics 
of human-nonhuman relationality; of how human and animal flourishing 
within creation are bound up together, and what types of relationship are 
therefore most proper for the humanity of the human and the animality of 
the animal. Stewardship as traditionally conceptualised does not provide an 
adequate base from which to begin a theological exploration along these 
lines. In affirming a responsibility to the nonhuman creation, stewardship 
models can be a valuable corrective to harmfully anthropocentric theologies 
which place the human creature as the sole criterion of value within 
creation. As has been noted, however, understandings of dominion as 
stewardship can serve to undermine the particularity and relationality of 
nonhuman animals, depicting human responsibility as monodirectional. 
Part of the reason why this can be the case lies in theological 
anthropology – namely, those elements of theological anthropology 
concerned to articulate human distinctiveness within creation. When 
arguments are made along these lines, the doctrines of dominion and 
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human creation imago Dei – central to stewardship theology – are used to 
make the case for human superiority over other creatures; and so the 
building blocks of stewardship theology come to subvert claims about 
animal value and relationality. In turning to think more closely about how 
human distinctiveness within creation is described and defended, I aim to 
identify where stewardship is (and where it does not need to be) 
problematically anthropocentric. 
 
Theological Anthropology and Human Distinctiveness 
The concerns raised thus far, over monodirectional responsibility and the 
denial of animal particularity, illustrate the dangers inherent to theologies of 
stewardship; but also, more broadly, to certain anthropocentric theological 
formulations. Anthropocentrism is, to an extent, unavoidable. Being human 
creatures who struggle to understand the inner workings of our fellow 
humans, let alone those of other species of animal, it is to be expected that 
the theologies we write are human-centred (and self-centred!) to a degree. 
There is a distinction to be made, however, between anthropocentrism 
which is primarily concerned with human responsibility, and 
anthropocentrism which claims exclusivity for human responsibility and 
relationality. Anthropomonism, being an ontological claim that humans are 
the sole criterion of value in creation, is but the most extreme outgrowth of 
this latter form of anthropocentrism. Models of stewardship, in exhorting 
concern for the nonhuman creation, are not easily described as 
anthropomonist; but they are perhaps too close to it for comfort. By 
emphasising human responsibility to God, and depicting the duty of 
stewardship as merely a transaction between human and divine, the 
nonhuman is conceptualised as a ‘second-rate’ creation. The particularity 
and capacity for relationship of nonhuman animals are therefore neglected, 
with the end result that appropriate reflection on our relationships with and 
responsibilities to them is undermined. 
It is unfortunate that questions surrounding anthropocentrism within 
theology and ethics have been (historically and presently) obfuscated by 
what is commonly read as one of the most significant tasks of theological 
anthropology: this is the of articulating humanity’s distinctiveness within 
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creation.51 I will first consider theological discussions concerning human 
distinctiveness, and their impact upon understandings of human-animal 
relationality: David Clough and David Cunningham are instructive 
conversation partners to this end. From that base, I will engage with the 
work of Andrew Linzey, whose account of human responsibility to other 
animals – rooted in theological anthropology and a reading of stewardship 
– offers a corrective to the detrimental impact of exclusivist 
anthropocentrism on animal theology. 
Neil Messer has written that “A theologically satisfactory account of 
proper human conduct in respect of non-human animals will have to be 
teleological in character.”52 That is, our understanding of how we ought to 
relate to the animal creation should be shaped by a proper understanding 
of human and animal ends; what we are here for. Messer writes that 
Aquinas’ threefold hierarchy of natural ends is the model most commonly 
used today, whether explicitly recognised or not: this view separates the 
created order into those that just exist (e.g. plants), those that procreate 
and raise offspring (e.g. animals), and those that live in ordered rational 
societies and know God (i.e., humans). The imperfect are intended to serve 
the perfect, and so, broadly speaking, we kill plants for animals and kill 
animals for humans.53 As will be explored in more detail in chapter 3’s 
discussion of the Incarnation, such a hierarchical account of creation raises 
questions about God’s being for God’s creatures: if the ‘lower’ beings in this 
feudal categorisation are to be subordinated to the ‘higher’, even to the 
extent that the interests of the lower are collapsed into those of the higher, 
what does this suggest for what Christians claim about God – that God is 
for us, and we are for God, and so are called to exist in relationship? If 
human creatures are afforded a unique status within creation, such that the 
God-human relationship is wholly separate to the relationships between 
God and God’s other creatures, then the problems a hierarchical reading of 
creation raise will be minimised: that is, if humans are understood to be at 
the top of the created order but also separate from it, then the notion that 
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the lower is to be subordinated to the higher has no normative influence on 
understandings of how humans relate to the divine. With that being noted, 
however, it must also be highlighted that even a brief survey of creation, 
sin, grace, covenant, Incarnation and reconciliation – such as that 
performed in chapter 3 – suggests that such an exclusive status for 
humanity would have to be the product of an unrealistic and non-theological 
anthropology. 
 In his systematic theology on animals, On Animals, David Clough 
puts forward a critique of theological accounts of human distinctiveness that 
do as much to denigrate the nonhuman creation as they do to delineate the 
human. Aiming particular criticism at ‘Chains of Being’ such as Aquinas’ 
hierarchical account of creation,54 and noting the considerable difference 
between the Platonic underpinnings of such an account and the 
presentation within scripture of human-animal commonality,55 Clough 
moves from a survey of key voices in the tradition – including Philo, Origen, 
Celsus, Calvin, and early modern readings of “dominion” – to the argument 
that 
It is not difficult to find Christian theologians stating that human 
beings are God’s sole or primary purpose in creation. It is harder, 
however, to find good theological argument in defence of this 
proposition... At every point, the central Christian concern to preach 
the good news of God’s love for human beings seems to be 
unnecessarily allied with contemporary philosophical and social 
pressures, emphasising anthropocentric views of the universe. The 
weight of theological opinion that human beings are God’s aim in 
creation, therefore, is not matched by a similar weight of theological 
argument.56 
In light of Clough’s indictment of accounts of human distinctiveness which 
owe more to “philosophical and social pressures” than to scripture, 
tradition, and the work of theology, it is instructive to turn to David 
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Cunningham. Cunningham has criticised – in the course of a 
deconstruction of susbtantialist understandings of human creation imago 
Dei57 – theological acceptance of common cultural presumptions about 
human superiority to all other animals.58 These are typically rooted in a 
given capacity or function, from ‘sentience’ to ‘tool use’ to ‘awareness of 
mortality’, which is identified in order to draw an absolute and categorical 
line between ‘humans’ and ‘other animals’ – an approach which Slavoj 
Žižek, drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, criticizes as unhelpfully 
(and unrealistically) reductive.59 Alisdair MacIntyre agrees: 
Theories about what it is that distinguishes members of our species 
from other animal species... may seem to provide grounds for the 
belief that our rationality as thinking beings is somehow 
independent of our animality. We become in consequence forgetful 
of our bodies and of how our thinking is the thinking of one species 
of animal.60 
Presenting an alternative model of how best to understand our relation to 
creation, Cunningham points to Genesis 1 as a reminder that a sharp 
distinction between humans and other animals is only  one way to image 
the diversity of creation: after all, he argues, humans were not gifted a 
unique day for their creation but were formed at the same time as all other 
land animals;61 to which it might be added that humans were formed from 
the same material,62 and given the same breath.63 
Cunningham is equally sceptical about what human creation imago 
Dei means for our place in creation, pointing out that in Genesis 1:26, 
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imago Dei is not explicitly denied to the animals, and that image-language 
itself is relatively rare in the Hebrew Bible. When present in the New 
Testament, it typically refers not to humankind in general but Christ in 
particular:64 perhaps, then, the distinction is between God and all God’s 
creatures?65 Furthermore, Cunningham argues, the language of image is 
not the language of fixed designation: do we define ‘image’ in terms of 
physical representation, character, attitude, manner, and so on? Who 
judges, and how exact can any subjective judge be? In chapter 3, I will 
explore in more detail the distinction between substantialist accounts of the 
imago Dei (which claim the imago Dei is substantially present in the human 
creature) and relational accounts (which understand humans as called to 
live in the image of a dynamically relational God). At present, it suffices to 
note, along with Cunningham, that when our attention turns to the imago 
Dei, our limited understanding of God means that the archetype for what is 
imaged is not available for comparison.66 Scripture witnesses that humans 
are created in God’s image; but the form, content, and measure of this 
remains undefined. 
Avoiding the language of image, and the potentially anthropomonist 
implications thereof, Cunningham suggests that we instead talk about flesh. 
The language of flesh appears more frequently in the Bible than that of 
image, and when it does God is frequently described as being in 
relationship with “all flesh”.67 The language of flesh communicates what 
unites humans with other animals as well as what separates them;68 and, 
lest we forget, flesh is what Christ shares in the Incarnation with all flesh,69 
all of which suffers and will be redeemed come the kingdom. Raising 
serious questions about the premise that human creation imago Dei 
constitutes our ontological and relational divorce from other animals, 
Cunningham concludes that we should be reflexively aware of our 
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anthropomorphising tendencies with regards to God; and resultantly 
sceptical of any anthropocentric worldview. 
As humans, we have a responsibility to the rest of creation rooted in 
our relationship with God. Genuine relationship exists in both directions – 
with God and with our fellow creatures – and so it is appropriate to talk of 
God and God’s creatures cohabiting a network of relationality, within which 
humans have a special role which nonetheless does not separate them 
from their fellows. And if, implicated in and constrained by the corrupted 
relational networks which constitute this fallen creation,70 we will never 
achieve perfection in our creaturely relationships, we can recognise that our 
very fallenness renders our relationship with other animals more like that of 
one human to another than of God to humankind. I turn now to the theology 
of Andrew Linzey, whose theology contains a similar understanding of 
human distinctiveness in creation, arguing as he does that humans are not 
completely apart from their fellow animals, but are instead called to be the 
“servant species”. 
 
Andrew Linzey: a Different Kind of Stewardship? 
Although exhibiting a primary concern with the human creature, and its 
responsibilities within God’s creation, the work of animal theologian Andrew 
Linzey presents a model which differs from more conventional theologies of 
stewardship. Linzey reads Genesis 1 as indicating the common creation of 
humans and other animals, highlighting how the vegetarian diet of Genesis 
1:29 precedes the dominion granted in Genesis 2:15: our dominion, he 
argues, does not justify abuse and exploitation of the animal creation. “The 
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Page 40 of 287 
characteristic thrust of scripture certainly distinguishes between animals 
and humans but it does so in such a way that the commonality of both is 
also stressed in relation to creation as a whole.”71 Adhering to the 
traditional assumption of human uniqueness among the animal creation – 
and in this way diverging from (for example) Clough, who is cautious about 
any model which distinguishes in a binary fashion between “humans” and 
“animals”72 – Linzey argues that the position of authority into which humans 
were elected is a position of responsibility. Called to live as Christ in the 
world, humans created in God’s image are to play the role of the servant 
species; making sacrifices if necessary (even if all that is sacrificed is the 
satisfaction of base appetites) for those species lower in the created 
order.73 “Lordship – from a Christological perspective – is inextricably 
related to service.”74 Christ’s sacrifice, Linzey argues, did not abolish the 
need for animal sacrifice75 but inverted it, being the willing and loving 
sacrifice of the ‘higher’ for the ‘lower’. Our relation to other animals, 
supposed to be modelled on this sacrifice, has gone astray: “The unique 
moral capacities of humans demand of them a loving and costly 
relationship with the natural world.”76 
Tied into Linzey’s take on stewardship is his model of “theos-
rights,”77 a theological reconception of the rights-language more commonly 
associated with animal rights philosophers such as Peter Singer78 and Tom 
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Regan.79 Linzey proposes that creation exists for God, and God is for 
creation: all creatures are therefore blessed in relation to the Creator, and if 
this is so then humans – created in God’s image – cannot do other than live 
for creation, imitatio Dei. Humans must do what other creatures cannot: we 
must “honour, respect and rejoice in [other creatures]... If God is for them, 
we cannot be against them.”80 
Animals have God-given rights. But it is vital to grasp the theological 
logic underpinning this position: Animals are God’s creatures, they 
have intrinsic value not just as collectivities but as individuals. The 
Spirit is the source of their life and some creatures are endowed 
with God-given capacities for intelligence and sentiency. Humans 
are made in God’s image, and we are given power over animals, 
which, Christologically-interpreted, is the power of God to care for 
them as God himself cares. In speaking of their “rights” we 
conceptualise what we owe to them objectively as a matter of 
justice because they are God’s creatures.81 
Put simply, all animals have a right to be valued as God values them. 
Linzey does well to avoid many of the theological dangers associated with 
the adoption of the secular-liberal language of “rights”,82 but the problem 
                                                                                                                                                   
created, became flesh for, and will redeem all creatures – to live for the other in a way 
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sceptical of any deontological maxim such as that upon which utilitarianism hangs: 
Christian ethics is teleological, focused toward the penultimate end of serving God in the 
world and the ultimate end of the kingdom. 
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limited or ‘deficient’ rationality – foetuses, babies, those suffering from mental illness or 
learning disabilities, and indeed animals – can receive rights only insofar as they reflect 
the interest of ‘fully rational’ human beings. Another potential pitfall is that rights-
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remains that rights-language itself does no more to call humans to relate to 
other animals than do the traditional formulations of stewardship upon 
which Linzey builds. Animals’ rights are grounded as our duty to them as an 
act of fealty to God – “what we owe them objectively as a matter of justice 
because they are God’s creatures” – and in this way the language of theos-
rights continues to distance humans from the nonhuman creation. Animals 
have rights because God says so: concerns remain, despite Linzey’s claim 
that animals have value as intrinsic individuals, that their particularity – and 
therefore the potential for transformed relationship with them83 – is in this 
way undermined. 
Stephen Webb has been critical of what he perceives as a 
theological accommodation of the ‘animal rights’ movement. Webb 
suggests that if all creatures have the intrinsic right to be valued as God 
values them, then one of two things is true: either God values animals 
differently and therefore has favourites (meaning that this is the model 
humans should adopt in their relations with the animal creation), or humans 
are incapable of living up to God’s love.84 For example, I cannot value an 
ant or a rat or even a dog as much as I value my mother; and if I met 
someone that could, my reaction would more likely be one of consternation 
than admiration. This should not be surprising:85 born imperfect and 
inextricably bound in the distorted relational networks which testify to sin’s 
perpetual presence in creation, we are incapable of living up to God’s love 
through our own willing. More simply, we cannot love as God loves (just as 
we can’t know as God knows) because we are not God. Therefore, Webb 
argues, if neither of the two possibilities he has raised are acceptable, then 
the language of theos-rights may not be the best way for Christians to 
promote animal welfare. 
                                                                                                                                                   
language essentially seeks to argue from similarity (animals are similar to us in these ways, 
and therefore we should care for them); a position which is again theologically 
problematic if we are to take seriously the wondrous diversity of God’s creation, all of 
which God is responsible for and all of which God declared good. 
83
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I disagree with Webb that the human inability to value others as 
God values them is sufficient reason to abandon the talk of rights 
altogether. When we say the Lord’s Prayer, we ask God to forgive us our 
sins as we forgive those who sin against us. Do we claim, in so doing, to be 
able to forgive as God forgives? The answer is clearly (one would hope) in 
the negative. Should the Lord’s Prayer then be abandoned as an 
unworkable model of Christian living? Regardless of whether we can reach 
the ideals we draw from scripture, tradition, prayer, and worship (which, as 
fallible beings, we cannot), the ideal is what we are called as disciples of 
Christ to strive towards. The necessity of faith, worship, the formation of 
character in community, and – above all – justification and sanctification 
through grace, lay clear the intimate relationship between our sinfulness 
and our calling to be perfect as our Creator is perfect.86 
This is not to say that there is no better way to conceive of human-
animal relationality within creation: indeed, where Webb accuses Linzey of 
going too far, I would suggest that the continued under-emphasis on animal 
particularity means Linzey has not gone far enough. Webb proceeds to 
argue that, for theology, any talk of abstract “rights” must be “preceded by 
and grounded in acts of charity,”87 which are themselves rooted in an 
understanding of grace and the proper human response to it. “We strive for 
excellence of practice, knowing that we can never earn the excellence of 
grace.”88 Theological accounts of human-nonhuman relationality like those 
advanced by Linzey, Cunningham, and Webb emphasise human 
distinctiveness and dominion as necessarily leading to human responsibility 
for creation; a responsibility which involves our being the servant species, 
and so living out “good Christian stewardship for all of God’s Creation.”89 To 
use Webb’s language, this is indeed a charitable reading of human 
dominion within creation; if, that is, one has already accepted that human 
creation imago Dei and election to dominion creates in every way a clear 
and absolute line between human and nonhuman animals. Our shared 
mutuality, and the ways in which our flourishing connects to and depends 
upon theirs, find little room in such an argument. 
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Linzey’s emphasis on theos-rights, rooted in the language of ‘higher’ 
and ‘lower’ creatures, can in this way be understood as a Christological 
reading of human stewardship. We see, at the Cross, that God’s attitude to 
the whole creation is generosity: he gives humans the strength to resist evil 
by becoming human. Christ’s sacrifice was that of the higher being for the 
lower,90 and this must be the paradigm for human dominion as outlined in 
Genesis 1:26.91 Human creatures are totally dependent upon and helpless 
before God, and yet God’s grace justifies and sanctifies us: this is the very 
nature and etymology of grace, coming as it does as a gift which cannot be 
earned. Following this pattern, seeking to fulfil our creation and election 
imago Dei, humans are called to be present for creation as Christ is – here 
dominion entails service, responsibility, and stewardship rather than 
domination. Furthermore, for Linzey, God’s nature as creator and sustainer 
of all means that God cannot only enter into human suffering. The 
crucifixion – and the resurrection, and what it inaugurates – was and is for 
all creation: where there is suffering, God suffers too. And as creatures 
made imago Dei, “the uniqueness of humanity consists in its ability to 
become the servant species.”92 
Linzey’s animal theology, itself anthropocentric, supplements the 
conclusion that anthropomonist theologies are to be rejected. Whether it is 
sufficient to stop at this point, as Linzey does – and so leave unquestioned 
the implicit hierarchy of creation, wherein human responsibility is not a call 
to genuine relationship with other animals but an act of responsibility to 
God – is another question entirely; and one I hope to answer. Contra the 
ecotheologians, Linzey’s understanding of stewardship is one which 
recognises that nature is creation fallen, that humans cannot restore 
creation, and which therefore aims to care as God cares for creation’s 
creatures at an individual and relational level.93 Whether or not we accept 
Linzey’s depiction of stewardship – which retains the image of humans as 
representative of God in creation94 – the serious concerns he raises about 
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ecotheologies are worth remembering. Linzey does not make exclusivist 
claims about human particularity or relationality, but the inherent 
monodirectionality of stewardship theology leaves the difficulty of talking 
meaningfully about animal relationality intact. 
 
Conclusion 
To consider how best to move forwards from the stewardship theologies 
examined in this chapter towards a relational account of the human place in 
creation, it is worth returning to Neil Messer; namely, to the four “diagnostic 
questions” he poses for responsible theological anthropology. What attitude 
does our action manifest towards the material world? Is the course of action 
an attempt to conform to the imago Dei or to become sicut Deus (like 
God)? What attitude does our action manifest towards past human failures? 
Is our proposed action good news for the marginalised?95 Self-awareness 
and reflexivity are paramount to a theology of human-animal relationality; 
and at the heart of this self-awareness is the knowledge that we are not 
and cannot be sicut Deus. I would add to this: not only are human creatures 
not sicut Deus, but neither are we a bridge between heaven and earth,96 
and nor are we the tenant-managers of God’s creation. We were created in 
God’s image and are called to respond to our Creator, but if we are to avoid 
lapsing into a kind of speciesist isolationism, we need to acknowledge that 
“theologically the human/non-human difference is vocational.”97 Any 
theology which advocates isolationism – be that of church from world,98 or 
of human from nonhuman – is a direct abrogation of the Lordship of God, 
who created, affirmed, and will redeem all creation. Renaissance 
philosopher Michel de Montaigne rails against what he sees as this very 
human arrogance: 
Man is the most blighted and frail of all creatures and, moreover, the 
most given to pride. This creature knows and sees that he is lodged 
down here, among the mire and shit of the world, bound and nailed 
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to the deadest, most stagnant part of the universe, in the lowest 
storey of the building, the farthest from the vault of heaven; his 
characteristics place him in the third and lowest category of animate 
creatures, yet, in thought, he sets himself above the circle of the 
Moon, bringing the very heavens under his feet. The vanity of this 
same thought makes him equal himself to God; attribute to himself 
God's mode of being; pick himself out and set himself apart from the 
mass of other creatures; and (although they are his fellows and his 
brothers) carve out for them such helpings of force or faculties as he 
thinks fit... We are so much more jealous of our own interests than 
of those of our Creator that not one of us is more shocked when he 
sees himself made equal to God than reduced to the ranks of the 
other animals [emphasis mine]. We must trample down this stupid 
vanity, violently and boldly shaking the absurd foundations on which 
we base such false opinions. So long as Man thinks he has means 
and powers deriving from himself he will never acknowledge what 
he owes to his Master.99  
It is a recurrent problem in exclusively anthropocentric theology that the 
human creature is cast as unique, not only in its relationship with God, but 
also in its capacity for relationship among other creatures. In chapter 3, I 
outline a theology of human-animal relationality which maintains human 
uniqueness in our power and responsibility within creation, while at the 
same time recognising the profound commonality between humans and 
other animals. Such an account is sympathetic to Clough’s claim that 
To conceive of our place as separate to that of all other animals... 
risks ignoring key aspects of what it means to be human that 
intersect with what it means to be animal. It is therefore important to 
recognise that humans dwell in the place of animals before God, 
though they occupy a distinctive territory within it.100 
Mindful of this, I intend to move away from traditional formulations of 
stewardship by emphasising that our response to God requires not only 
attention to the dynamics of inter-human relationality (striving to will as God 
wills in our inter-human relationships) but also of human-animal 
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relationality. In this way, I affirm the particularity and relationality of 
individual nonhuman animals; the necessary foundation for then moving (in 
chapters 4-5) to consider what kinds of relationship are proper for the 
humanity of the human and the animality of the animal. Our responsibility is 
not to God and other humans at a relational level, and then – derived from 
our responsibility to God – to the environment at an administrative level. 
Our responsibility is to God, at the level of worship, and from there to all 
creatures, in both their particularity (in so far as we can understand it) and 
their involvement in the wider networks of relationship which constitute 
creation. 
According to Webb, “A theology of animals must be dialogical, both 
committed and open... rooted in an experience of grace.”101 Reflecting on 
the myriad ways in which our relationship to the nonhuman animal creation 
is distorted and corrupt, Norman Wirzba notes how far we are today from 
being rooted in such an experience. 
The brokenness of creation and the degradation of its food webs 
demonstrate that we have hardly begun to understand what real 
intimacy is and what it requires. The disrespect and the violence 
with which we treat the world’s human and nonhuman eaters shows 
that for many of us the grace of intimacy is hardly yet a taste.102 
The grace of God and the grace of intimacy are a direct assault on the kind 
of anthropomonism Montaigne takes to task in the above excerpt – the 
absurd notion that because we were made in God’s image we are, 
ourselves, mini-Gods, and the rest of creation is therefore infinitely below 
us. To experience grace is to know that what we have, all we have, is 
gift;103 and furthermore that we are infinitely closer to our fellow animals 
than we are to our mutual Creator. In the words of Barth, “Those who 
handle life as a divine loan will above all treat it with respect.”104 It would 
appear, then, that any effort to construct a theological account of human-
animal relationality requires a deeper and more holistically relational 
anthropology than is present in the stewardship theologies examined thus 
far. What it means to be human – created imago Dei, trapped in the depths 
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of sin, freed by grace, called to relationship, called to be perfect, promised 
reconciliation and redemption – will therefore underpin what it means to be 
human in relationship with nonhuman animals. On the theological 
framework of these opening chapters, I aim to build an ethic of dietary 
pacifism: if I were to construct this ethic without considering theologically 
what it means for humans and animals to be in relationship, I would risk 
maintaining the monodirectional understandings of human relationality 
within creation that I hope to subvert. If this were so, I could not claim to 
have satisfactorily answered Messer’s third diagnostic question: that is, 
what attitude does the theological work done here take towards past 
failures? As it is, I hope to find positive answers to all four of Messer’s 
questions; and it is through systematic theological reflection on human 
relationality that I hope to discern those answers. 
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3. God’s Relational Creatures 
A Theology of Human-Animal Relationality 
 
In chapter 2, I surveyed a number of theological models of stewardship, 
concluding that despite their value for challenging harmfully anthropocentric 
anthropologies, they retain a number of problems for Christians concerned 
to think about how they relate to nonhuman animals. Key among these was 
the complaint that, by emphasising human action within creation as an act 
of responsibility to God alone, stewardship theology renders itself “purely 
vertical”;105 undermining efforts to recognise our responsibilities to, and 
shared mutuality with, other animals. In this chapter I take a step towards 
remedying this, constructing a relational theology concerned with human 
relationships with both humans and other animals. The ultimate claim I 
seek to make is that Christians are called to live and will as God lives and 
wills in relation with other animals (as well as with humans, and with the 
wider environment); and that this will require attention to the particularity of 
the animal other, including the things we share with other animals and the 
things that differentiate us. From there, and in conversation with pacifist 
theologian Stanley Hauerwas, I will outline the dietary implications of this 
theology; for Christians as individuals, and for churches as communities. In 
this chapter, in conversation with Stanley Grenz, G. C. Berkouwer, Al 
McFadyen, and David Clough, among others, I engage with doctrines of 
human creation imago Dei, the Trinity, Incarnation, sin, covenant, and 
eschatology. 
The construction of a theological account of human-animal 
relationality begins with the doctrine of creation; specifically, of human 
creation imago Dei. This follows and expands the discussion in chapter 2 
about theological articulations of human distinctiveness, and how these 
articulations affect notions about the particularity and relationality of 
nonhuman animals. From here, the relational interpretation of human 
creation imago Dei – the notion humans are called to live for others in 
relationship – will be outlined and defended. This defence will involve 
consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity, whose divine interrelationship 
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underpins relational theology. Upon these foundations, other doctrines – 
Incarnation, sin, covenant, and eschatology – will be explored. It is not my 
aim here to construct anything like a systematic theology of animals106 or of 
relationality:107 there are already excellent works along these lines, and in 
any case I lack adequate space in this chapter to do so. Rather, my 
intention is to draw out and reflect upon theological understandings of 
human-animal relationality. Questions about what the Incarnation means 
for human relationality, whether or not nonhuman animals are capable of 
sin, what God’s covenantal activity with other animals means for our 
relationships with them, and how human-animal relationality might be 
transformed come the eschaton all serve this end. More than this, they 
furnish the central argument of this chapter – that the human calling to will 
as God wills in a fallen world is not limited in scope to interactions within the 
relational networks that constitute human society alone. 
 
In God’s Image: the imago Dei and Human-Animal Relationality 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, human creation imago Dei – 
particularly, the substantialist interpretation of what God’s image involves – 
has long been equated with human distinctiveness within creation. Taken to 
an extreme, the central place given to human creation imago Dei108 in the 
creation narratives can overshadow the significance of God’s creative act 
itself – in other words, our being created in God’s image can come to 
obscure the significance of our being creatures. This is largely due to the 
older, substantialist understanding of human creation imago Dei,109 wherein 
the image is perceived as something essential to the human creature: 
opposite to the relational understanding of the divine image, the 
substantialist reading focuses on the imago Dei as an ontic reality in human 
creatures as they are now.110 God’s image is most commonly identified in 
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the ‘superior’ capacities of reason and volition:111 if deemed to have neither 
of these,112 nonhuman animals are infinitely distant from humans, whose 
creation imago Dei lifts them above and separates from their fellow 
creatures. In the City of God, Augustine diagnosed humanity as halfway 
between animals and angels, on the grounds of our reason: 
Man is a kind of mean between beasts and angels. The beast is an 
irrational and mortal animal, the angel is a rational and immortal 
one, and man is between them, lower than the angels but higher 
than the beasts: a rational and mortal animal, having mortality in 
common with the beasts and reason in common with the angels.113 
Commenting on the substantialist imago Dei, and the way it separates 
humanity from creation, David Cunningham calls it “the most significant 
theological justification for claiming a significant distinction between human 
beings and other creatures.”114 As discussed in chapter 2, however, 
Cunningham rejects the substantialist interpretation on scriptural, 
theological, and philosophical grounds. Interestingly, he does not engage 
with the substantialist tendency to equate God’s image with what is typically 
considered to separate humans from all other animals. As was the case for 
Augustine, this has often been described as our advanced rationality: 
understood in this way, the model of imago Dei can become a tool to 
support anthropocentric (even anthropomonist) worldviews.115 William 
Greenway has noted that 
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We are tempted to turn the unmerited gift of our creation in the 
image of God into a claim of greatness, into a reason not to love 
those who are not our equals. We often resemble the man in the 
parable of the unmerciful servant, who owed a king a great debt, 
was forgiven it, and then did not extend the same grace to those 
beneath him.116 
As the reference to the parable of the ungrateful servant suggests, one 
possible criticism of the substantialist understanding of the imago Dei is 
that it appears dangerously hubristic, claiming understanding of God’s 
nature117 and elevating human creatures closer to their Creator than is 
scripturally warranted.118 G. C. Berkouwer noted, and criticised, this when 
he wrote that 
It is regrettable that the valid emphasis in the dogma of the image of 
God in the wider sense [that is, what makes humans distinctively 
human] has often taken on the form of an analysis of the ontic 
structure of man, e.g., as defined by person, reason and freedom. 
For it is undeniable that Scripture does not support such an 
interpretation. Scripture is concerned with man in his relation to 
God, in which he can never be seen as man-in-himself, and surely 
not with man’s “essence” described as self or person.119 
The impetus to live transformed lives, arising from humble thanksgiving, is 
endangered by any reading of the imago Dei which seeks to locate the 
divine image as something innate to the human creature, and not a state of 
being from which humanity has fallen. In the conclusion to chapter 2, 
Michel de Montaigne was quoted, lamenting the self-centred hubris of 
substantialist accounts of the human, and arguing that “So long as Man 
thinks he has means and powers deriving from himself he will never 
acknowledge what he owes to his Master.”120 These powers deriving from 
oneself are those allegedly unique human faculties which substantialist 
interpretations attribute to the imago Dei – although gifted to humanity by 
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God in creation, our rationality (for example) is now fundamental to human 
beings and not dependent on our relationship with our Creator. If the image 
of God is thought to be innate to us, there is a risk that our debt to the God 
whose image we bear will not be adequately acknowledged, and right 
response to the Creator not given. Pace Augustine, I believe we can say 
with reasonable confidence that at least some nonhuman animals have 
rationality and agency of a kind; and therefore might be spoken of as 
relational and responsible beings. 
This is not a maverick claim, separate from the scriptural witness. 
The prophets and psalmists tell us of the nonhuman creation honouring 
YHWH: in Deutero-Isaiah, God proclaims that “the wild animals will honour 
me” in response to his providing “water in the wilderness, streams in the 
desert.”121 In response to God’s restoration of God’s chosen people, 
making the uninhabitable places once again inhabitable, the wild animals 
honour their Lord.122 It is this very response, the performance of different 
behaviour in response to different external stimulus (praising God in 
response to water in the wilderness), that suggests both rationality and 
relationality. Or take the book of Job: when God answers Job’s questioning 
with the recitation of a list of animals outside Job’s control, animals with 
lives of their own who look only to God and not humans for sustenance – 
animals such as the horse who “laughs at fear, and is not dismayed”123 – 
Job is reminded of his place.124 This place is simultaneously that of a 
creature worthy of God’s response, and of only one creature among 
many125 who look to their Creator and exercise responsibility of a kind.126 
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Even in the act of creation, when God made humans in God’s image, we 
hear that both humans and other animals receive the breath of life – 
nephesh hayyah. This is the witness of scripture, even if numerous 
translations, from the KJV to the NRSV, have obscured this reality in subtle 
and not-so-subtle ways, often rendering nephesh hayyah as “living soul” or 
“living being” with regards to humans and “living creature” with regards to 
nonhuman animals.127 Such translations form part of the exegetical process 
Clough describes as a preference “for the coherence of a particular 
thought-world over attending properly to the lives of other animals,”128 
consistent with neither the scriptural witness nor (as discussed below) 
modern ethology. 
The book of Jonah is rich in witness to the complexity of God’s 
nonhuman animals. A human creature is elected by God to a distinct task 
within creation, and initially and repeatedly refuses to undertake it. But 
nonhuman animals have their part to play in Jonah’s prophetic calling; from 
the whale who intervenes in the ocean crossing, to the pack animals of 
Nineveh whom YHWH expresses explicit care for. God cares for God’s 
creatures, who are shown to exert agency and even bear responsibility of a 
kind; and this demonstration of God’s love for all animals is reminiscent of 
the instruction to Noah to ensure the survival of more than the merely 
human.129 In contrast, Jonah does not even consider the fate of Nineveh’s 
nonhuman animals.130 Jonah is emblematic of humanity within creation: 
powerful, elected to live in God’s image and so live in relationship; but 
reluctant to take up the responsibilities of that election, and keen to reduce 
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the scope of his moral concern when possible. The same cannot be said for 
the king of Nineveh, who not only hears the judgement of YHWH and 
responds to it in the affirmative, but involves the animals of his city in the 
rituals of lament and confession. “Human beings and animals shall be 
covered with sackcloth,” he decrees, “and they shall cry mightily to God” 
(Jon. 3:7). The responsibility of nonhuman animals to their Creator, and the 
commonality and relationality they share with us, are affirmed in the king’s 
order of repentance. 
The field of cognitive ethology provides numerous data augmenting 
the scriptural witness. From his studies of wolves at play, Marc Bekoff has 
concluded that, “It’s not unusual to see known mating behaviours 
intermixed in highly variable kaleidoscopic sequences along with actions 
that are used during fighting, looking for prey, and avoiding becoming 
someone else’s dinner.”131 In play, as in other activities, myriad gestures 
and forms are reused and thus transfigured through these variations of 
combinations, suggesting real interaction and real reaction. Play is 
spontaneous, reactive, and educative; it rewires the brain and hones 
cognitive skills;132 fair play is encouraged and cheaters excluded;133 the 
‘bow’ used by individual wolves to initiate play is reused as an apology if 
one bites too hard;134 larger and stronger individuals use self-handicapping 
and role-reversal to ensure everyone involved can play safely.135 Examples 
from other species abound: inequity aversion in capuchin monkeys;136 
magpie funerals;137 an elephant matriarch slowing down the herd so a 
crippled younger elephant could keep up138 – in all these cases individual 
animals of some species respond to other individual animals both internal 
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and external to their family units in ways suggesting agency and degrees of 
accountability.139 
Having examined similar data about animal capacities and agency, 
Clough argues that “What we now know about non-human capacities 
makes clear that we have much more in common with other animals than 
we previously thought... [These] new areas of knowledge constitute a 
remarkable scientific illustration of the theological affirmation of the 
commonality of living things.”140 Later in the same book, Clough goes on to 
defend himself against the claim that he is denying that “humans possess – 
like all other animals – a unique and distinctive combination of capacities 
and attributes that make us what we are.”141 He is, however, denying – and 
I would join him in this denial – that the human animal is totally separate 
from all other creatures: “humans dwell in the place of animals before God, 
though they occupy a distinctive territory within it,”142 as do all animals. 
My argument here is not that there are no differences between 
human beings and other animals... My objection is to the routine 
and thoughtless, theological or philosophical, drawing up of a list of 
attributes supposedly possessed by all human beings, and 
excluding all non-human beings. In the first place, many of the 
entries on such lists are inaccurate: the more we understand about 
the lives of other creatures the more obvious it becomes that 
intelligence, rationality, self-consciousness, relationality, morality, 
culture, and so on, and so on, define at best a spectrum of ability on 
which different creatures can be placed at different points. To 
believe ourselves to be the unique possessors of such attributes 
misleads us, both by underestimating the capabilities of the 
creatures erroneously denied possession of these attributes and by 
inaccurately characterising the particularity of the human.143 
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In short, humans are distinct creatures of God; as are cows, crows, snakes, 
wasps. Our distinctiveness might be argued to lie in our creation imago Dei, 
or our election to dominion, reception of revelation, or even freedom to 
respond to grace (constrained by temporality and sin as that freedom may 
be). Wherever it lies, however, our distinctiveness is not uniqueness apart 
from other animals: it is uniqueness among animals, and to make more of it 
than is warranted – to claim that it separates humanity from creation – is to 
arrogantly overstate our status as creatures of God. As Clough argues 
elsewhere, 
Christians have no reason for insecurity about the place of human 
beings in God’s good purposes, and no need to establish their 
identity at the cost of diminishing the importance of others of God’s 
creatures. We stand in need of a theological account... not only to 
do justice to the particularity of the other creatures God made 
alongside human beings, but to rescue theological anthropology 
from implausibility and incoherence as well.144 
The construction of a theology of human-animal relationality is a task which 
neither affirms nor denies human distinctiveness within creation. Rather, it 
affirms that human distinctiveness cannot be affirmed by denying either the 
particularity of other animals or the relationality we share with them. Just as 
stewardship does not need to be defined in monodirectional terms, neither 
does human distinctiveness need to be defined by denying the presence of 
certain capacities in other animals. This is particularly so when said 
capacities (e.g. rationality) are empirically observable in at least some parts 
of the animal creation. Human creation imago Dei is not a doctrine which 
requires the depiction of nonhuman animals as irrational or non-relational. 
Having established this, we turn now to consider more closely the doctrine 
of the Trinity: through reflecting on the dynamic relationality of the triune 
God, the implications of recognising animal relationality are further 
unpacked and explored. 
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The imago Trinitas and the Dynamic Relationality of God 
Having established the insufficiency of the substantialist account of the 
imago Dei, and having held up the relational interpretation as a valuable 
alternative, it will be instructive to look more closely at the interrelationship 
of the triune God, in whose image humanity was created. Our relationship 
with God – that between Creator and creature, affirmed by Barth and 
Brunner as the root and shaper of human relationality145 – needs to be 
understood in the context of the relationship of the Trinitarian persons. 
Father, Son, and Spirit are unique and distinct; and yet mutually 
perichoretic.146 Although unique and distinct, the Trinitarian persons are 
intimately involved with one another, their mutual interpenetration co-
existing with their separateness in a dialectical and mysterious communion 
which Christians, individually and corporately, are called to imitate. 
Alistair McFadyen has written elegantly on human relationality in 
God’s image, presenting a model for understanding the triune God as a 
community of individuals-in-relationship. In this model, the Trinity is “a 
unique community of Persons in which Person and relation are 
interdependent moments in a process of mutuality.”147 Each person of the 
Trinity is distinct and particular, but this particularity does not undermine 
mutuality and is no bar to relationship: indeed, the terms of personal 
identity within the Trinity are also relational terms. 
Father, for instance, denotes both a specific individual and the form 
of relation existing between Him and the other Persons... The 
Father, Son and Spirit are neither simply modes of relation nor 
absolutely discrete and independent individuals, but Persons in 
relation and Persons only though relation... The three divine 
Persons are united by sharing uniquely in a common nature. By 
sharing in this common nature they are all equally divine; by doing 
so in an asymmetrical manner, each is uniquely divine.148 
In all theological anthropology, our understanding of God grounds our 
understanding of what it means to be human. Arguing in The Call to 
Personhood that “personal identity and individuality are never asocial nor 
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prosocial, but arise out of one’s relation and community with others,”149 
McFadyen applies his theology of the Trinity in this way; going on to clarify 
that living for others does not, and should not, involve the collapse of one’s 
individuality into one’s relationships. 
This discreteness and independence, however, must not be 
understood as a reservation from genuine and as complete self-
presence as is possible and appropriate; it is not a reservation of 
their being but the designation of the difference and individuality of 
the partners.150 
Indeed, McFadyen is concerned by historical (and current) manipulations of 
the human calling to live for others, by individuals and systems which 
exploit others’ self-negation. Patriarchal cultures, where women are 
expected to bear suffering and hardship as their particular calling;151 and 
the excessive focus on the other (as object for either service or exploitation) 
which can become a coping mechanism for victims of abuse,152 are 
examples of this. McFadyen understands such harmfully corrupt 
relationships – which draw parallels with factory farming,153 ignoring the 
particular needs of the oppressed other and the mutuality shared with them 
– as manifestations of our present condition of original and perpetual sin.154 
To serve the other, but to do so without either collapsing them into 
ourselves (i.e., viewing our relationship with the other through a lens of 
selfish concern) or ourselves into them (i.e., denying our own particularity in 
order to accommodate them),155 is the relational end to which the human 
creature is called and exhorted by grace. It is this relational ideal – to be in 
relation in such a way that both differences and similarities are recognised, 
and the flourishing of all parties is the intended end – to which Christians 
are called with respect to nonhuman, as well as human, animals. The 
dynamic relationality of God, in which humans hope, pray, live, and 
worship, is the image through which humans are to understand their own 
relationality and that of their animal brothers and sisters; and it is in the life 
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of the church, the body of Christ, that humans learn what it is to love God 
and love their fellows. 
The dynamics of God are oriented towards all of humanity, the 
universal human community. Just as the dynamics of God in 
salvation and creation are unrestricted, unbounded and universally 
extensive, so the responsibility and commitment of human beings 
energised by these dynamics is similarly unrestricted: a universal 
solidarity in the dynamics of creation and salvation, and therefore 
also of sin.156 
The relational understanding of the Trinity is not exempt from criticism: 
Karen Kilby extends the criticism previously levelled at the substantialist 
imago Dei – that it claims for humans too deep an understanding of God’s 
nature – to readings of the Trinity which place, for her, too great an 
emphasis on the relationships of the Divine Persons.157 In response to this 
criticism, Matthew Levering points to John 14-15,158 arguing that Jesus’ 
explanation of the Son’s relationship to the Father roots a human 
understanding of the Trinity – however limited such will inevitably be – in 
the practice of love-in-relationship.159 Such a view is supported by Jürgen 
Moltmann, who comments on creation that 
In the free, overflowing rapture of his love the eternal God goes out 
of himself and makes a creation, a reality, which is there as he is 
there, and is yet different from himself. Through the Son, God 
creates, reconciles and redeems his creation. In the power of the 
Spirit, God is himself present in his creation – present in his 
reconciliation and his redemption of that creation.160 
The Trinity is perichoretic; not only in its internal relationships, but in its 
external relationships within creation. God freely chose to create, including 
in creation creatures with whom God could genuinely be in relationship; 
humans, unique among creatures in that we can choose whether or not to 
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respond to our Creator. What the Father created, the Son redeems, 
through his salvific and history-shattering act; and what the Son redeems, 
the Spirit brings towards ultimate reconciliation. Looking both forwards and 
backwards in time, and looking at the ongoing transformation worked by 
grace in and with and for the world, a call to live imago Trinitas thus 
understood is a call to live out right relationships, with a view to how things 
were and how they will be. In the words of Norman Wirzba, “While the 
Trinity does not yield a specific plan of action, it does give the contours of a 
vision for what relations between creatures ought to be.”161 
 It is important to note that even if the primary orientation of the 
divine relationality is towards human creatures – as McFadyen argues – 
this does not preclude God’s being in relationship with nonhuman 
creatures, and neither does it preclude the possibility of relationality 
between humans and other animals. This is a parallel to the reality that 
God’s orientation towards the church – God’s people in the world – neither 
precludes God’s striving for relationship with those humans outside the 
church, nor the possibility of genuine relationship between Christians and 
non-Christians. It is not only humans who exist within, impact upon, and are 
shaped by distorted networks of relationality; and it is not only in inter-
human relational networks that Christians are called to live for the other. 
Through communal worship of the triune God, and ultimately 
through God’s grace and Spirit, humans learn and are formed into patterns 
of relationality which set them outside the distorted and self-oriented 
networks which constitute the world: but it is in all creation that we are 
called to live out the implications of this sanctification. We are called to will, 
not as the world shapes us to will, but as God wills; and at the heart of the 
divine will is the dynamic relationality where three are one in relationship, 
but are yet particular. In the words of Gilbert Meilaender, “Our task is 
nothing less than this: to achieve within human life the love that is a dim 
reflection of the life of God.”162 If living imago Dei is understood as a 
relational calling, a move to relate to God as we are supposed to and not as 
we, marred by sin, actually do,163 it is to be expected that an affirmative 
response to God’s offer of grace should transform not only our relationship 
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with our Creator but our relationships and responsibilities within creation.164 
We image God in life in community; and we also image God by living out 
transformed relationships elsewhere. 
Writing on the relational understanding of God’s image with respect 
to nonhuman animals, Daniel Miller proposes that, “We choose to answer 
or reject the divine call or the call of creaturely neighbours. This ‘call’ and 
‘answer’, to use Brunner’s terminology, is what makes humans 
responsible... [C]reation in the imago Dei distinguishes us from other 
animals, but it does not truly separate us from them.”165 Miller argues that 
the freedom to respond (or not) to God is the marker of human 
distinctiveness; but that nonhuman animals also respond to God, albeit 
passively. As Barth says, “As man thanks God and is man in so doing, he 
does no more and no less than all other creatures do with their life.”166  
Taking this claim further than Barth might have done, Miller argues that in 
responding to God, however passively (i.e., having no freedom to not 
respond),167 nonhuman animals become worthy of Christian moral 
attention.168 
 What is problematic about Miller’s account is that, despite 
attempting to bring nonhuman animals into the sphere of Christian moral 
concern, it leaves intra-species relationality, and the assumption that 
animals are not intrinsically valuable, untouched. By moving from the claim 
that animals are passively in response to God to the argument that this 
means they can only be passively responsible even to others of their own 
species – by directly linking the choice to respond to the “divine call” and 
that to respond to the “call of creaturely neighbours”169 – Miller in fact 
begins to move back towards the substantialist understanding of the imago 
Dei. If nonhuman animals are only passively responsible, even within their 
own families, what rationality do they have? To claim that animals cannot 
be actively responsible in any sense is to claim that they are irrational and 
without agency, and to cast ‘active responsibility’ as a uniquely human 
faculty which absolutely separates us from our fellow creatures. 
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We have considered, in conversation with McFadyen, that human 
relationality is most readily formed into God’s image within a human 
community striving to live for God170 – and that, therefore, we better 
understand who we are through relationships with our fellow humans than 
through our interactions with other animals. It does not follow from this that 
there is nothing to be learned from human-animal relationships; and neither 
does it follow that, because nonhuman animals do not choose to respond to 
God, they do not exercise responsibility of a kind in other creaturely 
relationships. To make such a claim would be analogous to the argument 
that humans are incapable of being responsible agents in their human 
relationships without being in relationship with God. For sure, our 
relationality will be impoverished – and hostage to the perpetuality of sin – if 
we do not seek to discern God’s will, but this does not mean that non-
Christians in every time and place are incapable of agency or relationality. 
Neither are nonhuman animals – who praise God in their very being – 
incapable of relationality of a kind within creation. Any understanding of the 
imago Dei which leads to a more exclusive conclusion than this retains at 
least some substantialist element. 
 It has been a concern that attributing agency and relationality to 
nonhuman animals might endanger humanity’s distinctiveness within 
creation. Barth laid great theological weight on this distinctiveness when he 
wrote that “the being of man is plainly separated and distinguished from all 
others,”171 a statement to be understood in light of his claim elsewhere that 
“We venture a bold conclusion by analogy if we understand animally 
vegetative... life as life in the same sense as human.”172 Barth’s 
foundational theology of “covenant before creation” does give statements 
such as these nuance: Barth’s claim is not that humans are distinct from all 
other animals in our biological nature, but through the grace of God – a 
claim I would not disagree with. Given this emphasis, however, it is 
regrettable that Barth would not leave the door open to the theological 
exploration of animal relationality, in light of God’s covenantal activity with 
nonhuman animals (about which more will be said below). 
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Contra those whose primary concern is to defend human 
distinctiveness, I propose that recognition of animal relationality is coherent 
with the relational understanding of the imago Dei, in a way which does not 
endanger but better defines humanity’s place within creation. This is so 
precisely because our likeness to God is fundamentally relational: we are 
called to live out relationships which are proper for our humanity and the 
humanity of our fellows, to achieve as best we can in our relational 
networks the mutual flourishing and interdependence which is characteristic 
of the Triune God. In relationship with other animals – over whom we have 
relative worldly power – the call is much the same, being towards 
relationships which are proper for the humanity of the human and the 
animality of the animal, rejoicing in our shared mutuality as creatures of 
God. My humanity is at stake in how I relate to other animals, because I am 
called to love and relate as God does: if I allow my power over them to 
excuse treating them destructively and without love, I elect to remain in sin 
and so turn down the hand of grace. 
A thankful response to God’s offer of grace can transform our 
relationality, so that we move from seeing others as objects for use or 
experience – as an ‘It’ – to seeing them as a ‘Thou’; a seeing informed by 
our relationship to God, the ultimate and eternal Thou.173 When we stand in 
relationship with Christ,174 hoping and striving for the sanctification of our 
worldly relationships in an effort to love as God loves,175 we are living in the 
image of God; and just as our inter-human relationships are caught up in 
our response to divine grace, so it is with how we relate to God’s other 
relational creatures. In turning next to the person of Jesus Christ, and so 
examining the Incarnation whereby we see the truly substantial image of 
God in creation, I intend to explore further what sanctification might mean 
for human-animal relationships. What, in light of the Incarnation, does it 
mean to be in relationship? 
 
“The Word became flesh” (Jn. 1:14) 
The significance of the Incarnation for any effort to construct a theology of 
human-nonhuman relationality can be posed in a question. If humans are 
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created in God’s image and called to relationship by God’s grace, what is 
the significance of God becoming human (as opposed to a turtle, say, or a 
bear)? That is, is God becoming human more significant than God 
becoming a creature? In chapter 2, I considered Cunningham’s move away 
from the language of image to the language of flesh; language which is at 
once more applicable to embodied creatures, and which furthermore is 
scripturally abundant.176 Even in Genesis, ‘flesh’ is referred to more 
frequently than ‘image’;177 and when God is spoken of in relation to flesh, 
he is spoken of in relation to all flesh. As Paul writes, “there is one flesh for 
human beings, another for animals, another for birds, and another for fish” 
(1 Cor. 15:39) – that is, there are discontinuities between God’s animal 
creatures, but through recognition of those differences the underlying 
commonality is emphasised. Humans are like other animals in some ways, 
and not in others; but as God’s covenanting with humans and other animals 
suggests, both are infinitely closer to each other than either is to the 
Creator upon whom both depend. As David Kelsey puts it, 
Creatures are even more radically ‘other’ to the Creator than the 
triune persons are ‘other’ to one another. This is a difference in type 
of ‘otherness,’ not a difference in degree of ‘otherness’: creatures 
are not divine, not God; the three persons are divine, are God.178 
Kelsey’s remark here does not specifically refer to the distance between 
humans and animals as much as that between one creature and any other 
creature: whatever our creaturely differences, though, they pale in 
comparison to the difference of all creatures from our mutual Creator. In 
this vein, Cunningham continues to use the language of flesh in turning to 
consider the Incarnation: for him, the central stress is on “the Word [that] 
became flesh and lived among us” (Jn. 1:14).179 “Revealed in flesh, 
vindicated in spirit” (1 Tim. 3:16), Christ’s becoming human was certainly 
for the sake of humanity; but this does not mean it was not also for all flesh. 
In becoming flesh, God’s perfect Word could not do other than identify with 
all flesh. This is not in any way a claim against human distinctiveness: 
rather, it is the claim that human distinctiveness is not necessarily and 
inevitably a difference-that-makes-a-difference, any more than feline or 
canine distinctiveness (say) make a difference. Jesus’ humanity and his 
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creaturely flesh are not mutually incompatible truths, as Peter Scott 
recognises when he writes that 
Jesus' humanity participates in the shared life of God and is the 
‘place’ from where he participates in God's redeeming work in the 
world of God. Moreover, by way of this humanity, which is 
constitutional for God, this Jesus is constitutive of the history of all 
creatures, human and non-human... The human reality of Jesus is 
secure both as an identity of God and as the constitutive ground of 
the participation of creatures in God's creating and redeeming. 
Creatures thereby are already placed in the humanity of this Christ 
and are directed towards the eschatological renewal of creaturely 
participation.180 
The Incarnation, as the transhistorical ground of the man Jesus’ 
participation in redemption, cannot be reduced to the specific Incarnation 
into human flesh, but is into flesh. In the words of Andrew Linzey, “The 
flesh assumed in the incarnation is not some hermetically sealed, tightly 
differentiated human flesh; it is the same organic flesh and blood which we 
share with other mammalian creatures. There is no human embodiment 
totally unsimilar to the flesh of other sentient creatures.”181 Pointing to 
Colossians 1:13-20, Ephesians 1:9-10, and Romans 8:21, Clough agrees 
with such a proposal when he writes that “the incarnation is cosmic in 
scope, rather than merely human.”182 Regarding the Incarnation’s 
particularity, Clough notes that Jesus’ gender, ethnicity, religion, and 
geographical location are not taken to be normative in determining the 
significance of God’s action in Christ: in fact, as Paul told the Galatians, in 
Christ “there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female” 
(Gal. 3:28). It is incongruous, therefore, to suppose that Jesus’ species is in 
itself determinative for the Incarnation’s significance. 
If we judge it illegitimate to discriminate between Jews and Gentiles 
or women and men on the basis of the kind of creature in whom 
God became incarnate, it seems that we should also consider it 
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illegitimate to discriminate between humans and other animals on 
this basis. Theological positions employing the doctrine of the 
incarnation to create a boundary between humans and other 
animals are misreading the particularity of the creature we know as 
Jesus of Nazareth.183 
Or, in the words of Howard Snyder and Joel Scandrett: “Paul begins with 
the fact of individual and corporate personal salvation through Christ. But 
he places personal salvation within a picture of cosmic transformation. The 
redemption of persons is thus the centre of God’s plan, but not the 
circumference of that plan.”184 
Although the creedal statement that God became human is 
accurate, to present the Incarnation solely in this way risks misleading by 
understating its cosmic significance; much as stating that God became 
male, or Jewish, would be accurate but run the same risk. Indeed, one 
could argue that any level of particularity less than the singular – such as 
“God became a Jewish man known to his associates as Jesus of Nazareth” 
– opens the door to exclusionary readings of the Incarnation’s significance. 
Clough considers John’s claim that “the Word became flesh” in light of the 
linkage between the Greek sarx and the Hebrew basar, used frequently in 
the Hebrew Bible with reference to all living creatures.185 “The fundamental 
New Testament assertion concerning the incarnation, therefore, is not that 
God became a member of the species Homo sapiens, but that God took on 
flesh, the stuff of living creatures.”186 And the Incarnation of God into flesh 
is not a spatiotemporally limited event, inaugurating and looking both 
backwards towards creation and forwards to the eschaton: in the Pauline 
hymn of creation in Colossians 1, Jesus is recognised as firstborn of 
creation, in whom all things were created, who holds all things together and 
in whom all things will be reconciled to God.187 
 If we are to accept that the significance of the Incarnation was 
primarily God’s becoming creature, and that the Incarnation is therefore 
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cosmic in its scope, does that leave us able to say anything about God’s 
becoming human? McFadyen’s reflection on the Incarnation is helpful here. 
For human creatures, God’s relationality in and for creation is seen most 
closely in the Incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Incarnate into flesh, crucified at the hands of individuals operating in 
corrupted relational networks, the resurrection that followed was “not a 
reconstitution of initial conditions in relation either to Jesus or to God’s 
relationship with humanity, [and] neither did it involve an escapist fantasy 
about the incapacity of particular, concrete events and relationships to 
effect serious damage.”188 The killing of Jesus and total collapse of 
humanity into sin are taken seriously, but met with a radical response which 
“works through reality and, instead of restoring original conditions, pours 
out the possibility of and energises a more abundant life than was possible 
hitherto.”189 This is the victory over sin God won for creation; not by erasing 
Christ’s crucifixion but by allowing his cross to stand and working through it 
in the resurrection.190 Christ’s victory is not only a meta-victory over sin in 
the sense that it reaches out to transform our corrupted and distorted 
relational networks, but also in his triumph over the arrogant willing in every 
human creature, which feeds and is fed by the corruption of these 
networks. In the words of Stephen Webb, 
The basic point of Christian theology is that the cross does not take 
away but instead reveals our sin, so that repentance, not 
celebration, is the only possible response. The cross says no to our 
amazing and infinite capacity to make violence meaningful. The 
implication for animals is enormous.191 
Although human creatures are unique in having been created imago Dei 
and called to respond to grace, we should not think that those relational 
networks which constitute creation and which God is interested in are 
limited to those made up of inter-human relationships. This much is 
recognised by Jürgen Moltmann, when he writes of the triune God’s 
presence in and for creation: 
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If the Creator is himself present in his creation by virtue of the Spirit, 
then his relationship to creation must be viewed as an intricate web 
of unilateral, reciprocal and many-sided relationships... relationships 
of mutuality which describe a cosmic community of living between 
God the Spirit and all his created beings.192 
If we are to say, then, that the Incarnation reveals God’s intimate 
relationship with creation, and in so doing inaugurates and foreshadows the 
reconciliation of all things – and if it is through Christ, therefore, that human 
creatures can begin to understand the dynamic relationality of the triune 
God193 – we cannot neglect to attend to the possibility that relational 
networks involving nonhuman animals and the creaturely networks of the 
environment are taken up in this radically new relationality as well. If the 
Incarnation is for all creation, and nonhuman animals exist within relational 
networks which overlap and interrelate with the relational networks of 
humanity, we are unable to conclude that the sanctification wrought by 
grace should be limited in its impact to inter-human relationships. Christians 
are called, in responding to the story of God and God’s people through 
history, to live for the eschaton, counter to the culture of the world194 (which 
distorts relationality by idolising individuality); rejoicing in God’s love for 
creation, understood as including but not being limited to the human 
creation. 
To return to Scott, the cosmic incarnation of God into flesh is 
“constitutive of the history of all creatures” and the “constitutive ground of 
the participation of creatures in God’s creating and redeeming.” The 
Incarnation works looking backwards as well as forwards: backwards, to 
human creation imago Dei and the transformation of relationality that 
comes through grace; and forwards, towards the eschaton and the 
formation of peaceable community and relationship there. Scott maintains 
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this dialectical construction when he writes that Jesus’ humanity is both an 
“identity of God” and the place where creatures are “placed in the humanity 
of this Christ.” The Incarnation of God into human flesh is an act of radical 
solidarity with all creation; human, nonhuman, and nonanimal. If we 
recognise this, the ultimate reconciliation195 we pray for is not limited to 
human animals: indeed, it will extend beyond the animal creation to include 
environmental considerations. In talking of the new and transformed 
relationships the Incarnation inaugurates, however, our focus cannot but 
fall on God’s relational creatures – human and (some) nonhuman animals. 
Christ, God Incarnate for all flesh,196 calls us to respond to our fellow 
animals as we strive to imitate and so internalise197 the divine relationality 
which Christ revealed; looking, praying, and acting in anticipation of the 
kingdom to come. 
Thus far, we have established that human and nonhuman animals 
can be considered relational creatures, albeit in different ways.198 Created 
in God’s image and called to live out transformed relationships in creation, 
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the recognition that some other animals are relational individuals, and that 
God became Incarnate for all creation, lead us towards the claim that 
human-animal relationships can be taken up and transformed by grace, so 
that we might look to their flourishing as we look to our own. In the next 
section, I move to reflect on the impact of sin on human-animal 
relationships: in considering the question of whether animals can be 
thought of as culpable sinners, I begin to draw a picture of the relationality 
of nonhuman animals in particular. 
 
Animal Sin 
It is worth stating, as I begin to think through animal relationality in more 
detail, that I am not concerned to define exactly where relationality and 
responsibility begin and end within a taxonomy of creation. Primates? 
Mammals? Birds? Fish? Insects? Sponges? Bacteria? The basic and 
significant point is that at least some animals can be thought of as relational 
agents;199 and that included among these are most (if not all) of those 
nonhuman animals who humans most commonly relate to, be these 
relationships positive (e.g. petkeeping) or destructive (e.g. factory farming). 
Neither am I interested to say that all animals, as individuals or as species, 
are moral exemplars. Some animals are (if judged by human standards) 
nice and some are distinctly unpleasant, but all perform according to their 
natural and agential animal responsibility. The same can be said, as 
individuals or as species, about humans – but, created imago Dei, we 
receive the offer and responsibility of grace, so that we might learn to relate 
to others as God relates to us. Created for a gracious covenant which we 
did not and do not deserve,200 human creatures are called to say ‘Yes’ to 
God by accepting grace. Through responding, in joyful worship, to the 
“dynamic relationality” of the triune God,201 we begin to learn what it means 
to respond ex-centrically in our dealings with our fellow humans;202 and 
from here, as has been argued already, we are freed to extend our new 
understanding of proper relationship as mutual flourishing outwards, into 
the animal creation. 
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Our call to respond to God does not preclude responsibility of a 
different kind in some nonhuman animals, and neither does it preclude 
relationality being something we share with our animal fellows. This does 
not, however, mean that what we call right relationship within human 
communities is the same as right relationship with or among other animals. 
For this reason, reflection on the doctrine of sin is necessary for the 
construction of a theology of human-animal relationality; and not only 
because the relational understanding of sin articulated by McFadyen and 
others highlights the extent to which human willing is distorted by the 
corrupted relational networks of the world. It is also the case, with respect 
to animal relationality, that relational accounts of sin enable deeper 
reflection on the ways in which nonhuman willing, relationality, and 
responsibility are similar to – and different from – our own. 
In his account of human personhood, McFadyen contrasts the 
relationality of God with the atomised individualism of modern liberal 
secularism. For him, “It is... freedom conceived of as consisting in 
separation that makes it so difficult generally to speak of God and world 
together, without appearing to compromise the integrity of one or the 
other.”203 Contrary to this, Christian doctrine presents sin “not as a 
phenomenon of our freedom, an object of choice, but as an unavoidable 
reality conditioning and shaping freedom”204 which we are nonetheless 
accountable for. The distortions in human willing, which we call sin, are 
taken up into the interlinked networks of relationality which we call human 
society, and more broadly the world, so that “Situation permeates will in a 
way and to an extent which makes it descriptively inadequate to name 
personal pathology... without at the same time naming the overarching 
pathological dynamics in which the person is incorporated and incorporates 
herself through her own willing.”205 As human sociality is fundamental to 
what it is to be human, being intrinsically related to one another and to 
God,206 sin is therefore understood as the perversion of this sociality;207 
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causing and perpetuated by the same over-confidence in the will’s ability to 
discern the good which Augustine saw in Pelagius.208 
At the root of the doctrine of original sin is the recognition that we do 
not begin life with a clean slate and then make a series of deliberate 
choices that result in our being awarded good or bad marks... By 
the time we are able to exercise what we think of as free choices, 
we are already deeply compromised by our pre-rational desires and 
actions, our complicity in social and historic acts of injustice and the 
many ways in which our lives are shaped by networks of 
relationship that frequently exhibit pride, selfishness and greed, 
together with any number of other sinful tendencies. In relation to 
any particular act, therefore, it is impossible to trace the extent to 
which it is free and deliberate and the extent to which it is forced or 
unwilling.209 
If we choose to follow the concupiscent desire to will not as God wills but as 
we will,210 we are drawn into willing not in accordance with our pseudo-
objective ‘conscience’ but with the distorted relational networks in which we 
live. Resultantly, we neglect God’s call for us to respond to God, and in so 
doing be formed by grace to respond to our fellows, both as individuals and 
as constituent members of the relational networks in which they move. This 
involves attending to their particularity and context,211 not forgetting our own 
particularity in the process, but not defining ourselves over-against the 
other either.212 We have already discussed the human calling to extend our 
relationality, sanctified by the grace of the triune God, outwards into the 
animal creation; an extension that involves attending to other animals as 
relational individuals. Having recognised this, we need to think in more 
detail about the relationality of nonhuman animals:213 as they are, like us, 
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imperfect creatures in a fallen creation, reflection on the doctrine of 
perpetual sin214 will be instructive in this regard. 
In On Animals, Clough looks at the question of whether nonhuman 
animals can be spoken of as sinful. He does so via an account by the 
primatologist Jane Goodall of intra-species cannibalism performed by 
chimpanzees; an account which includes explicit community disapproval of 
the cannibalistic acts, and the transmission of cannibalistic habits from 
parent to child. 
Passion attacked Gilka, Pom helped for a bit, and then while 
Passion continued, Pom seized the baby, went off with him, and – 
just as Passion did before – deliberately killed him, biting into his 
forehead. Then the cannibalistic family fed on his remains for 5 
hours, Passion taking charge of the body, Pom and Prof begging... 
Sparrow... came alone, picked up a bit of meat, after staring and 
staring, sniffed it, flung it down and vigorously wiped her fingers on 
the tree trunk. Her daughter, Sandi, did the same.215 
Can such incidents – and related ones, such as the practice within some 
species of males killing the young of potential mates – be understood as 
‘natural’216 in the purely evolutionary (i.e., amoral) sense? Clough 
disagrees: “This position seems very implausible in that it excludes from 
moral censure actions done for selfish reasons by non-human animals, 
when actions done from this motivation by humans are most of what 
concerns ethics in the normal run of things.”217 
The biblical view, evident in Genesis 9 and other texts such as Job 
38-41 and Psalm 104, is that each creature has been given its place 
within God’s creation and the Genesis 9 covenant is an expression 
of a divine expectation that creatures will live within the boundaries 
God has established for them. While non-human infanticide is not 
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prohibited in the Genesis 9 covenant, we could extend the 
metaphor of covenant to propose that infanticide as practised by 
Passion and her family is outside the boundaries of creaturely 
flourishing envisaged in the commands to be fruitful and multiply 
(Gen. 1:22, 8:17).218 
Clough’s excellent treatment of sin with respect to nonhuman animals is 
consistent with McFadyen’s relational account of sin. Human and 
nonhuman animals do not only share a capacity for relationship: we also 
share the ways in which we inhabit wider relational networks, which shape 
our character and which we in turn impact upon. In this chapter, we have 
heard of the horse who “laughs at fear, and is not dismayed” (Job 39:22); of 
wolves learning and using symbolic gestures in a reactive and interactive 
fashion; of crows who craft tools, and elephants who teach the younger 
members of their community. In accounts like these, we witness other 
animals displaying agency, communication, and relationality and 
responsibility within specific relational networks (such as in the familial herd 
of pachyderms). Within such networks, knowledge, skills, values, and 
beliefs are learned and transmitted: in the wolf packs he observes, Bekoff 
observes at least the first three of these; and in the elephant herds, local 
knowledge and foraging skills are passed from older to younger. It does not 
seem unreasonable, in light of this, to imagine that not only positive but 
also negative and harmful values and ways of living can be passed on in 
specific contexts; and if we follow such an analysis, it would appear that 
this is precisely what is happening when Passion the chimpanzee inducts 
her children into a practice their fellows find reprehensible. 
 If, like humans, nonhuman animals can be spoken of as living in 
and being shaped by relational networks, is it appropriate to talk of them as 
being sinful in a way they bear responsibility for? Clough writes: 
We might judge the ability of chimpanzees to make considered 
choices about their actions to be closer to the capacity of a human 
child than a human adult, but we do not believe that children go 
from automata to responsible subjects at a particular age and so 
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this judgement of degree is not a reason for considering 
chimpanzees outside the boundary of sinful action.219 
Nonhuman animals exhibit intra-species responsibility in a variety of ways, 
from teaching the young of their species to disapproving of or shunning the 
dangerous members of the community. Although the theology of human-
animal relationality constructed thus far suggests that the corruption of 
animal relational networks can only be understood through the language of 
sin, the question of the extent to which we can talk of animals as being 
directly responsible for sin is more complicated. Lacking even the 
constrained and distorted freedom to choose grace possessed by human 
creatures (although praising God in their very being) they might be deemed 
less culpable for improper and destructive relationships within creation as it 
is now. They remain corrupted within the world, limited in their potential to 
transcend the distorted relational networks they inhabit; and although 
humanity may be spoken of as having greater potential to live transformed 
lives this side of the eschaton, the limitation and constriction of our animal 
fellows is something we cannot fail to see mirrored in our own lives. 
Is Passion the cannibal chimp responsible to God for her actions? 
This is a question to which the limits of a human answer must be the 
disavowal of certainty. If, as Barth writes, all sin is the rejection of grace,220 
and if we are to diverge from Barth in affirming animal responsibility and 
relationality, it would seem that we are bound to return to him in affirming 
that – in their fallen state – animals can indeed be spoken of as de facto 
‘rejecting’ grace. Such a view runs counter to that of some other animal 
theologians, perhaps most notably Andrew Linzey, who writes in Why 
Animal Suffering Matters that “Animals are morally innocent”221 – a claim 
which hinges on his own minimization of animal particularity (discussed in 
chapter 2). Indeed, elsewhere in the same text Linzey claims commonality 
between animals and infant humans on the grounds that “Animals and 
infants constitute paradigmatic cases of innocence and vulnerability.”222 
Vulnerability, to be sure; but animals and infants also share a commonality 
in that they are prone to being romanticized as ‘innocent’. By biological and 
theological standards, the actions of cannibal chimps are difficult to defend 
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as innocent. Newborn humans, at least, do not have the physical capacity – 
let alone the mental – to sin by commission, but even if it is most proper to 
talk of sin with reference to adult humans, we cannot lose sight of the 
reality that all creation is fallen. 
However we might perceive and understand the actions of other 
animals, it is beyond our knowledge to say how God judges the animal 
creation. Additionally, as has been touched on in conversation with 
McFadyen, the extent to which we can say humans are free is limited by 
the distortions wrought by sin – the distortions which impact upon us, and 
which we in turn perpetuate, in the relational networks in which we live and 
move, and from which we are ultimately dependent upon grace to liberate 
us. If we recognise that nonhuman animals are involved in relational 
networks – and if we accept that human and nonhuman relational networks 
overlap in places – we are led to acknowledge our shared mutuality, seen 
here not only in a shared capacity for relationship but in the common 
deformation of our wills by sin’s distortion of the relational networks which 
we cohabit. 
In God’s relationship with creation – with human creatures who are 
called to respond to grace and so conform their will to God’s,223 and with 
the nonhuman creatures who praise God in their very being – the 
relationships are multidirectional. The same is true of humanity’s 
relationships within creation: as imago Dei, we are called to attend to the 
other with respect for their particularity and our shared mutuality.224 Grace 
allows us to simultaneously recognise our animality and our humanity: we 
are not separate from the animal creation, but we stand in a position of 
relative power and understanding that means the responsibility for proper 
human-animal relationships lies more heavily on us than on them. Just as 
Barth wrote that sin is the human refusal of grace,225 we can say that it is 
sinful for humans to follow only their animal nature when offered the 
guidance and transformation of the divine command. 
The prophetic lament that “The ox knows its owner, and the donkey 
its master’s crib; but Israel does not know, my people do not understand” 
(Isa. 1:3) illustrates well the different standards to which humans and other 
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animals are held with respect to grace.226 If our relationship with the animal 
creation is primarily determined by exploitation and corruption, it is difficult 
to claim that we rejoice in their particularity and animality as God rejoices in 
ours. The mechanised and impersonal nature of factory farming 
(considered in more detail in chapter 5) is surely one of the clearest 
examples of human sin in relation to the nonhuman creation: collapsing 
individual animals, even entire species, into their relationship to humanity – 
as food and clothing – is a wholesale denial of our shared mutuality with 
them, and a refusal to be concerned for their flourishing as animal 
creatures of God, in a manner wholly congruent with McFadyen’s 
description of sin.227 
If we are to say, with McFadyen, that it is in the depths of sin in 
creation – where the ex-centric and loving relationships God intends for us 
are most distorted – that God’s grace and active willing in the Spirit are 
most concentrated,228 we cannot neglect the possibility that the relational 
networks involving nonhuman animals and the creaturely networks of the 
environment are willed to be healed by God as well. Therefore we cannot 
fail to consider that our own sinful incurvature, the privileging of our 
appetites and those cultivated by our culture over God’s will, perpetuates 
the affliction of the animal creation. As Hosea told the people of Israel, 
“There is no faithfulness or loyalty, and no knowledge of God in the land... 
Therefore the land mourns, and all who live in it languish, together with the 
wild animals and the birds of the air, even the fish of the sea are perishing” 
(Hos. 4:1-3). Sin’s impact on creation is cosmic. 
Snyder and Scandrett put forward a relational “ecology of sin,” 
wherein human alienation from God induces alienation from oneself, which 
causes alienation from other humans, which gives rise to alienation from 
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and within nature.229 This is a useful model for displaying the ways in which 
sin works – by distancing one from God – to distance one from proper 
creaturely relationships as well. It remains problematic, however, in its 
maintenance of the troubling binary between ‘human’ and ‘nature’ noted 
elsewhere. This model contributes to human alienation from nature, leading 
individual humans to see themselves as external to nature, and so ignore 
their commonalities with the nonhuman creation as a result. Even if one is 
unsure about the lengths to which I go in this chapter, it should appear 
strange – when discussing something as fundamentally relational as sin – 
to collapse all the nonhuman creation into one ‘circle’. It is quite possible to 
debate the extent to which a dog is relational; but to portray the dog as 
being no more or less relational than a tree or mountain is reductive in the 
extreme. If we add one more relational category to Snyder and Scandrett’s 
model – alienation between humans and other relational animals – we can 
take advantage of another of their insights. This is the insight that the 
ecology of sin is an interrelated one.230 Our alienation from God, from 
ourselves, from other humans, from other relational creatures, and from 
nature do not proceed one into the other in a linear sense: whenever one 
category of relationality is distorted by sin, our whole relational person 
suffers. Sin’s systemic and perpetual presence in our relational networks 
makes it impossible for one to be healed in isolation from one’s fellows – as 
McFadyen writes, if one sins we are all responsible231 – but with God’s 
grace we can make a start, and “be part of a healing community and family, 
and part of healing causes and currents on earth.”232 
Grace, God’s pouring out of love-in-relationship, is most drawn to 
the most pathological networks of relationship in creation; and it is here that 
God is most active in God’s transformative relationship with humanity. 
Christians are called in responding to grace, through worship, to rejoice in 
creation as they rejoice in their Creator, striving to live for the world and so 
attending with love to individual animals (human and nonhuman) in the 
image of how God attends to us. Note that no value claim is made here: I 
am not arguing, for example, that acting responsibly towards a cow 
(whatever that might involve) is an exercise of sanctified relationality in the 
same way that acting responsibly towards a human is. What I am arguing is 
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that to recognise responsibility to a cow, to be concerned for her particular 
flourishing as a cow, is to act appropriately as a Christian disciple who 
rejoices in other individuals and hopes for sanctification by grace. This is 
the case whether or not we recognise that the cow acknowledges 
relationship with us. Just as Christians are called to act towards those 
humans who are incapable of relationship (such as coma patients), are 
severely hampered in relational terms (such as those with severe learning 
disabilities), or disavow responsible relationship (such as one’s enemies), 
the relationality that is transformed by living and worshipping in the body of 
Christ and the image of God can be extended to nonhuman animals. 
The statement in Proverbs 12:10, that “The righteous know the 
needs of their animals, but the mercy of the wicked is cruel,” offers another 
insight into human-animal relationality. Richard Bauckham draws a 
compelling parallel between Proverbs and Exodus 23:9, wherein the 
Israelites are reminded that they should “know the heart of an alien” 
because they themselves were aliens in Egypt. What the NRSV translates 
as ‘needs’ with respect to animals is actually the same word (nephesh) 
translated as ‘heart’ with respect to human aliens.233 This anthropocentric 
translation, parallel to that already discussed in this chapter in relation to 
Genesis 1-2, obscures the significance of the proverb. This significance lies 
not in a claim that the righteous person should know what it is like to be a 
nonhuman animal; just as the Exodus verse does not constitute a claim that 
Israelites should know the inner self of Gentiles. Neither is it simply an 
empathic command to be attentive to the feelings of animals; although it is 
certainly also this, an act of responsibility wholly other to the fake “mercy of 
the wicked” witnessed too often in the modern flesh-food industry, where 
animals are fed and treated with antibiotics not as an act of responsibility 
but in a purely economic effort to maximise the profit deriving from their 
planned slaughter and evisceration. Read in tandem with Exodus 23:9, 
Proverbs 12:10 confronts the reader with a challenging reminder of the 
extent of relationality within creation: as the Israelites knew what it was to 
be an alien because they were themselves aliens at a time, so does the 
human reader of Proverbs know what it is to be an animal because they are 
themselves an animal. When Laban fed and watered the camels of 
Abraham’s servant, even before food was offered to the man (Gen. 24:31-
33), or in the proscription against muzzling the threshing ox (Deut. 24:4), 
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one can see this in practice. As the psalmist tells us that “everything that 
breathes praise the Lord” (Ps. 150:6), human and nonhuman animals alike 
are called to joyfully recognise their Creator as fellows within creation. 
A genuinely relational act, in light of what has been argued thus far, 
is one which is in the first place attentive to one’s relationship with God 
(and so gives thanks for grace), and in the second place attentive to both 
the particularity and relationality of the other (and so treats them as a 
relational individual, with loving concern shaped by the unmerited grace 
which is extended to us). That humans, and our relational networks, are 
distorted by sin is a fundamental theological truth: whether nonhuman 
animals can be spoken of as committing sin is a more contentious question, 
but if we are to say that some animals are relational creatures, awaiting 
redemption in a fallen world, it follows that (in line with Clough) it would be 
a step too far to claim that animal sin is ontologically impossible. Having 
made the case for recognising animal particularity and relationality, arguing 
that human-animal relationships can be sanctified by grace as can inter-
human relationships, I move to examine God’s covenantal action in 
relationship with human and nonhuman animals; and the scriptural, 
foundational, and precedential examples of human-animal relationality 




In the covenants of Genesis 9 and Hosea 2, God explicitly enters into 
relationship with both human and nonhuman animals. Genesis 9235 marks 
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the first time God enacts a covenant with God’s creatures.236 Bill Arnold 
makes the point that “‘Covenant’ occurs seven times in ten verses (9:8-17), 
and the very density of the term itself makes the point: God's covenant with 
Noah is central to the post-diluvian world order.”237 Kent Hughes notes 
three themes of the Noahic covenant which are useful in describing it in 
more detail; it can be understood as universal (involving all creation), 
unilateral (dependent entirely on God), and unconditional (there will never 
be another flood).238 The universality of the covenant – which Arnold limits, 
describing it as God’s covenant with Noah – is seen in that it involves 
humans, other animals, and all generations of all creatures.239 That this 
covenant goes beyond the merely human is highlighted by the repetitive 
focus on “every living creature”, “all living creatures” and “all life”, with these 
repetitions making clear the extent of the covenant.240 The view that the 
covenant is unilateral is shared by many biblical commentators,241 and 
Clare Amos notes that this is highlighted by the fact that “throughout 9:1-17 
Noah remains completely mute, accentuating the one-sided obligation 
which God is placing himself under.”242 We might remember at this point 
Job’s ultimate muteness in the face of YHWH as his Creator lists his co-
creatures and their independence from humanity: here, too, divine-animal 
relationality is communicated in God’s covenantal action, in the face of 
which Noah is rightly acquiescent. That the Noahic covenant is 
unconditional is seen in the thrice-repeated phrase “never again”,243 as well 
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as the explicit mention of it being an “everlasting covenant”.244 This 
covenant extends to all God’s creatures, is dependent on God alone, and is 
unbreakable: in the words of Patrick Miller, it “restores and secures the 
creation for the benefit of the creatures, animal and human.”245 
The covenant of Hosea 2 continues this acknowledgment and 
extension of relationality to nonhuman animals. Here the term “covenant” 
occurs only once, but God states “I will make for you a covenant on that 
day with the wild animals, the birds of the air, and the creeping things of the 
ground.”246 The goal of the covenant – understood as part of the greater 
goal of restoration communicated in Hosea 2, and coming on the back of 
some animals serving God against humanity247 – incorporates some of the 
same ideas as the Noahic covenant, including “freedom from harm from 
animals, and freedom from harm of humans.”248 Robert Murray suggests 
that Hosea’s writer “saw the covenant as that of cosmic renewal and peace 
rather than any other model.”249 This cosmic peace involves (at the very 
least) a covenant involving God and both human and nonhuman animals. 
In Hosea 2, unlike Genesis 9, it should be noted that there is no explicit 
mention of God even covenanting with humans; only for humans, with 
nonhuman animals.250 Given that a covenant involves a relatively clear 
demarcation of relationship – and as such can be termed a relational 
network of its own, within which God’s creatures live and serve their 
Creator – what does God’s covenantal activity with nonhuman animals 
mean for human-animal relationality? 
One specific element of what it means to covenant has been 
highlighted by James Scott: “Generally speaking, the term, “covenant” 
indicates a special relationship that is based upon commitment, in which 
obligations and promises are included, and which contains both qualities of 
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dependability and permanence.”251 That a crucial idea of what it means to 
be in covenant is to be in relation is a point which has been noted by a 
number of biblical scholars and theologians: others, such as Bruce Waltke 
and W.J. Dumbrell, suggest instead that a covenant confirms a pre-existing 
relationship.252  With regards to the covenant found in Genesis 9, the pre-
existing relationship is found in Genesis 1, through God’s act of creation 
and blessing253 – a creation and affirmation which was not limited to 
humans. Reflecting on the cosmic nature of God’s covenantal action, 
Murray states that “though creation was not expressed in explicitly 
covenantal terms..., already there was [an] emphasi[s] on the relationship 
of humankind to God and to the animal orders.”254 In the case of Genesis 9, 
the only active partner is God. Yet the passive nature of being a covenantal 
partner with God suggests not only relation between God and creation, but 
also relation between all the passive members; between human and 
nonhuman animals. Scott notes that in translating bĕrît as “covenant”, we 
have lost something of the original meaning, which would have been an 
emphasis on a binding relationship.255 Peter Golding likewise notes that the 
emphasis on a “bond” is inherently relational, and suggests that even in 
Gen. 9 and Hos. 2 where the parties involved include animals, “it is still a 
‘bond’ that is being established with them.”256 
In addition to this more general understanding of covenant as 
relational, Frank Cross has proposed an idea of covenant which is rooted in 
kinship, arising from his recognition that “the social organization of West 
Semitic tribal groups was grounded in kinship. Kinship relations defined the 
rights and obligations, the duties, status, and privileges of tribal members, 
and kinship terminology provided the only language for expressing legal, 
political, and religious institutions.”257 Part of what kinship meant was 
upholding the welfare of one’s fellow kinsman, and redeeming them in 
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times of need, as well as being loving, just and generous to them.258 Amos, 
discussing Cross’ work, suggests that in covenanting with both human and 
nonhuman animals, God was, “in effect, ‘adopting’ the other party as kin, 
and agreeing to accept the mutual obligations inherent in kinship.”259 
Through covenanting, God became (using Cross’s term) the Divine 
Kinsman.260 Cross is not alone in his presentation of covenant as closely 
related to familial ties. D. J. McCarthy states “there is no doubt that 
covenants, even treaties, were thought of as establishing a kind of quasi-
familial unity. In the technical vocabulary of these documents a superior 
partner was called ‘father’, his inferior ‘son’, and equal partners were 
‘brothers’.”261 Though this is stronger language than other relational 
discussions of covenant, the idea is the same: by God’s self-chosen action, 
God covenants not only with humans, but with all God’s creatures. 
 If we understand covenant as inherently relational, it is only rational 
to suggest that in covenanting with a group, the members of that group are 
valued and cared for. Various theologians have commented on the care 
that God has for creation, as seen through God’s covenantal action in 
relation to it. Claus Westermann suggests this is an “unconditional 
approval” by God towards creation;262 Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests that 
God both preserves and cares for each individual creature;263 and David 
Fergusson notes that in the covenant of Genesis 9 “God offers care to all 
creatures”.264 The relational significance of God’s covenanting with 
nonhuman animals265 is further emphasized by the Anglican Church’s 1998 
Lambeth Conference, which recognized the relationship between all 
creatures based on God’s covenantal action.266 
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The covenant is not a cause of God’s love: it follows naturally from 
it. As discussed above, engaging in covenant suggests a pre-existing 
relationship. But what does God’s relation to the nonhuman have to do with 
humans? Do God’s promises to the nonhuman involve the human in some 
way; and if so, how? In the case of the Noahic covenant, humans are 
passive members alongside nonhuman animals and creation as a whole; a 
situation which puts human and animal in relationship together. For Murray, 
this raises a question: “[If] God is seen as promising to care for both orders 
of creatures; and if both are God's covenant-partners, how can they not be 
in some sense covenantally bound to one another?”267 Jürgen Moltmann 
puts an ethical spin on this, suggesting that this covenantal relationship is 
so strong that violence against members of God's covenant (including 
animals) is an injury against God.268 Through covenanting with humans and 
animals, God binds them into a covenantal (and therefore relational) 
community. Beyond this shared community, the very fact that God’s 
covenantal action towards animals indicates God’s care for them has 
implications for how we understand and view our animal fellows. Rather 
than viewing other animals as mere resources, material for our use, the fact 
that God covenants with these creatures – and draws us into covenant with 
them – is grounds for the call which has been considered in this chapter. 
This is the call towards sanctified relationships with the nonhuman animal 
creation – proper for the humanity of the human and the animality of the 
animal – in the spirit of grace in which God covenants with God’s creation. 
God’s covenantal action anticipates and exhorts the “cosmic peace” which 
Murray notes. It is the ultimate fulfilment of this cosmic peace – the 
eschatological reconciliation of all things – to which we now turn, reflecting 
on visions of the peaceable kingdom with human-animal relationality in 
mind. 
 
Animal Relationality in Creation and Eschaton 
In this chapter, I have developed a theological account of human-animal 
relationality through considering the nature of God, humanity, creation, 
covenant, Incarnation, and sin. One question which remains unanswered is 
that concerning how animal relationality fits into eschatology. In considering 
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the implications of sin for animal relationality, it was suggested that 
nonhuman animals can be thought of as existing in and being shaped by 
distorted relational networks in a manner analogous to how sin works in 
human lives. If the groaning animal creation is to be taken up, redeemed, 
and reconciled by its Creator – and so exist in perfected networks of 
relationality come the kingdom – what, then, will eschatological animal 
relationality look like? 
In considering the place and relationship of humans and other 
animals in creation, we must remember that the world as we understand it 
is imperfect, but that through God this will be transformed at the end of 
history. We are not to become focused on the things of the world at the 
expense of the kingdom:269 this holds true across the breadth of theology. 
And neither, as argued above, must we imagine that the reconciliation 
Christ has painfully laid the groundwork for is for humans only. Jürgen 
Moltmann asserted this much when he wrote that 
Jesus’ proclamation of the imminent kingdom of God was a 
proleptically eschatological proclamation, and was as such aligned 
towards future endorsement. What the disciples proclaimed as his 
‘resurrection from the dead’ embodied the eschatological 
endorsement of his anticipation of the kingdom of God, because the 
resurrection of the dead was the symbol under which the end of 
history was imagined.270 
The resurrection of Christ is not simply a triumph over fleshly death; it is the 
gifting of hope for all creation, which currently groans in bondage.271 All 
creatures captive to death receive eschatological promise: considered with 
critical attention to nonhuman animals, and with an eye to Isaiah’s 
proclamation of the peaceable kingdom,272 a practice of praying and living 
with the relationships and responsibilities of the eschaton in our hearts is 
one potential faithful response to this promise. 
Similar to Moltmann, Miroslav Volf speaks of “the reconciliation of all 
things (Col. 1:15-20) – reconciliation between human beings and God, 
reconciliation among human beings themselves, internal reconciliation 
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within human beings, and reconciliation of human beings and the 
nonhuman environment.”273 Bauckham agrees that “Reconciliation with 
God and reconciliation with the rest of God’s creation are not alternatives 
but natural partners.”274 The blood of the cross reconciles all things 
together, including the wild animals who “cry out” to God:275 this scandalous 
subversion of the natural order as we know it is mirrored in Isaiah’s 
presentation of the peaceable kingdom, as well as the life and death of 
Jesus Christ. In the words of Snyder and Scandrett, “Salvation means 
creation healed, and that is shocking and stupendous news. The good 
news of Jesus is even better than we thought.”276 
Isaiah’s is “an eschatological peace that renews the peace of the 
beginning, where humans and animals do not depend on one another’s 
destruction for their own survival.”277 It is the end of violence, exploitation, 
and death, even to the extent of subverting the natural order; although it 
should also be noted that those humans and animals depicted in the 
kingdom are embodied, fleshly creatures. As children play with asps and 
adders,278 we see peaceable relationship where in the world as we know it 
we would expect mortal fear. But this is not the reduction of creation to a 
blank state, a completely fresh start; it is the creation of new responsibility 
and relationship in the kingdom, in the direction of which the Incarnation 
points us. Neil Messer says as much, in talking of the peaceable kingdom, 
when he writes that “If we wish to take seriously the Isaianic promise of a 
coming age in which lions live at peace with cattle, we shall also have to 
acknowledge that it is quite beyond our power to imagine what such an age 
will look like, much less to bring it in or to ‘approximate’ it.”279 This humble 
admission of the limitations of our eschatological knowledge is reminiscent 
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of Barth’s majestic rumination on what Clough calls “the shape of 
redeemed living”:280 
Let us be honest: we do not know what we are saying when we 
speak of Jesus Christ’s coming again in judgement, and of the 
resurrection of the dead, of eternal life and eternal death. That with 
all these there will be bound up a piercing revelation – a seeing, 
compared to which all our present vision will have been blindness – 
is too often testified in Scripture for us to feel we ought to prepare 
ourselves for it. For we do not know what will be revealed when the 
last covering is removed from our eyes, from all eyes: how we shall 
behold one another and what we shall be to one another – men of 
today and men of past centuries and millennia, ancestors and 
descendants, husbands and wives, wise and foolish, oppressors 
and oppressed, traitors and betrayed, murderers and murdered, 
East and West, Germans and others, Christians, Jews, and 
heathen, orthodox and heretics, Catholics and Protestants, 
Lutherans and Reformed...281 
And, I might add, humans and other animals! Indeed, Barth does mention 
that “We also do not know what Nature... will be for us then,”282 but, having 
performed the regrettably reductive act of collapsing ‘animals’ into ‘Nature’, 
he does not see the potential for human-animal relationality come the 
eschaton. 
The caution exhibited by Barth and Messer when it comes to 
eschatological pontification is well-noted, but I would not want to go so far 
as to conclude that our limited and flawed faculties mean we should 
attempt to say nothing at all about life in the kingdom; any more than I 
would want to draw that same conclusion in relation to the doctrine of God 
(or creation, or sin, or indeed any element of systematic theology wherein 
we do not truly understand that of which we speak). Isaiah’s vision of the 
peaceable kingdom is, after all, an imagining of what the age to come will 
look like;283 and it is consistent with this chapter’s theology. The peaceable 
relationships between wolves and lambs, and leopards and kids, surely 
                                                          
280
 Clough, On Animals, chapter 7. 
281
 Karl Barth, God Here and Now (New York: Routledge, 2003), 45-6. 
282
 Barth, God Here and Now, 46. 
283
 For other possible images of redeemed nonhuman animal life, see Gen. 2, 7-9; Ps. 65-6, 
98, 145, 148; Isa. 65:17-26; Dan. 1:12-15; Rom. 8:19-23; Eph. 1:10; Col. 1:15-20; Rev. 4:6-
11, 5:11-14, 21:1-2. 
Page 90 of 287 
look strange to us; but so did the life of Jesus Christ, wherein infinite power 
became boundless self-emptying and the strictures of law became the 
freedom of love. The end to hostilities between the peoples of Isaiah’s time 
in Isaiah 11:10-15, following on from the transformation of animal 
relationality in verses 6-9, suggests that for the prophet an end to inter-
human conflict seemed no more or less likely than a cessation of violence 
between bear and cow. 
A productive comparison might be made between the Isaianic vision 
of the peaceable kingdom and early Christian hagiographies. In particular, 
Helen Waddell’s excellent collection Beasts and Saints collates numerous 
tales of the saints and their relationships with nonhuman animals.284 From 
St Macarius’ charitable education of the hyena – who gives up her flesh-
eating ways upon his instruction285 – to the abbot Gerasimus, who 
befriends and is served by a lion until his death,286 we see in these stories 
lives lived in the hope and anticipation of the kingdom. Of course, the 
transformed responsibility and relationality witnessed to in the lives of 
Macarius’ hyena and Gerasimus’ lion is impossible to attain in creation as 
we know it:287 but so too, it should then be added, is the life of the saint – 
this is the miracle of grace and the hope of the kingdom.288 
 What, though, does the reconciliation and redemption of nonhuman 
animals mean for human-animal relationships, in both the fallen world and 
the renewed creation to come? Christopher Southgate rejects ‘protological’ 
vegetarianism on the grounds that it claims too much for human capabilities 
in hoping and working towards a return to Eden.289 In the same essay, he 
takes a similarly critical approach to what he terms “eschatological 
vegetarianism”; this being a future-oriented dietary model which he also 
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rejects for articulating a supposedly hubristic account of human 
capabilities.290 I am not sure, however, that eschatologically-focused 
models for Christian living need to be categorised as solely future-oriented, 
and therefore juxtaposed against transcendent models wherein Christians 
act in service to God in the present, regardless of the efficacy or long-term 
impact of their actions.291 This is a view shared by Clough: 
A vision of what the reconciliation and redemption of all things by 
God in Christ through the Spirit might mean for relationships 
between humans and other animals will cause Christians to be 
motivated to act in whatever ways they can to witness to redeemed 
patterns of creaturely relations... The doctrine of redemption is not 
reducible to a set of beliefs about some future state, but is an 
understanding of what God is doing in the world and of how God 
intended and intends creaturely relations to be ordered.292 
Living a life of service oriented to the future reconciliation of all things does 
not have to equate to belief in one’s ability – or the ability of one’s tradition 
– to bring about that future peaceableness oneself. Indeed, the ultimate 
reconciliation has already been inaugurated in the Incarnation: we await, in 
a world marred by sin and constrained by temporality, that which has 
already happened at the end of time. We are not (at least, not yet) to live 
with hyenas as St Macarius did; but we are to recognise their impending 
reconciliation to us and ours to them, and so consider our relationships with 
them with an eye to the redemption of our intertwined relationalities that will 
come with the kingdom. 
Southgate raises a valuable issue at this point: even if one accepts 
the eschatological promise of the leopard lying with the kid, he suggests, it 
is very difficult to see how the leopard remains a leopard if its fundamental 
nature has been so transformed as to no longer desire the flesh of the 
goat.293 Although the issue of identity-continuity either side of the eschaton 
is a valuable one to explore, I stand alongside Clough in finding 
Southgate’s response unsatisfying. Clough compares Southgate’s 
“acceptance of predation as God’s original creative intent” to the 
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ecotheologies which Andrew Linzey criticises as privileging the flourishing 
of the whole over the life of individual creatures.294 This similarity lies in a 
denial of the particularity and relationality of animal others; a collapse of 
individual animals into the morally uninteresting monolith of nature 
(contrasted with humanity, the only creatures to stand outside nature). 
The idea that our inability to imagine how redeemed animals might 
relate to each other means that predation is a necessary element of 
creation brings to mind Hauerwas’ claim that just-war theologies quiet the 
impetus for moral alternatives to warfare;295 leading in the end to the 
acceptance of the way things are as ‘necessary’, and the move from 
thinking about how to witness against them to thinking about how best to 
live within them.296 Eschatological accounts of relationality further 
undermine Southgate’s notion that predation is natural-and-therefore-
neutral: if God is not able to redeem and reform lives fundamentally marked 
by predation and exploitation, then the possibility of peace between 
humans seems no more likely than any alteration of animal relationality. 
Clough highlights the historic (and contemporary) celebration of human 
warriors, whose role in demarcating and defending territory and resources 
is surely ‘natural’ if understood in an evolutionary sense, and proposes that 
within Southgate’s argument for the ontological necessity of predation such 
fighters would continue to kill their enemies (albeit, perhaps, with an 
absence of suffering) come the eschaton. 
Instead, it is a Christian expectation that such human lives require 
transformation in order to fit them for life under the reign of God, just 
as the lives of non-warriors will need to be purged of their manifold 
vices. The transformation required to fit human beings for life in the 
new creation is hard to imagine while still preserving human identity, 
if the human life I know best is anything to go by. Yet biblical and 
later Christian traditions encourage us to entertain the audacious 
hope that even creatures like us could find a place in the peaceable 
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kingdom... A Christian vision of redeemed creaturely life must be 
one in which predation is no longer a possibility for human or non-
human creatures... If we can envision redeemed human creatures 
thriving in ways very different from our current patterns of life, we 
can envision similar redeemed non-human creaturely thriving. 
[emphasis mine]297 
The ontological and teleological ambiguity surrounding theological 
definitions of ‘nature’ will be taken up further in chapter 4: for now, it should 
suffice to note that peace between human creatures, between humans and 
other animals, and between nonhuman animals are equally unrealistic and 
unattainable in the world as we know it.298 Human creatures are blessed in 
that we can choose God, and so conform our concupiscent will to better 
align with God’s own; but as imperfect creatures who are deeply enmeshed 
within distorted relational networks we are unable and unwilling to do so 
fully. In this way, we will remain unperfected until the kingdom comes; as 
will brother leopard and sister hyena. 
Reflecting on watching his cat watching birds (aware that in nature 
as we know it, Mitsy’s birdwatching includes the desire to kill and eat, 
regardless of her proficiency to achieve this), Clough suggests that in the 
transformation wrought by God at the end of history 
there could be a perfect existence that consisted in the 
contemplation or even befriending of birds, without having to rely on 
killing them to survive, and it does not seem implausible to me that 
[Mitsy’s] lounging bigger relatives could also enjoy an existence in 
which they were freed from the burdens of having to kill to assure 
their continued existence.299 
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This is not to make the claim that we are not called to work for the 
transformation of relationships between cats and birds in the same way as 
we are called to work for peace between human individuals, institutions, 
and societies. It would be unjust for humans to attempt to write our 
(distorted, limited) perception of the kingdom onto nature as we experience 
it: in the above example, we would be hard-pressed to interfere in the cat-
bird dynamic without negatively impacting the flourishing of one or both 
parties. Instead, in the hope of the kingdom and in our efforts to reflect the 
triune relationality of God, we attend to fragmentations in human relational 
networks. This will include inter-human relationships, but also those 
networks which involve both human and nonhuman; such as the networks 
of factory farming, looked at more closely in chapter 5. 
What does this account of redeemed animal relationality suggest for 
how we might relate to our nonhuman brothers and sisters? We inhabit a 
world which is not the kingdom; but that should not inhibit us as Christians 
from attempting to anticipate the eschaton, our hope for the future and our 
inspiration for the present, in our relationships and the exercise of our 
responsibility here and now. Just as talk of the perfectly equal and ex-
centric human relationships of the eschaton should never justify 
acceptance of the status quo – or abandonment of ventures for social 
justice – in the fallen creation we now inhabit, the talk of similarly 
transformed relationality with other animals in the peaceable kingdom 
cannot justify practices which override and ignore animal particularity here 
and now. Michael Northcott was wary of this when he wrote that 
St Paul, and the writer of the Book of Revelation, speaks of a time 
when the whole cosmos will be brought into relationship with the 
supreme justice of the Lord who is God in Christ. Christians have 
often proclaimed this justice to people of their own race and gender 
and class. They have more rarely proclaimed it amongst people 
different from themselves. Far more rarely has it been proclaimed to 
those orders of life which are not human flesh and blood.300 
God’s grace justifies and sanctifies us; but the fact that it justifies us 
(redeeming us through an act of love that comes as a gift) does not mean 
that we can resist or ignore it sanctifying us (forming us into a pattern of 
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living that strives to reflect that freeing love). If we do not display, in our 
creaturely relationships, the transformed responsibility that comes through 
grace, we are not acting as thankful disciples. If we do not try to work for 
what we hope for in the kingdom, even knowing that we cannot achieve it 
through our own power, we neglect the call to respond to our fellows 
(human and nonhuman). In Isaiah’s vision of the lion lying down with the 
lamb, and the stories of the saints and their animal companions who lived 
out eschatological relationality in a fallen world, we see shared mutuality 
and the potential for transformed relationships between humans and other 
animals. This is a perception which meshes with the recognition of other 
animals as relational individuals, and with the inauguration of the eschaton 
wrought by the Incarnation. 
Before moving to consider the ethical (specifically, the dietary) 
implications of this chapter’s theological work, it is worth returning – prior to 
concluding – to the doctrine of human dominion. Proceeding from human 
creation imago Dei and foundationally linked to the stewardship theologies 
critiqued in chapter 2, the possibility of ‘redeeming’ stewardship in a 
relational direction is in this way considered. 
 
Dominion 
In light of the divine transformation of our natural relationality which comes 
when we joyously accept grace – and the novel way we can view animal 
relationality in light of Incarnation, covenant and eschaton – perhaps the 
most significant point to be made here is that election to dominion is not 
election to exploitation. Such a reading of human dominion, historically 
prevalent and often pinpointed as the ideological heart of human abuses of 
nature,301 can only be underpinned by a hierarchical understanding of 
power and lordship. In God’s creative, redemptive and sustaining action, 
however, and in the free outflow of grace to undeserving human creatures, 
Christians witness that a lordship of coercion is no lordship at all. God’s 
gracious action reveals that true lordship is service to one’s fellows: being 
in relationship with God calls us towards right relationship with all. For John 
Howard Yoder, the cross of Christ is the model of Christian social 
                                                          
301
 See for example Lynn Townsend White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”, 
Science, 155.3767 (1967) 1203-7. 
Page 96 of 287 
efficacy302 precisely because it is the locus where God’s sovereignty is 
subverted; a subversion which shows up relationships of worldly power as 
neither really powerful nor really relational. The lordship of Christ is 
servanthood;303 the omnipotence of God, absolute freedom to love. 
To be sensible for Christian action and witness, then, dominion 
must be understood in light of the responsibility-to-God which accompanies 
human creation imago Dei. This cannot, however, be only understood as a 
monodirectional responsibility to the Creator, but must be read in light of 
the relational call-and-response which draws us to respond to our 
neighbours in the church and the world. This definition of neighbourliness is 
not dependent on species boundaries, but on the recognition of particularity 
and relationality, and the willingness to respond with respect to these and 
with the aim of ensuring mutual flourishing. ‘Election’, after all, implies 
selection from a larger population: the Deuteronomical prescriptions for 
Israel’s kings, wherein the king is elected as one among equals, not to 
profit from his people but to serve them, gives scriptural precedent for how 
election is to be lived out in a fallen creation.304 Were human dominion read 
in isolation from the revelation of God’s love for us, or from the shape of 
perfected human relationality revealed in the life of Jesus Christ, we would 
still be unable to avoid the reality that election to dominion is a call intended 
to transform us. Richard Bauckham writes that “the vertical does not cancel 
the horizontal”;305 meaning that any dominion humans have over other 
creatures does not annul the brute fact of human creatureliness. 
If dominion is understood as election from among equals, this is not 
in the sense that humans are not different from other animals, but that the 
distance between creatures pales in relation to the distance between 
creation and Creator. We must remember to read the first creation narrative 
in the context of scriptural warnings about God’s ownership of all creation, 
such as when the Psalmist reminds us that “the earth is the Lord’s, and all 
that is in it.”306 As Greenway suggests, “If we are rightly to understand how 
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to exercise our dominion, we must strive to imitate and understand God's 
dominion.”307 
Paulos Gregorios has spoken of the need for humans to balance 
“mystery and mastery.”308 He does so in the context of environmentalism, 
but this need for balance is also instructive for human-animal relationality. 
The mystery to be balanced is that God creates, sustains and redeems all 
creation; the mastery is the active responsibility humans have to our 
fellows, human and nonhuman. If mutual creatureliness is recognised, the 
way is open for dominion and any attendant ideas of stewardship to be 
understood in the language of responsible community and right 
relationship, as well as faithful service. Different species of animal differ in 
their relationality – as do particular members of specific species, including 
humans – but difference does not easily translate to value, and if one is to 
be king then one is to be understood as being elected from among equals. 
Pace the theos-rights of Andrew Linzey – discussed in chapter 2 – true 
relationality is not about serving one as an act of service to another (e.g. 
serving animals as an act of service to God); rather, it is about serving one 
as one is served by another (e.g. serving animals as God serves us). “Like 
good stewards of the manifold grace of God” (1 Pet. 4:10), we are to 
embody what dominion we have in service to our fellows – human and 
nonhuman – with whatever gifts we have received. 
In the concluding chapter (9) of this thesis, I will return to the 
doctrine of dominion and consider whether there is a place for stewardship 
in an embodied theology (and ethic, and ecclesiology) of human-animal 
relationality. For the purposes of this chapter, it should suffice to conclude 
that dominion as a classical theological doctrine is not inimical to reviewing 
and revising understandings of human-animal relationality. 
 
Conclusion 
Distinct among their particular and relational fellows, humans are created in 
God’s image and elected to dominion within and for creation. This election 
is also a calling, to live out right and proper relationships with God’s other 
relational creatures – human and animal – and it is by responding to this 
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calling, in relationship with God and the body  of Christ, that sinful human 
creatures might hope to be transformed by grace. If we recognise other 
animals as relational creatures with whom we share commonality, while 
having particular capacities and needs of their own (as do we), it then 
follows that relating to them as God relates to us will involve paying close 
attention to what is necessary for their flourishing within creation as it s 
now. Understood in this way, human election to dominion is expressly not a 
licence to dominate but a call to serve: dominion is the exercise of our 
responsibility on behalf of all our creaturely fellows, as an act of service to 
God and an act of relationship with other animals. 
It must be remembered that humans are creatures: “The fact that 
humans are commanded to what other species do as well as, uniquely, to 
exercise dominion over other species, is important to our understanding of 
the latter. Creation in the image of God does not make them demi-gods. 
They are unequivocally creatures.”309 Our creatureliness, and our 
transformative relationship with our Creator, call us to respond to our 
animal fellows as individuals worthy of relationship, and so seriously and 
reflectively take a new look at them and our relations with them. The 
importance of this is highlighted by God’s covenantal action with nonhuman 
animals, recognising them as responsible individuals and bringing them into 
relationship with humans. 
 The triune God, relational in God’s very being,310 freely chose to 
create beings with whom God could be in relationship. The Incarnation of 
God’s Word into flesh, an act of cosmic significance,311 is the revelation of 
God’s relational care for all God’s creatures; the paradigmatic example of 
perfected human relationality; and the inauguration and foretaste of the 
peaceable kingdom where relationships will be made anew.312 The need for 
this remaking of creaturely relationships was raised through reflection on 
relationality and sin: here the possibility of nonhuman animal culpability for 
sin was left open, but their need for redemption was affirmed. The 
necessity of reconciliation for nonhuman animals was highlighted by noting 
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their ensnarement in distorted relational networks analogous to (and 
overlapping with) those in which humans are caught and corrupted. 
The eschatological remaking of human relationality will fulfil in us 
the image of the triune God; freeing us to live for the other in a way which 
rejoices in their particularity and relationality.313 This other can be human or 
nonhuman: striving to witness to God’s dynamic relationality and 
unbounded grace, we are to attend to our animal fellows – so far as we are 
able314 – as individuals and as creatures-in-relationship. Although we must 
remain cautious about claiming too deep a gnosis of the shape of kingdom 
living, to exclude nonhuman animals from redemption on the grounds that 
they are presently grounded in networks of predation is to make too great a 
claim in the opposite direction: we do not know how animals will be 
transformed by God come the kingdom, but neither do we know they will 
not be transformed. Nonhuman animals are relational beings – even though 
their relationality differs from the human – and if we exist in a unique 
position of responsibility within creation, this position is to be understood as 
being that of ‘first among equals’. Dominion is not a licence to exploit and 
ignore our nonhuman brothers and sisters. 
In this chapter, I have constructed a theology of human-animal 
relationality, with the intention of demonstrating that the sanctification of 
human relationality need not only impact upon inter-human relationships, 
but can and should be good news for all relational creatures. A relational 
understanding of the imago Dei, in which our call to respond to God is 
likewise a call to respond to our fellows, is therefore appropriate. This is so 
in the light of the cosmic and transtemporal events of Incarnation, 
crucifixion, and resurrection: made aware of God’s love for us, shown the 
perfected form of human relationality (and the ex-centric orientation that 
involves), exposed to the tragic depths of our own sinfulness, and shown 
the eschatological end to sin and death, the question of what makes 
humans distinctive in creation pales into insignificance compared to the 
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question of how humans are to relate to those other animals alongside 
whom we were created, and with whom we are brought into relationship. 
Answering this question will involve thinking seriously – with attention to the 
nature and will of God – about the place of animals in creation. 
This chapter’s theology of human-animal relationality places  a 
degree of importance upon our dietary choices (as choices which impact 
and influence how we perceive and relate to other animals) which other 
embodied and relational practices – particularly sexuality and inter-human 
violence – have long received in the Christian traditions. In chapter 4, I 
move, via conversation with Stanley Hauerwas, to reflect on these dietary 
choices in light of the theological work undertaken thus far. 
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4. Dietary Pacifism 
Stanley Hauerwas and Dietary Ethics 
 
Having raised concerns about the theological adequacy of existing 
stewardship models for thinking about human-animal relationality in chapter 
2, in chapter 3 I articulated a theology with greater scope for responding to 
other animals as relational individuals. Recognising animals as having 
relationality of a kind – even if such is not directly translatable to human 
standards – they are included in the world in which Christians are called to 
put their faithful response to grace into practice. The point should be made, 
however, that the framework thus far constructed is exactly that: a 
framework. Recognising the particularity and relationality of nonhuman 
animals is not in itself an argument for practising nonviolence towards 
them, any more than a recognition of the novelty of human relationships 
lived imago Christi automatically precludes all use of coercion by 
Christians. If we accept other animals as relational creatures, however, we 
should therefore be concerned to think about how we relate to them in the 
world as it is now: in this thesis, I am particularly concerned with eating, 
which incorporates the question of how we relate to nonhuman animals in 
procuring our food.315 Over the next two chapters, I outline an ethical model 
of ‘dietary pacifism’ – this is not an argument which stands on its own, but 
rather one potential implication of a theology which recognises nonhuman 
animals as creatures of God with whom humans are called to relate; in the 
hope of the kingdom, in thanks for grace, and in striving to heal those 
relational networks most fractured by sin. 
It is worth posing, and answering, one pre-emptive question: why 
dietary pacifism? Why not animal pacifism? Eating is certainly not the only 
practice I could have selected through which to reflect on our relationships 
with other animals: it was chosen because our diet – what we eat – is an 
embodied practice, which both reflects and shapes our beliefs about that 
which we choose to eat. Food, as a culturally-shaped embodied practice, is 
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important: if we eat without thinking, we eat without seeking to discern 
God’s will; and in this way, we fail to act responsibly in relation to those 
among our animal brothers and sisters we destine to be butchered. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the biological fact of food’s importance 
seems too obvious to mention. Those of us who are able to eat regularly 
and often, but the ease with which we obtain our meals can obscure the 
processes behind their production. For Christians, this lack of knowledge 
about what goes on ‘behind the scenes’ should be worrying, because it 
covers up another way in which food is important – theologically, as 
something central to the life of all animals. In the words of Norman Wirzba 
(whose theology of food is engaged with critically in chapters 5 and 9): 
What a theological approach to eating does is enable the perception 
of food within a context that stretches through the many ecological 
and social relationships of this world to the divine creator and 
sustainer of it. To approach food with a concern for its theological 
depth is to acknowledge that food is precious because it has its 
source in God.316 
What we eat, and how we relate to what we eat, is a particular element of 
bodily life, as vulnerable to concupiscence as any other. Unlike some 
elements of bodily life, such as sexuality, diet is one that regularly impacts 
on relational networks which extend beyond the human, including other 
animals and the environment we share with them. The specific meanings 
of, and complexities within, dietary pacifism and Christian vegetarianism 
will be explored in more detail in chapter 5:317 first, I will consider the dietary 
implications of the theology outlined thus far, in conversation with the work 
of Stanley Hauerwas. 
Hauerwas’ work joins John Howard Yoder’s Anabaptist nonviolence 
with Alisdair MacIntyre’s tradition-oriented emphasis on casuistry, creating 
a framework which calls the church to truthful witness above all else – a 
truthfulness which is achieved when its theology is embodied and lived out 
in its ethics. In the second part of this thesis, I turn to relationality within the 
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church – how the community engages in moral reflection, and relates to its 
marginal members and the human and nonhuman animals outside its walls 
– but here my primary concern is with nonviolence. In dialogue with the 
pacifist Hauerwas, whose communitarian emphasis is a ready partner for 
the theology of human-animal relationality outlined thus far, I will construct 
a foundation for dietary pacifism. Through engagement with criticisms of 
Hauerwas’ work, primarily those of Jeffrey Stout, I will then begin to nuance 
dietary pacifism, as well as considering possible criticisms of the framework 
constructed up to that point. Prior to concluding this chapter, I will engage 
closely with Stanley Hauerwas’ co-authored article “The Chief End of All 
Flesh,” a sustained look at the suitability of vegetarianism for Christian 
ethics from within the Hauerwasian framework. Questions about ‘nature’ 
and the meaning of ‘natural’, as well as the tenability of the trope of 
sacrifice for Christians thinking about diet today, arise from this discussion 
and are considered through a dietary pacifist lens. In chapter 5, the 
complexities and nuances of dietary pacifism will be explored further; along 
with a critical comparison of dietary and military pacifism, and a similarly 




The body of work produced by Stanley Hauerwas spans nearly forty years; 
and it is arguably best understood through the lens of The Peaceable 
Kingdom,318 a keystone work first published in 1983. In this book Hauerwas 
builds on the essays that comprised the 1981 A Community of Character,319 
outlining his virtue-based theological ethics and his emphasis on formation 
in community,320 which stand in contrast to any deontological or 
authoritarian approach. Relationship, and the necessity of recognising 
one’s own creatureliness and sinfulness, are strong and recurrent themes, 
highlighting the necessity of conforming one’s will to God’s. How one does 
this, for Hauerwas, is through learning from and relating to one’s fellow 
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Christians, in this way being formed to view the world through the lens 
provided by scripture and tradition. 
For Hauerwas, we live in a world of moral fragments: with no firm 
conceptual scheme for resolving disagreements, and with postmodern 
awareness that our contexts (to a greater or lesser extent) shape our 
outlook, it is easy to become cynical or even resigned about our actions 
and motivations and those of others.321 This reality, as perceived by 
Hauerwas, is exacerbated by modern liberal culture’s fallacious claim that 
we are autonomous individuals; that we are free to make our choices as we 
see fit, weighing up whatever options are available and reaching the 
decision which best fits our chosen values.322 For Hauerwas, the liberal 
worldview thus envisioned is a formative narrative which denies that it is 
such – a story which claims we do not need stories.323 
Hauerwas rejects the claim that we have a choice to avoid such 
narratives. We are formed by the narratives we live within: what we can 
choose is which narratives and which communities to be formed by324 
(although even these choices will be contextually constrained). The 
Christian narrative, as that which is about and has been revealed by the 
one true God, is the story which shows us the world as it truly is: a divided 
world, a world of sinners, a world whose ideals are not shared by God, a 
world which propagates selfishness under the pseudonym ‘individualism’.325 
If we seek to see the world through the lens of the Christian narrative, we 
can learn the extent to which we are compromised by sin and in need of 
grace.326 For Hauerwas, this recognition of sin and acceptance of grace is 
not a denial of freedom; it is rather a freeing from selfishness and 
materialism, freeing us to be truly open to the other.327 Even ‘freedom’, a 
concept taken by many to be concrete and fixed, is revealed to hold a 
meaning which differs depending on how one’s character has been formed: 
for Hauerwas, modernity “names the times when a people are produced 
that believe they have no story, except the story they chose when they had 
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no story.”328 Choosing to ‘self-determine’ is effectively a choice to be 
determined by one’s impulses and environment, condemning one to persist 
within the perpetual cycle of sin. Looking instead to God for guidance – and 
reflectively approaching scripture and tradition to discern that guidance – 
offers the chance to escape one’s own concupiscence, and so be 
transformed. 
Hauerwas’ focus on narrative provides a ready and directly relatable 
language through which to discuss the conformation of one’s will to God’s – 
and the sanctification that can proceed from this – but the fundamental 
similarity to the theology of chapter 3 should be clear. If we imagine we are 
acting in total freedom, we are not: we are simply allowing our will to be 
shaped and directed by the corrupted relational networks within which we 
live and move. It is only by recognising this fundamental truth that we can 
hope to become more like Christ; to have our relationality transformed by 
his Spirit, and so attend to the individual other with our view to our shared 
mutuality and our respective flourishing. Our internal inheritance (the 
formation of our character within the relational networks which constitute 
the world) is always an ambivalent one; but, as Rachel Muers writes in a 
review of Hauerwas’ autobiography,329 it is through relationship with God 
that we are shown “the graced possibility of transforming as well as 
acknowledging that inheritance.”330 And it is in the church – the community 
shaped around the story of God and God’s people – that we seek and find 
formation in the here and now. 
Comparing Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder (himself a formative 
influence for Hauerwas’ nonviolent ethics), Gerald Schlabach characterises 
the Hauerwasian framework thus: 
Craftlike training at the hands of masters who have internalized a 
community's moral standards and purposes, apprentices who 
cannot know that moral craft until they learn it first by habit, ancient 
narratives retold across generations, saints and other mentors who 
are a bridge to Jesus across time, sacraments that reenact and re-
present the fullness of his very life, moral disciplines learned 
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through patient accountability both to the weakest in a community 
and to its authorities—all these are the stuff of continuity, character 
formation, and tradition.331 
It should be noted that the key point of divergence between Hauerwas and 
Yoder, for Schlabach a “chasm of a hidden ravine”,332 is that of 
continuity:333 both emphasise nonviolence and communal formation, but 
Hauerwas places a far greater emphasis than Yoder on the role of tradition 
and continuity for the formational community.334 Ethics, understood within 
his framework, is not a question of legalistic precepts but of how we see the 
world; in particular, how we must be transformed to see the world truthfully: 
For Christians, such seeing develops through schooling in a 
narrative which teaches us how to use the language of sin not only 
about others but about ourselves... Christian ethics must serve and 
be formed by the Christian community, a community whose interest 
lies in the formation of character and whose perduring history 
provides the continuity we need to act in conformity with that 
character.335 
It is along these lines that Hauerwas argues for the centrality of truthful 
witness to Christian living, “because peace comes only as we are 
transformed by a truth that gives us the confidence to rely on nothing else 
than its witness.”336 The church’s first social task is therefore nothing more 
complicated than being the church;337 but although this is a simple precept, 
to embody it is a radical and dangerous undertaking, particularly if one 
agrees with Hauerwas that nonviolence is fundamental to Christian 
witness.338 
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It is a fundamental proposition of Hauerwas’ work that theology is 
ethics;339 that our theology ought to be praxis, and if our action does not 
reflect our theology then our action is false and our theology arid. To live a 
nonviolent communal life, trusting in God and giving up on worldly claims to 
power and self-determination,340 is to embody Hauerwas’ theological claims 
– and it would seem that this is the example Hauerwas has in mind. To live 
‘out of control’ in this way, accepting our ultimate dependence on God and 
not on ourselves, is a radical and eschatological commitment;341 something 
noted by Stout, a prominent critic of Hauerwas who summarises his 
ecclesiology as “a matter of maintaining a pacifist community of virtue in the 
midst of a violent world, thus providing a foretaste of the peaceable 
kingdom in which God reigns absolutely and eternally.”342 
For Hauerwas, we are formed in and by the church-as-community: 
commenting on evangelism, he notes that part of his work is to challenge 
“the assumption that conversion has primarily to do with an individual’s self-
understanding rather than his or her being put in the context of a different 
community with a different set of practices.”343 Being formed to see the 
world as it is revealed in the Christian narrative, in the midst of a new 
community with radical practices, necessarily involves coming to view 
history doxologically.344 The historical centre of our ethical worldview 
becomes a divine animal, Jesus Christ, who brought the dynamic 
relationality of the triune God and the good news of grace’s triumph over 
sin, and was killed for it by limited human creatures. To refuse to exclude 
the enemy, once history is understood in this way, is to witness to the 
kingdom Christ inaugurates and points towards.345 This is because we 
recognise our shared mutuality with the human enemy, as another 
relational creature of God: if we recognise the same of nonhuman animals, 
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and hope for the supernatural relationships promised in the kingdom, can 
we do anything other than include the animal too? 
 
Hauerwas and the Narrative of Jesus 
Within the narrative at the heart of the Christian narrative (which is to say, 
scripture), Hauerwas recognises Jesus’ earthly life and ministry as centrally 
important.346 Indeed, The Peaceable Kingdom makes clear that in the world 
as it is, the church is called to be a counter-cultural community of character, 
following Jesus’ example in practicing nonviolence. And this nonviolence “is 
not one among other behavioural implications that can be drawn from the 
gospel but is integral to the shape of Christian convictions.”347 Hauerwas’ 
post-Constantinian theology reminds us that early church Christology 
bothered itself less with the theological ramifications of the resurrection 
than the lived example of Jesus’ life, which we must understand before we 
can know who he is post-resurrection.348 
This does not, however, mean that we should simply copy the 
actions of Jesus, so much as we should look to understand and emulate 
the virtues underpinning those actions.349 How we understand and emulate 
Jesus correlates to how we live and act in anticipation of the eschaton. 
“Jesus is the autobasileia – the Kingdom in person... There is no way to 
know the Kingdom except by learning the story of this man Jesus.”350 In 
Mark’s gospel, Peter struggles to understand how Jesus can be the Christ 
and simultaneously be so out of control as to be led to suffering and 
death.351 This is Jesus’ example to humanity, and it is one of suffering 
servitude for the whole creation, even and especially those parts of creation 
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over which one is in a position of relative power. The use of power to profit 
from one’s worldly relationships is alien to the sanctification that God offers 
humans. As Hauerwas writes in A Community of Character, “The 
incarnation is not the affirmation of God’s approval of the human, but God’s 
breaking through the borders of man’s definition of what is human to give a 
new and formative definition of the human in Jesus.”352 
Relationships of coercion are in stark contradistinction to the 
example of Jesus’ life; and, therefore, to the kingdom. Jesus’ openness to 
the unclean, denial of the right of violence even when under attack, 
association with those on the outside, resistance of temptation, peaceful 
challenge of the authorities, acceptance of his fate, and trust in God’s 
power to bring peace all serve as relational examples for our lives that we 
are challenged to understand. “His life is the life of the end – this is the way 
the world is meant to be – and thus those who follow him become... the 
people of the new age.”353 God’s peaceable kingdom, the subversion and 
submission of the ‘natural’ order to God’s will, is inaugurated and 
foreshadowed in Jesus; and it is what the church is called to witness to 
today, as it lives out its unique narrative in a fallen world. Aware of the 
radical inversion of worldly power dynamics lived out in the Incarnation, 
Hauerwas finds in the life of Jesus the inauguration of kingdom living; the 
open path to sanctified relationships. This inversion of power-relationships 
adds extra impetus to the call for Christians to consider other animals when 
thinking through their call to live out transformed relationality in creation – at 
the very least, it supports the argument of chapters 2-3, that the reality of 
our dominion over creation does not free us from the responsibility to 
respond to our fellow animals in love. 
 
Hauerwas and Liberalism 
Hauerwas’ opposition to contemporary liberalism, outlined above, is worth 
considering in more detail, as a way into exploring why nonhuman animals 
are so often undermined and objectified. Central to Hauerwas’ opposition is 
the individualism he perceives at the heart of modern secular liberalism,354 
caught up in which is the idea that we have complete power and control 
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over our lives. For Hauerwas, this self-centred focus on power and control 
feeds and is fed by sin: 
Sin is the form our character takes as a result of our fear that we will 
be ‘nobody’ if we lose control of our lives. Moreover our need to be 
in control is the basis for the violence of our lives. For since our 
‘control’ and ‘power’ cannot help but be built on an insufficient basis, 
we must use force to maintain the illusion that we are in control. We 
are deeply afraid of losing what unity of self we have achieved. Any 
idea or person threatening that unity must be eliminated.355 
To justify our sense of power, control and unity of self one must ultimately 
be prepared to resort to coercion against others: other individuals, 
ethnicities, religions, cultures, and institutions, each of which have their own 
self-centred claims to power, control and unity of self. This is sin as outlined 
in chapter 3: the refusal to live out of control356 and denial that we need 
God to be truly free – a refusal which leaves us mired in and compromised 
by the corrupted relational networks of the world – can lead us to value 
individuality above all else. The distortion of our relationality that can 
proceed from this is well-recognised by Isaiah in the lament that “The ox 
knows its owner... [but] my people do not understand” (Isa. 1:3) – that is, 
while other animals understand their place in the relational networks of the 
world, humanity struggles with the concept that it is not the ultimate. This 
struggle is a rebellion against the transformed relationality which creation 
imago Dei and life imago Christi calls Christians towards. 
Hauerwas reserves particular criticism for the language of ‘rights’, 
which remains popular among activists advocating animal liberation.357 
Rights-language is objected to on the grounds that it is a product of liberal 
society’s atomic individualism, wherein people “no longer trust their lives to 
                                                          
355
 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 47. 
356
 The feminist critique of theologies which emphasises submission – such as Hauerwas’ 
call to live out of control, or the Augustinian conception of sin as pride, or Martin Luther 
King Jr’s stress on redemptive suffering – should not be neglected at this point. The ways 
in which critiques of selfishness and pride can be used to support abusive and/or 
degrading relational networks, as well as victim-blaming and a laissez-faire attitude 
towards worldly injustices, are many and complex. It should be remembered, for the 
purposes of this discussion at least, that any talk of living out of control, accepting our 
limitations, and being wary of hubris is in the specific context of humans standing before 
God – not women before men, or the oppressed before their oppressors. 
357
 Hauerwas’ criticism is of the secular rights-language employed by predominantly 
secular animal liberation efforts: the “theos-rights” of Andrew Linzey, although arguably 
not doing enough to emphasise animal particularity and relationality, manage to avoid 
many of the complaints Hauerwas makes here. 
Page 111 of 287 
the hands of those they live with”358 and therefore demand inalienable 
rights over and against them. “The political consensus has been that the 
most nearly just social arrangement is the one which requires no 
commitment to any good except the protection of each individual to pursue 
his or her interests fairly.”359 With worldly claims to power and control come 
fear of the power and control of others: the language of rights, although 
functionally contributing to maintaining a minimally violent society, 
ultimately furthers the dissolution of right relationship which self-centred 
culture produces. 
Additionally problematic when the language of rights is applied to 
nonhuman animals is the conceptual link between rationality – deemed a 
prerequisite to have and defend rights – and speech, recognised by 
Jacques Derrida in Of grammatology.360 Not having speech, animals can 
therefore only be “given” rights by humans, and only then if those humans 
can adequately demonstrate that they feel pain, or are subjects-of-a-life.361 
Andrew Linzey’s claim in defence of the “theos-rights” model discussed in 
chapter 2, that “Rights talk moves the discussion away from feeling and 
sympathy to what is objectively owed to animals,”362 is only accurate if one 
already believes that nonhuman animals are valuable subjects; something 
rights-language cannot establish in isolation. Animal rights theorists and 
activists are free – indeed ‘well within their rights’ – to apply their preferred 
ethical language to nonhuman animals; but those who disagree with them 
are equally free, and equally consistent, to reject and ignore any 
manifestation of ‘animal rights’ that does not align with their interests. In 
chapter 2, it was argued that speech is a tool and function of inter-human 
relationship, and that it does not follow that the absence of vocal 
communication in other animals renders them less capable of relationship. 
Recognising the limits of human speech is not a denigration of human 
logos, but a more accurate situation of its significance in relation to the 
divine Logos, who calls us to fresh relationships in anticipation of the 
peaceable kingdom. 
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Building on his argument that rights-language is inherently self-
centred and negative, Hauerwas has written (in an article which will be 
explored further below) that 
To ascribe rights to an animal may, in the short run, be a strategy 
for its survival, but, in the long run, this language will simply 
maintain the current understanding of and practices in relation to 
other animals that continually bring about their destruction.363 
Rights-language is not fundamentally hostile to responsible relationship, as 
is self-centred individualism: a focus on what others cannot do to you, 
however, seems to not be a productive base from which to work for 
transformed relationships in creation. If Christian discipleship involves 
responding to others as relational individuals with whom we share 
commonality, striving to bring healing and peace in those places in creation 
most marred by sin, a fundamentally negative presentation of freedom 
appears incompatible with living imago Christi. 
 Having outlined Hauerwas’ theological ethics – with a particular 
focus on the primacy of nonviolence, Jesus’ incarnate life, and criticisms of 
modern liberalism – it will now be beneficial to turn to consider some of 
Hauerwas’ notable critics, before reflecting alongside Hauerwas on the 
application of his theology to questions of diet. 
 
Hauerwas’ Critics 
Among Hauerwas’ critics, it is perhaps Jeffrey Stout who best systematises 
objections to Hauerwas’ fusion of narrative, communal character formation, 
tradition, and idealism. Stout’s most forceful criticism of Hauerwas lies in 
what he sees as an overly simple and extreme separation of church and 
world. He writes that “what Barth saw as an ever-shifting boundary between 
church and world appears to have hardened in Hauerwas's rhetoric into a 
rigid and static line between Christian virtue and liberal vice.”364 I believe 
that Stout simultaneously overstates and oversimplifies the case: 
Hauerwas’ understanding of the messianic community is not one that 
denies the presence of sin inside the church – however, his account (and 
the rhetoric underpinning it) does understate the presence of virtue and 
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wisdom and positive ways of relating in the world outside it. Scott Holland 
conceptualises this as 
a temptation in Hauerwas’s program to identify the church as the 
kingdom of God... Yet because the church is not the kingdom of 
God, there is salvation outside the church. Where is this salvation? 
Jesus said: "If I cast out demons by the finger of God, then the 
kingdom of God has come upon you" (Luke 11:20). We would do 
well to be attentive to those who exorcise the demons of racism, 
sexism, heterosexism, militarism, classism, and religionism. They 
may be in the church or far from the church, but they are not far 
from the kingdom of God.365 
When the church recognises and accepts that it is not enacting or 
approximating, but simply anticipating, the kingdom, it is called to seek new 
and transformed relationships, which necessitates a new perception of 
what lies outside the church but within creation. Stout highlights that, for 
Barth366 as for others, the fallen church of fallen individuals is not set apart 
from the non-Christian world and can indeed never be so before the 
eschaton. As Barthian ethicist David Haddorff makes clear, an ecclesial 
theology which considers itself above “eavesdropping” on the world “leads 
to a wrong understanding of the person (as saint but not sinner), the church 
(as excess but not defect), and the world (as fallen but not redeemed).”367 
Nigel Biggar questions why Hauerwas’ resistance to the world 
extends beyond opposition to selfish individualism to complete dismissal of 
the whole of liberalism, given that liberalism can be humane, polyglot and 
accommodating. He asks, “Does it issue, ironically, from an all too worldly 
anxiety about identity, self-definition, and boundaries?”368 In short, 
Hauerwas’ picture of the church-world relationship is one which tends 
towards the negative and the monodirectional: the justified and sanctified 
church tells the world what it is, and in so doing witnesses that its ways are 
not the ways of God.369 More recently, Hauerwas seems at times to accept 
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that the sin of the church is manifest; but this is only when the church is 
spoken of in a vacuum. When Hauerwas’ focus is on the world, and its 
relation to the church, the dichotomy in his rhetoric reappears. In his 2012 
Presidential Address to the Society of Christian Ethics, Hauerwas claimed 
that “the world has trouble acknowledging that we are wounded animals.”370 
This is true; but it is equally true for the church. Any binary-oppositional 
model of church and world is problematic for talk of transforming 
relationships: if we are called as Christians to attend to others as valued 
individuals, with concern for their flourishing as well as our own, we fall 
short whenever we adhere to such absolute boundaries. 
 C. Melissa Snarr argues similarly, focusing on Hauerwas’ emphasis 
on truthfulness; an emphasis which causes him to advocate living 
consistent with the Christian narrative over any concerns of temporal 
justice.371 Snarr rejects this, writing that Christians 
are called to be concerned about public policies because they are 
called to love their neighbour. Their religious lives do not float above 
their existence in the world, and their existence in the world is 
always affected by political decisions. To think otherwise is the 
privilege of the privileged few.372 
This is one of the most significant problems Hauerwas’ work poses for any 
relational theology. His separation of church and world, effected via the 
language of narrative communities, is such that faithful adherence to the 
norms of the church can obscure the story of sanctified relationality running 
through scripture. More simply, Hauerwas’ particular blend of narrative 
theory and church-world dualism can produce self-contradictory 
consequences. The story of Jesus’ earthly ministry, central to the 
Hauerwasian framework, shows us the need to break down the world’s 
boundaries;373 but if the perceived selfishness of liberal culture is taken as a 
cue for Christians to withdraw from political action,374 new boundaries are 
drawn up, and new relationship avoided. 
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 Aaron Conley situates Hauerwas’ strong boundary between church 
and world in his adherence to the “master narrative” of Constantinianism, 
inherited from Yoder.375 This is a reading of church history which sees the 
early church as divorced from worldly politics, highlighting the church’s later 
failures as outgrowths of complicity with the state – an order created when 
Constantine sponsored Christianity as the official state religion. Regardless 
of the extent to which this is true, Conley suggests, the key problem lies in 
how church history and narrative are read through the Constantinian 
master narrative. Similarly to Biggar’s question over delineation of identity, 
Conley argues that Hauerwas’ use of Constantinianism to define and 
delineate his own theological narrative leaves certain elements (i.e.,, those 
which do not fit) neglected or obscured.376 Hauerwas’ framework struggles 
with secular virtue and liberal Christians because any adherence to a 
master narrative will hamper examination of traditional norms. This has 
certainly been the case regarding the location of vegetarianism within 
church history: a popular master narrative of ‘Christian freedom’ from 
dietary regulation has been allowed to obscure the not-insignificant 
episodes of vegetarianism practiced faithfully by Christians in different 
times and places, and for different reasons.377 Those on the margins suffer 
whenever truths are cropped in service to a master narrative: this has been 
the case too often for the church’s ‘heretics’, as well as for women and 
minorities; and, it might be argued, for animals too. 
 
Summary 
Stanley Hauerwas’ framework for Christian ethics is rooted in communal 
character formation: a rightly formed Christian character will see the world 
through the lens of the Christian narrative, living out the virtues embodied 
by Jesus as best they are able, not seeking worldly power but recognising 
their dependence on God, and so living in the hope of the peaceable 
kingdom. Being so formed involves the realisation that one’s will is 
constrained by sin’s perpetual presence in the relational networks of the 
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world: simultaneously, however, it involves the joyous acceptance of grace, 
through which one can be sanctified and so find true freedom. This freedom 
lies not in the capacity to do whatever one wants, but in the opening of new 
possibilities for life-in-relationship. 
Having outlined Hauerwas’ theological-ethical framework – focusing 
on the example of Jesus’ life and ministry, and Hauerwas’ critique of 
liberalism – and having found them sympathetic to chapter 3’s theology of 
human-animal relationality, attention was turned to the criticism that 
Hauerwas’ understanding of the church-world relationship is unrealistically 
monodirectional. On this matter, Yoder issues his own warning in The 
Politics of Jesus: “What is Caesar’s and what is God’s are not on different 
levels, so as never to clash; they are in the same arena.”378 Yoder goes on 
to add that the cross of Christ’s crucifixion is “a cross identified as the 
punishment of a man who threatens society by creating a new kind of 
community leading a radically new kind of life.”379 What is radically new 
about this life is, at least in part, the sanctification of our relationality that 
grace can work; a transformation that will involve seeking to serve our 
fellows. The question I will answer in this chapter and the next is whether 
embodying this necessitates a dietary choice. 
 
Human-Animal Relationality, Christian Nonviolence, and Dietary 
Ethics 
Hauerwas is known for dealing with a range of pressing social issues in the 
process of working out his arguments about Christianity, the church, and 
society. Furthermore, it is a fundamental proposition of his work that our 
theology should be our ethics. It is interesting, in light of this, that 
engagement with dietary issues constitutes only a minor footnote to his 
body of work. From the perspective of the theology outlined in the previous 
chapter this may appear doubly odd, because ways of relating God calls us 
to are explicitly recognised by Hauerwas when he writes that “The church is 
a people on a journey who insist on living consistent with the conviction that 
God is the lord of history. They thus refuse to resort to violence in order to 
secure their survival.”380 If our transformed understanding of worldly 
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relationships includes how we relate to those animals in whom we 
recognise relationality and share mutuality, a clear maxim might be derived 
from this alone: if you don’t need to kill to eat, don’t. 
Having considered Hauerwas’ theological framework, and the 
negative distortion of relationship which he locates in liberal individualism, it 
is worth attempting to bring these into conversation with the call towards 
extra-human relationships which chapter 3 proposed as a faithful response 
to God’s transformative grace. Although such a move may seem unusual, I 
believe it will be helpful, before applying Hauerwas’ theology to the 
embodied practice of diet, to first consider Hauerwas’ own application of his 
theology to another embodied practice. This is the issue of abortion,381 still 
a difficult question for theologians both liberal and conservative, perhaps 
particularly so in Hauerwas’ native USA. Parallel to the argument above 
that rights-language should not be central to any theology of animal 
liberation, Hauerwas argues that the focus of any argument over abortion 
should not be on determining whether the foetus is “fully human” (and 
therefore deserving of human rights).382 To do this, he argues, would only 
underwrite the Cartesian worldview wherein rationality is a prerequisite of 
full humanity and full rights; a position which diminishes or ignores the 
rights of foetuses, babies, those with learning difficulties or mental illness, 
and animals. 
Instead of the language of rights, Hauerwas argues that our concern 
with respect to abortion should be how the church relates to children. For 
Christians, having children ought to be a sign of their belief that “in spite of 
evidence to the contrary, God rules this world.”383 In the face of the selfish 
individualism of the surrounding world, having children testifies to the 
Christian belief that this world does not belong to the materially powerful 
but to God; and that the newborn therefore have the hope of transformed 
relationships come the peaceable kingdom. Any negative attitude 
Christians have to abortion is therefore “but an aspect of their conviction 
that they must be people who are ever ready to welcome children into the 
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world.”384 The church is a community of character whose emphasis on 
nonviolent relationship is in opposition to the selfish individualism which 
sees children as simultaneously obligation (having children being culturally 
normative) and burden (being objectively a drain on resources). 
Christians cannot oppose abortion by talking about failure to respect 
the human life of the foetus because we share no recognisable form of life 
or common response with the foetus385 in the way that a white person does 
with a black person, or a man does with a woman (to compare the abortion 
debate to recent and ongoing liberation efforts). Similarly, dietary pacifists 
will struggle to combat the exploitation of nonhuman animals by referring to 
shared interests, because the phenomenological gap between ourselves 
and other animals (which warns against reductive accounts of animal 
agency and relationality) limits any common response with them.386 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, we know what it is to be an animal, and 
the righteous know the needs of their animal387 – just as the righteous know 
the needs of foetuses – but shared animality is not the same as knowing 
what it is to be a particular animal, and there are limits to what we can say 
for them. 
There is nothing faulty with the perception of foetuses as other. 
Neither is there anything fundamentally wrong with a parallel perception of 
animals: as the feminist vegetarian scholar Carol Adams contends, 
“Animals are not equal to humans... [and we] need to develop an ethic that 
recognises this.”388 Animals’ status as other in no way reduces our 
responsibility to them. We should not be concerned with establishing that 
we are similar to unborn foetuses and animals: arguing on these grounds 
leads to the sectarian conclusion that those who are different are 
undeserving of our attention. Instead, our concern should fall on the 
community we want to be. As a Christian community seeking to trust in 
God’s sanctifying grace, looking to the example of Jesus’ incarnate life to 
learn virtuous perception and action, our focus should be on the effort for 
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novel relationships in the world, in anticipation of the kingdom. Regardless 
of similarity or difference, the call to nonviolent relationship which 
constitutes life imago Christi places upon Christians the obligation to 
respond, with love, even to those with whom we cannot fully identify. 
Yoder provided structural inspiration for the commonality of the 
animal creation when he wrote that “Christians are by definition committed 
to positing the larger commonality of all mankind, rather than the territorial 
unit, as their homeland.”389 The whole (human) creation, not just the nation 
state, is for Yoder our community: but if we recognise that all animals are 
part of creation, at least some of whom are in some way relational, and all 
of whom are ultimately dependent on God, then to remove national 
boundaries and neglect to attend at all to the human-nonhuman binary is to 
arbitrarily limit our involvement within creation. Aaron Gross has argued, 
similarly to Carol Adams,390 that it does little good to shift the balance of a 
binary construct if one does nothing to attempt to deconstruct the binary 
itself.391 Slavoj Žižek writes, with reference to the unhelpfully reductive 
claim (critiqued and dismissed in chapter 2) that humans are unique in their 
rationality and command of speech, that “it is not enough to say that, while 
such a determination of animals as speechless, etc., is wrong, the 
determination of humans as rational, speaking, etc., is right, so that we just 
have to provide a more adequate definition of animality – the entire field is 
false.”392 To attend to racial or national boundaries without doing similarly 
for species boundaries is to limit the potential of God’s grace and joy in 
creation to the human part of it: our shared covenantal history and the 
cosmic nature of Incarnation and reconciliation are not given their due. To 
return to Yoder: 
When we speak of the pacifism of the messianic community, we 
move the focus of ethical concern from the individual asking himself 
about right and wrong in his concern for his own integrity, to the 
human community experiencing in its life a foretaste of God's 
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kingdom. The pacifistic experience is communal in that it is not a life 
alone for heroic personalities but a society.393 
As a community of character the church is called to reject selfish 
individualism, anticipating the peaceable kingdom through the practice of 
nonviolence, towards animals both human and nonhuman. As Yoder – not 
himself concerned with vegetarianism – asserts at the end of The Politics of 
Jesus, “A social style characterised by the creation of a new community 
and the rejection of violence of any kind is the theme of New Testament 
proclamation from beginning to end.”394 This connection between 
nonviolence and human-animal relationships is not an external ideal 
imposed upon scripture: Jacob’s last words to Simeon and Levi, where their 
murder of men and hamstringing of oxen are condemned in the same 
breath (Gen. 49:5-6), shows a precedent for such a connection going back 
to Genesis. Dietary pacifism, by making an embodied ethical claim – that 
Christians should seek relationships with other animals which ensure 
mutual flourishing as far as possible, and so should not eat other relational 
animals without necessity – makes praxis from this precedent. 
The implications of recognising nonhuman animal relationality – and 
our calling to respond to them – need not only be manifest among Christian 
vegetarians. All Christians, in seeking the sanctification of their creaturely 
relationships, can strive to live more generously towards their animal 
brothers and sisters. Those Christians who do come to identify as 
vegetarian or dietary pacifist, however, are able to acknowledge, through 
their dietary practices, commonality with their fellow relational creatures. In 
this way, dietary pacifists aim to live with other animals in the image of the 
God who created, affirmed, and will redeem all creation. Dietary pacifism, 
then, anticipates the peaceable kingdom, and the end to violence it will 
bring. If, conversely, one neither practices vegetarianism nor reflects on the 
theological-ethical significance of diet at all, one neglects one’s relational 
engagement with creation and so ends up “eating in exile”: 
When we eat well, we honour and accept responsibility for the gifts 
of God given to each other for the furtherance of life. We move 
more deeply and more sympathetically into the membership of 
creation. But when we eat in exile we eat alone and with 
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considerable violence, without deep connection or affection, 
experiencing food and each other as mere objects and threats or as 
the means to our power, control, and convenience.395 
In chapter 3, I outlined the fundamental relational link between the 
Incarnation – which looks back to creation and covenant, and forwards to 
the eschaton – and the peaceable kingdom. In this chapter, I have 
discussed the inversion of power relationships which characterised Jesus’ 
life, enacted for all time by his crucifixion, which is so central to the 
Hauerwasian framework. If we anticipate the kingdom without recognising 
the crucifixion’s victory over sin, death, and the hierarchical relationships of 
the world, our own worldly relationships (with humans and with other 
animals) cannot be transformed through our response to God. If we do not 
live ex-centrically, attending to the fractured relationships which make up 
creation, it is hard to argue that we are living as faithfully as we could. 
Hauerwas stresses that the theological enterprise is embodied and situated 
in particular contexts and standpoints:396 today those of us fortunate 
enough to live in North America or Western Europe (to say the least) rarely 
need to kill to eat – and neither do we need to get other people to kill 
animals for us to eat! Looking towards the eschaton, and in so doing 
working to will as God wills in the world as it is, those Christians for whom 
vegetarianism is a practicable option are faced with a moral imperative to 
consider (if not to change) their dietary practices. 
To change dietary practices for this reason is an explicitly positive 
act of relationship, something perhaps best understood by considering the 
way in which cattle farming is a negatively relational act. We see this when, 
for example, the individual cow destined for slaughter is designated as 
“beef”: her individuality, even her status as a living member of a particular 
species, is collapsed into a term which lays bare the reductive and 
destructive nature of humanity’s relationship with her. Not a particular cow, 
not even a cow in general; but beef, a food product, whose evisceration 
and consumption is explicitly recognised long before it is actually enacted. 
Human relationship with the beef-cow is not concerned with her individual 
flourishing, but solely with what can be gained from her ordained death. 
Our relationship with the animal creation suffers from the self-centred 
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individualism Hauerwas locates in the liberal narrative: animals should not 
be approached with the question “How can I make use of this creature?” 
but “How should I relate, as a Christian, to my fellow?” This kind of reflexive 
openness is vital for any work towards new relationship, be it with humans 
or other animals; and it is surely necessary if human dominion is to more 
truthfully be practiced in the image of God, encompassing charity and 
service rather than domination. 
The call for Christians to seek sanctified relationships does not 
mean that individuals can never benefit from particular relationships or 
exchanges. Rather, it means that Christians, appropriately formed in the 
narrative of self-giving love, need not feel that personal or mutual benefit is 
necessary in each and every relational transaction. Grace does not usher 
human creatures into self-denying asceticism: instead, it calls humans to 
relate to creation in a way which faithfully anticipates the kingdom to come. 
One paradigmatic human-animal relationship, that between pet-
keeper and pet, generally involves mutual benefit: Stephen Webb writes 
that 
Animals are beneficial to us in part... because they are indifferent to 
our social status, age, health, beauty, and other variables. Pets are 
a source of constant affection in lives that can change quickly and 
without warning.397 
As with inter-human relationships, however, it does not follow that the 
presence of personal benefit inimical to genuine and mutual relationship. 
The combined realities of our status as flawed creatures, the primacy of 
nonviolence seen in the example of Jesus’ life, and the recognition of 
animal relationality lead to an account of human-animal relationships which 
is open to the possibility of these relationships being affected by grace. As 
humans we are God’s creatures, part of creation; and so too are other 
animals. If Christians are called to re-examine their ways of relating to 
nonhuman animals, and if they are similarly called to reject violence in the 
world as it is, it logically follows from this that abstention from animal flesh 
(or even animal products) is a dietary option that needs, at least, to be 
seriously considered. Commenting on the presence of nonhuman animals 
in scripture, Webb writes that 
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The Bible contains no animal magic, animals are rarely symbolic of 
a greater mystery, and animals do not influence human affairs. In a 
word, the Bible is more realistic than romantic about the world of 
animals... [It] treats animals as others who are really different and 
yet similar enough to merit kindness and to be included in God’s 
plan for the world. By treating animals as animals, the Jewish 
tradition has been able consistently to insist on fair play between 
humans and animals while acknowledging the special role that 
humans have in that relationship, an outlook that has ample 
scriptural warrant.398 
I would like to nuance Webb’s claim that animals do not influence human 
affairs in scripture: there are times when they clearly do, from the wild 
animals visiting justice on Israel in Hosea 2 to the whale swallowing and 
then ejecting Jonah. In most of these incidents,399 however, the animals do 
not act independently or for their own purposes, as is the case in some 
mythologies: here, the animals act in faithful response to God, 
demonstrating the covenantal relationship between themselves and God 
and also with humans, emphasising the relational networks we share and 
the responsibility we have to our fellows. Webb’s point is that in scripture 
animals are neither mythologized nor degraded: they are animals, part of 
God’s creation and worthwhile for that reason alone. In Genesis 1, the first 
creation is nonviolent and vegetarian,400 while land animals are made on 
the same day as humans and are pronounced good independently of 
them.401 Adam names the animals,402 showing a personal connection that 
acknowledges the particularity of his fellow creatures and the ways in which 
his relationality is bound up with theirs; an act which emphasises that 
“Creatures cannot and were never meant to exist in isolation or separation 
from each other. Kinship and harmony, mutuality and intimacy are to be the 
rule of healthy life together.”403 
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Later in Genesis we see the first instances of a recurrent theme in 
the Bible, the language of “all flesh”404 (as opposed to “all people” or “all 
human flesh”). Only post-Fall, and particularly post-Flood, do we see this 
harmony dislocated and human exploitation of creation begin in earnest:405 
even then, legislation is made describing the ideal diet as flesh-free (Deut. 
8:7-10) and extending the Sabbath rest to cattle (Exo. 20:10). God’s 
ultimate will for creation remains cast in the language of a new vegetarian 
garden (Isa. 11:6-9). The message to be drawn here for Christians 
reconsidering how they relate to others animals is simple: if we can trust in 
God’s power and Jesus’ example to sustain us in a life of nonviolence 
within the relational networks that constitute human society, and if we 
recognise our place alongside other relational animals within the wider 
creation, we are liberated to seek sanctified relationships with all animals, 
and so consider the extension of nonviolent practices into the dietary arena. 
If we are called to transformed relationship with nonhuman animals, dietary 
pacifism is a serious option for discipleship.406 Through critical conversation 
with the article in which Hauerwas applied his framework to thinking about 
human-animal relationality and diet, I aim to begin to test the adequacy of 
the theological-ethical work undertaken thus far. Is dietary pacifism an 
application of Hauerwasian ethics which Hauerwas could find tenable? 
 
“The Chief End of All Flesh” 
“The Chief End of All Flesh”, an article co-authored by Hauerwas and John 
Berkman, is a valuable example of the application of Hauerwas’ 
eschatological and ecclesiological ethics to human-animal relationality. 
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Through a detailed and critical conversation with “The Chief End of All 
Flesh”, I hope firstly to consider how well dietary pacifism as discussed thus 
far fits with Hauerwas’ own understanding of what his theology reveals 
about human-animal relationality; as well as drawing out further theological 
questions pertaining to how humans relate to other animals in creation. The 
key questions that emerge in conversation with “The Chief End of All Flesh” 
concern how human-animal relationships impact upon human and animal 
identity; what ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ mean in the context of theological ethics; 
and whether sacrifice can be Christian if it is not self-sacrifice. Exploring 
these questions, and how they relate to Hauerwas’ theology more 
generally, highlights new and important points of consideration for dietary 
pacifism, which I will go on to explore. 
Building in “The Chief End of All Flesh” from a relational 
understanding of the triune God, and the humans created imago Dei, 
Hauerwas and Berkman stress that 
The only significant theological difference between humans and 
animals lies in God's giving humans a unique purpose. Herein lies 
what it means for God to create humans in God's image. A part of 
this unique purpose is God's charge to humans to tell animals who 
they are, and humans continue to do this by the very way they 
relate to other animals. We think there is an analogous relationship 
here; animals need humans to tell them their story, just as gentiles 
need Jews to tell them their story.407 
Hauerwas and Berkman are right in noting that we tell animals who they 
are, and have done so since Adam named his nonhuman companions in 
Eden.408 It is also worth noting that we tell animals who they are when we 
functionalize, symbolize and eat them, just as much as we do when we love 
and care for them: in the words of Carol Adams, the feminist and animal 
liberationist thinker, “A value hierarchy that is upheld by a logic of 
domination places animals so low on the hierarchy that their bodies can be 
viewed instrumentally.”409 In the epistemological act of defining nonhuman 
animals as sufficiently low in a devised hierarchy of nature that their bodies 
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are unproblematically available as food (or as research material), Adams 
suggests, those animals are turned from particular creatures to categorical 
objects, as concept grounds action grounds ontology.410 
It should be noted at this point that the relational process wherein 
humans tell nonhuman animals what they are is not monodirectional. Žižek, 
commenting on an encounter with an image of a laboratory animal, writes 
of 
seeing a photo of a cat after it had been subjected to some lab 
experiment in a centrifuge, its bones half-broken, its skin half-
hairless, its eyes looking helplessly into the camera... What [its sad 
gaze] expresses is perhaps the cat’s horror at having encountered 
The Animal, namely ourselves, humans: what the cat sees is us in 
all our monstrosity, and what we see in its tormented gaze is our 
own monstrosity.411 
In telling animals who they are – in this case, an object to be used – we 
learn something of who we are: in this case, an animal, a creature of God, 
who chooses material progress over attending, with concern and open 
eyes, to another of God’s relational creatures. The relationship between 
human and nonhuman in this instance is not monodirectional; but it is 
tragic. 
This multidirectional image of human-animal relationships is but a 
reflection of how God relates to creation – something explored in chapter 
3’s opening sections. In God’s relationship with human creatures, who are 
called to respond to grace and so joyfully conform their will to God’s,412 and 
with the nonhuman creatures who praise God in their very being,413 the 
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relationships are joyfully multidirectional. The same is true of humanity’s 
relationships within creation: as the image of God, we are called to rejoice 
in the other in their particularity and relationality (that is, as individuals and 
also as members of wider relational networks).414 If we are to tell animals 
what they are, then, we must also attend to the myriad ways in which we 
define ourselves and our relational networks through this process of 
telling.415 
The realisation that humans define themselves (and the distorted 
relational networks they live within) whenever they tell animals what they 
are offers a valuable perspective on the presence of nonhuman animals in 
scriptural descriptions of the relationship of God to creation, and of Christ’s 
action in and for the world. David Clough draws attention to the description 
of YHWH in Isaiah 31 as a lion; fierce, territorial, and unable to be shaken 
by any number of people called out against it.416 For Clough, the lion can be 
understood in this manner as a “partial image of God”;417 a revelation both 
in relation to how humans know lions and how humans know God. When 
we look to the lion, or to the ant (Prov. 6:6), and consider their ways – when 
we look to them and strive to consider them in their state of relative 
flourishing,418 which will be different for each creature – we relate to them 
as individuals with whom we recognise commonality. In so doing, we open 
ourselves to the possibility of learning about God (and ourselves) through 
them, as well as learning about ourselves and others from God. This 
understanding of how humans relate to other animals, bound up with them 
in the relational networks of creation – fallen, and yet declared good by God 
– offers insight into the connection between understanding Christ as Lamb 
of God and the modern industry of factory farming. Aaron Gross puts the 
question to the Judeo-Christian tradition well: 
It seems astonishing, for example, that it could be a matter of 
indifference to Jewish and Christian thought that not merely the 
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shepherd but the entire tradition of husbandry to which the 
shepherd belonged has been largely replaced in the last century by 
corporately owned factory farms and assembly-line slaughter and 
processing facilities. These new and global reconfigurations in 
animal agriculture are potentially as theologically significant as the 
notion of shepherding, but they remain largely unthought.419 
If observing nonhuman animals in their states of relative flourishing has the 
potential to teach us both about the animal in question and about the God 
who created that particular animal, the multiple and deep distortions of right 
relationship at play in the industrialised networks of factory farming ought to 
be a matter of deep concern for Christians (and, as Gross notes, for Jews 
as well). If our primary experiences of lambs and shepherds is collapsed 
into factory farming, and the commodified (and usually invisible)420 mass of 
lambs, sheep, pigs, and cows raised and slaughtered without concern for 
their pre-slaughter experiences, we can at best make only partial sense of 
Jesus as the Lamb of God.421 This is not to say that we cannot still learn 
about individual lambs, human-animal relationality, and the action of Christ 
in such a context: certainly, the gross distortion of human relationality which 
factory farming represents speaks to a profound corruption of the relational 
networks of creation in a manner reminiscent of humanity’s tragic response 
to the Incarnation. We should remember here that the death of Christ on 
the cross was not undone but worked through in the resurrection:422 to live 
more closely for creation, then, requires that factory farming and similarly 
destructive relational networks are neither denied nor ignored but made 
visible.423 From that visibility, and the lamentation and confession that 
should proceed from it, can come the beginning of the process of healing; a 
microcosm of the cosmic healing inaugurated on the first Easter day.424 
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Eschatological Dietary Ethics: Humans, Animals, Creation, Nature 
Running through “The Chief End of All Flesh” is a key component of 
Hauerwas’ work, involving acknowledgement of sin’s omnipresence within 
human relationality. This proceeds from Hauerwas’ wariness about rights-
language: here, Hauerwas and Berkman argue that we should begin not 
with ‘rights’ but with God’s creation of the world. This world, now fallen and 
containing human and animal predation, is not perfect; and so we are 
cautioned against confusing the way things are now with the way God 
intends them to be.425 We must read the eschatological hope of Romans 
8:19-21426 alongside God’s ultimate will for creation as expressed in Isaiah 
11:6-9.427 This world, as creation, is less than its Creator: to talk of natural 
law or natural order is to neglect the eschatological hope of Christianity by 
placing more significance in the way things are than the way things ought to 
be.428 
This seemingly simple acknowledgement – that nature is creation 
fallen – is in fact a powerful one, worth considering a little more closely. In 
the first volume of his Scientific Theology, Alister McGrath highlights how 
“In modern western thought, the term ‘nature’ has acquired tones of 
innocence and nostalgia, perhaps evoking the memory of a distant rural 
past, whose idealized simplicities contrast sharply with the harsh realities of 
life in the urban west.”429 ‘Nature’ as most commonly used in modern 
English is not an empirical reality so much as a philosophical construct, 
usually serving an ideological function430 in a Derridean opposed binary.431 
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As was discussed in chapter 2, nonhuman animals most commonly suffer 
in this way by their reduction into a non-sentient monolith, set against 
rational and relational humankind – McGrath has more in mind the perverse 
relationship between the idealization of nature and the onwards expansion 
of human urbanity. In this way, nature is more an ideological tool than 
something that actually exists; and in this way, it is also highly variable. The 
general reception of the famous stanza from Tennyson’s In Memoriam,432 
referring to “nature red in tooth in claw,” highlights this ideological use of 
nature (as well as exemplifying how a reductive binary between “human” 
and “nonhuman” hampers reflection): 
Man... 
Who trusted God was love indeed 
And love Creation’s final law – 
Though Nature, red in tooth and claw 
With ravine, shrieked against his creed.433 
Note first that my consideration of this stanza is neither the result of literary 
or historical criticism, but of theological reflection. We are informed that 
humans who know God, and know God is love, are capable of living lives of 
love themselves (for love is “Creation’s final law”, following the pattern of its 
Creator). Meanwhile, Nature, set against humanity, is amoral and self-
centred, concerned with propagation and advancement and unconcerned 
with the means by which these are procured. This is a provocative and 
productive observation, particularly with regards to chapter 3’s discussion 
of nonhuman sin. But looking at the two ways of living Tennyson here 
outlines – selfless love and self-preservation – can we say that the human 
creation, as it is now in actuality, is categorically in the former, and nature 
categorically in the latter? Humans may not be red in tooth and claw, but 
that as a species we spill blood – and often for reasons far less noble than 
the propagation of our genes – is undeniable. And what of Passion, the 
cannibal chimp examined (alongside Clough’s own examination) in the prior 
chapter? It was suggested that her actions might be thought of as both 
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natural and sinful. As Tennyson wrote, we trust that God is love indeed; but 
much like those who have faith sufficient to move a mountain (Mt. 17:20), 
the existence of any human who can embody that love, beyond the divine 
person of Jesus Christ, is an impossible ideal in creation as it is now. 
Nature is creation fallen; and humans are a part of nature. 
There exists an interesting and somewhat paradoxical relationship 
between claims that humans are set apart from nature (red in tooth and 
claw) and arguments which defend a particular human practice as morally 
acceptable because it is natural. A key example of this is hunting: I have in 
mind a piece from the Hansard, in which James Thompson asserted in 
defence of fox-hunting that people “who believe in God must come to terms 
with a creation of mutual hunting and eating.”434 In our inter-human 
relationships, a defence of ‘naturalness’ would presumably be insufficient 
justification for hunting or killing one’s fellows: when Thompson turns to 
human-fox relationships, however, not only is ‘natural’ taken to mean 
‘morally neutral’, but the efficacy of grace is implicitly denied to these 
relational networks through the implicit claim that God cannot redeem 
human-fox relationality. A romanticized and simplistic understanding of 
nature is used as an ex post facto justification of fox-hunting, in a way 
which bypasses proper theological reflection on creation, creatures, and 
Creator. 
To refer to human animal nature as legitimating flesh-eating betrays 
a peculiar blind spot with regards to Christian responsibility. It is, 
biologically speaking, quite natural for humans to fight and kill each other; 
and for strong virile males to take as many mates as they can in 
observance of the biologically-rooted tenet of the survival of the fittest. To 
recognise and admit this is to take a responsible and realistic view of the 
fallen world we inhabit: what is problematic is when the definition of ‘nature’ 
is allowed to undulate as need dictates, rendering one’s description of both 
creation and nature theologically bankrupt. Contra Thompson, for humans 
who have said Yes to God and so have accepted God’s sanctifying grace, 
killing without necessity is an unacceptable relationship which both denies 
that grace can be holistic and refuses to acknowledge the value and 
commonality shared with the other. In the words of Andrew Linzey, “The 
natural order does not constitute a moral order so that we are beholden to 
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follow whatever we observe therein. On the contrary, behaving morally 
sometimes involves acting contrary to what we perceive in nature, or 
against our natural impulses, such as the desire for revenge.”435 There is a 
strong and consistent precedent – constituted by the whole of theological 
ethics – for recognising grace’s transformational power over our biological 
proclivities; and it is not at all clear that (even in a conservatively 
anthropocentric cosmology) the transformation grace can work is limited to 
human relationships with other humans. 
Hauerwas and Berkman share my caution about the conflation of 
creation and nature, noting the danger of moving from recognition of animal 
predation as natural to the construction of a “survivalist” ethic, wherein 
anything which ensures human survival is de facto justifiable.436 Such an 
ethic must be avoided 
because Christians simply do not have an overriding stake in the 
survival of the earth or of our own survival. As God’s creatures, our 
‘chief end’ is not to survive but to be capable of serving one 
another, and in doing so to serve as signs of the kingdom of God.437 
This is a significant point, and one well-made. As Christians who worship 
God – the Father, who created us imago Dei; the Son, who redeemed us 
and opened the possibility of new relationship; and the Spirit, which moves 
in us as we live towards the kingdom – we are called to live not curved in 
on ourselves but ex-centrically and peaceably, in anticipation of God’s 
peaceable kingdom. “Survival is not and cannot be a proper end for the 
moral life.”438 
Hauerwas’ anti-survivalist claim can be extended: as Christians we 
should not look to root our beliefs or practices in the way things are now, 
but should focus on the way things will become. Christians are called to 
respond to grace by rejoicing in creation and its Creator, striving to live for 
the world and so attending with love to individual creatures as God attends 
to us.439 If we are to talk of natural relationships and responsibilities, we 
should not talk of living and eating as the wolf does now but as he will in the 
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kingdom prophesied by Isaiah; not of living in the corrupted relational 
networks of the world,440 but of the reconciled and redeemed relational 
networks of the eschaton. This does not require a refusal to see the world 
as it is now, but it does require the recognition that the world as it is is 
neither normative for Christian praxis nor an end in itself. 
Above all, add Hauerwas and Berkman, we must remember that 
God is the end of all creation.441 If we differ from other animals – which we 
do, although the matter is not so simple as a bifurcation of human and 
nonhuman animals442 – our difference comes in our unique telos, not in any 
fundamental ontos. God is the ultimate end of creation: animals (including 
human animals) are not. In the language of Andrew Linzey, if we are higher 
animals, called to higher relationships, we must exemplify this in being 
servants for the lower animals:443 
In light of the scriptural witness that humans and other animals 
share in the ultimate end, which is God’s peaceable kingdom, we 
thus believe that each and every creature is created to manifest 
God’s glory. Animals will not manifest God’s glory insofar as their 
lives are measured in terms of human interests, but only insofar as 
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their lives serve God’s good pleasure. Similarly, humans manifest 
God’s glory when we learn to see animals as God sees animals, 
recognising that animals exist not to serve us, but rather for God’s 
good pleasure.444 
Animals are a part of creation; creatures who respond to God in a way that 
serves God’s good pleasure. If we wish to better manifest God’s glory, we 
are called to respond to other animals as God responds to them; with ex-
centric love, open to relationship, closed to the possibility of selfishly doing 
harm. Hauerwas and Berkman go some way towards recognising this in 
their comparison of dietary debates with the theological tension between 
pacifist and just war traditions, casting vegetarianism as (potentially) an 
eschatological and relational act of discipleship. 
Just as we believe that Christians are not called to be nonviolent 
because nonviolence is a strategy to free the world from war, but 
because as Christians we cannot conceive of living other than 
nonviolently in a world of war, so it may also be true that Christians 
are called to live nonviolently towards animals in a world of meat-
eaters... Christian vegetarianism might be understood as a witness 
to the world that God’s creation is not meant to be at war with itself. 
Such a witness does not entail romantic conceptions of nature or of 
our fallen creation but rather is an eschatological act.445 
As has already been argued in this chapter, our status as beings created 
imago Dei should not lead us to think that those relational networks which 
constitute creation and which God is interested in are limited to those made 
up of inter-human relationships. This much is recognised by Jürgen 
Moltmann when he writes of the triune God’s presence in and for creation: 
If the Creator is himself present in his creation by virtue of the Spirit, 
then his relationship to creation must be viewed as an intricate web 
of unilateral, reciprocal and many-sided relationships... relationships 
of mutuality which describe a cosmic community of living between 
God the Spirit and all his created beings.446 
                                                          
444
 Hauerwas and Berkman, “The Chief End of All Flesh”, 196. 
445
 Hauerwas and Berkman, “The Chief End of All Flesh”, 207-8. 
446
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An ecological doctrine of creation (London: SCM 
Press, 1985), 14. 
Page 135 of 287 
If it is in the depths of sin in creation – those places where the loving 
relational networks God intends for us are most corrupted – that God’s 
grace and active willing in the Spirit are most concentrated,447 we cannot 
neglect the possibility that relational networks involving nonhuman animals 
(and the creaturely networks of the environment) are willed to be healed by 
God as well.448 Vegetarianism might then be understood as an act of joyful 
worship of the God who created, affirmed, and will redeem all creation, 
performed within the world by practicing a diet which witnesses to the 
present corruption within commonly-accepted patterns of human-animal 
relationship;449 living for other animals in the image of the God who is for us 
now and in the eschaton. 
 
The Weapon of Choice: Human-Animal Relationality and the Language of 
Sacrifice 
In the conclusion to “The Chief End of All Flesh”, Hauerwas and Berkman 
consider the dietary implications of their thesis up to that point. They argue 
that, just as just war theory is a theory of exceptions to the rule of Christian 
nonviolence (and does not therefore justify war in general),450 so too is the 
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burden of proof on Christians who wish to eat animal flesh;451 a 
characteristically bold statement which parallels the logical conclusion of 
Barth’s emphasis on the significance of necessity for flesh-eating.452 This is 
immediately qualified, however, by the suggestion that Christians might yet 
be able to eat meat, if it is understood as an animal sacrifice made for 
human survival. 
If any form of meat-eating is to be justified for Christians, it must be 
understood as animals making a sacrifice for us that we might live, 
analogous to the way soldiers are seen to be making a sacrifice of 
their lives for their nation-state, empire or tribe. This is but a 
reminder that, as Christians, we cannot understand the story of our 
lives apart from the importance of sacrifice, because God sacrificed 
his son Jesus that we might live.453 
In this way, a defence of ‘just flesh-eating’ might be built upon the presence 
of sacrifice in the Christian narrative and tradition, from the sacrificial 
legislation of the Hebrew Bible to the Eucharistic enactment of Christ’s 
sacrifice for creation. Hauerwas and Berkman do not go so far as to build 
such a defence themselves,454 so much as propose theologically 
acceptable boundaries for a counter-defence of flesh-eating. In doing so, 
however, they recognise the dangers inherent in their brief appeal to 
sacrifice: 
We are aware that the language of sacrifice is dangerous language, 
and we have no desire to underwrite the way this language of 
sacrifice has so often been used in the past, and no doubt will 
continue to be used, to justify all kinds of murderous deeds. 
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However, Christians cannot give up the language of sacrifice if they 
are to be the kind of people Jesus has made possible.455 
“Giving up the language of sacrifice” is, in light of Christ’s sacrifice for all 
flesh and the Eucharistic ritual whereby the church as body of Christ 
performs this, certainly unacceptable if Christians are to live faithfully within 
their narrative traditions as “the kind of people Jesus has made possible.” It 
is, however, worth reflecting on how the language of sacrifice can be used 
(and misused) “to justify all kinds of murderous deeds,” in light of 
Hauerwas’ and Berkman’s comparison of “animals making a sacrifice for us 
that we might live” with “the way soldiers are seen to be making a sacrifice 
of their lives.” Placing the deaths of soldiers and the slaughtering of 
nonhuman animals alongside the crucifixion, we can see what might be 
crudely described as three different ‘classes’ of sacrifice, as pertains to the 
willing of those who are sacrificed. In short, to collapse the different types of 
what we call sacrifice into a monolith is – without further nuance – to 
undermine the call to new and beneficial human-animal relationships 
Hauerwas and Berkman have constructed up to this point in the essay. 
The crucifixion of Christ, where the mocking of Jesus on the cross 
as unable to save himself456 belies the divine power evident in his miracles 
(and the explicit acknowledgement of the material potential of that power in 
the wilderness457), is the willing death of an individual. Christ’s death is not 
self-sacrifice, but an acceptance by the Son of God of the demise visited 
upon him by sinful humanity – not to be undone but to be worked through in 
the resurrection.458 The death of soldiers in military conflict are – speaking 
in general terms – willed, but only implicitly (as opposed to the explicit 
acceptance of his crucifixion by Christ, at Gethsemane459 and then in his 
passivity during trial and execution460). Soldiers can accept the possibility 
that they will die – that is, the reality that their service puts their lives in 
danger – but the death of the individual soldier is not seen, prior to the fact, 
as a necessary sacrifice. Soldiers are willing,461 therefore, to accept the 
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possibility of their death, but do not explicitly acknowledge their sacrifice as 
inevitable. 
Feminist theologian Kelly Denton-Borhaug has written on American 
“war culture” and the central role sacrificial language plays in the ex post 
facto justification of the deaths of American soldiers: the deaths of young 
men are portrayed as a “necessary sacrifice” in the service of national 
security, or the ‘liberation’ of foreign peoples, not prior to the conflict but 
after the American casualties are announced.462 Such an understanding of 
the place of warfare in the world portrays not only violent conflict, but the 
deaths of individual human beings, as a necessary reality. This cannot but 
raise concerns parallel to those of Hauerwas and Yoder about the stifling of 
moral imagination463 that can arise when worldly realities such as armed 
conflict are deemed to be brute facts which the church is to relate to,464 
rather than sinful distortions which the church can stand against. 
Relationally, there is also the legitimate concern that such a reading of the 
telos of the soldier can affect the collapse of individual soldiers into their 
military function; their identity being subsumed into their role within the 
interrelated networks of modern warfare.465 The particularity of the 
individual soldier, although not explicitly denied, is collapsed into their end 
as a sacrifice466 – still lamentable, the tragedy of their death is ameliorated 
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by the depiction of its necessity in service of an allegedly transcendent end 
(nation, ideology, ethnos, tribe). 
How, in light of the explicitly willing sacrifice of Christ and the 
implicitly willing sacrifice of the soldier, should the call for Christians to 
understand flesh-eating “as animals making a sacrifice for us that we might 
live” be understood? As the phrasing of this question suggests, I believe 
that an important element of the Christian understanding of sacrifice is the 
foundational necessity of willing.467 Whatever one’s view of animal sacrifice, 
it is a fact that the nonhuman animal does not elect to be killed; whereas, in 
the words of Wirzba, 
Christ’s self-offering marks the ‘end’ or completion of sacrifice 
because he gives the unsurpassable expression to how self-offering 
leads to true life. He turns all of us into altars for the receiving and 
giving again of the gifts of God. He turns our bodies and our entire 
being into gifts to be given to others.468 
The affirmation of Jesus as the final and complete sacrifice, who atones 
and defeats sin for all time (Rom. 3:25; Heb. 2:17, 9:22, 9:26, 12:2; 1 Jn. 
2:2), is also an affirmation about the character of God. “Jesus’ death 
speaks to God’s way of being with the world... On the cross Jesus 
encountered the alienating and violent death of this world and transformed 
it into the self-offering death that leads to resurrection life.”469 Within such a 
reading, it seems difficult to continue to assert that it is appropriate for 
Christians to think of death inflicted on other animals as ‘sacrifice’, 
especially in the case of those who are fortunate enough to live in times 
and places where we do not depend on the death of other relational 
creatures for our survival. Wirzba writes that “A sacrifice is an offering from 
one’s livelihood and life,”470 which is appropriate and true – but if our 
livelihood and life do not depend on the death of nonhuman animals, to talk 
of their death as a sacrifice is to move away from self-offering towards 
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selfish destruction. If Christ’s sacrifice is the end of all sacrifice (Heb. 10:1-
18), this cannot faithfully be interpreted as a sacrifice which liberates us to 
love our fellow humans while simultaneously freeing us to abuse and 
exploit other animals as we wish. In the death of Christ, God become flesh, 
The sacrificial system in which animals are put to death is brought 
to a conclusion in the death of the animal in which God was 
enfleshed... For Israel, therefore, non-human animals were 
sacrificed for the sake of humans; in Christ, a human animal was 
sacrificed not for humans but for the sake of all creatures.471 
Clough here reads Christ’s death as an animal sacrifice which ends the 
need for animal sacrifice.472 The kingdom has not yet come, and violence is 
still pervasive in the world; but if Christians are called to tell the world what 
it is, and to live for the eschaton, not by “trying to force contingency into 
conformity”473 but by sinning boldly in their efforts to live for creation, then 
Christ’s self-offering cannot be inverted to other-sacrifice without 
undermining the transformation worked in Incarnation, crucifixion and 
resurrection. 
In his incarnate life and ugly death, Jesus Christ was a radical 
inversion of the distorted relationality of the world; a downwards movement 
from divine to creature, which Christians are called to spread outwards into 
creation. The Eucharist, understood at the sacramental level, is anamnesis: 
the bringing together of individual Christians into the body of Christ in and 
through the Spirit, and the memory474 of Christ’s passion, resurrection and 
ascension. Included in this remembrance is the knowledge of our complicity 
in – our being formed by, and in turn forming – the profoundly broken 
networks of relationship which led to the execution of the Son of God, and 
which continue to wound and kill today. In short, in communion the church 
simultaneously rejoices in God’s Incarnation and resurrection, and 
confesses that it was for our sins that Christ died. If we wish to be 
transformed in the process, sanctified by our acceptance of the self-offering 
of God’s Son, this cannot be done by baptising systemic violence visited 
upon others (and this includes, among other things, warfare and factory 
farming) with the language of sacrifice. Rather, we are to offer ourselves, in 
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order that we may become peaceable citizens of the kingdom that abides 
the end of history.475 Rowan Williams notes that the Eucharist is the 
sacrament which confirms “the church on earth as a fundamentally 
sacrificial phenomenon”: 
[The church] is a place where offering is made, and there is nothing 
surprising in its being described as a shrine or an altar, or its 
members as priests – though it is a shrine because it manifests the 
heavenly altar, the underlying reality of Christ’s intercession, and 
Christians are priests entirely in a derivative sense: they ‘offer’, 
which is the characteristic priestly act, but only because they are 
being offered by the eternal high priest, and because they have 
been made a worthy offering by the atonement achieved ephapax in 
the cross.476 
The offering of bread and wine, the body and blood of Christ, is a sacrifice 
which affirms that our offering to God is only possible through the 
revelatory, intercessory, and salvific action of Christ. Christian sacrifice is 
self-sacrifice. All this is not to say that there will be absolutely no 
circumstances in which a Christian might eat a nonhuman animal: nor do I 
believe that there are absolutely no circumstances in which a Christian 
might harm a human being. Such circumstances will, however, be 
exceptional, predicated by genuine necessity, and conducted with a prayer 
of confession. Christians are called to sacrifice of themselves for creation: 
an appeal to Christian sacrificial language, after Christ’s death has undone 
the need for sacrifice of others, is an unsuitable theological approach to 
considering our destructive relationships with others; particularly if, like 
Hauerwas and Berkman, we are concerned to avoid “justify[ing] all kinds of 
murderous deeds”. If the language of sacrifice is to be used, it must be the 
language of self-sacrifice – recognition of which reveals consumption of 
mass-produced animal flesh as sheer concupiscence;477 a capitulation to 
our senses over and against the particularity of the animal killed, contrary to 
God’s loving intimacy in and for creation. 
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Earlier in “The Chief End of All Flesh”, Hauerwas and Berkman 
state that “our practices with regard to other animals shape our beliefs 
about them”,478 a claim which echoes Carol Adams’ drawing together of 
ontology, epistemology and ethical practice into the argument that 
whenever animals’ bodies are instrumentalised and consumed, the 
potential for any relationship with them – let alone one transformed by 
grace – is denied.479 “The way we humans look at animals,” for Adams, 
“literally creates them as usable.”480 The cyclical and destructive 
relationships the flesh-farming industry, itself a clear and present symptom 
of sin’s distortion of creaturely relationality, stands in stark contrast to the 
thesis of “The Chief End of All Flesh”: that humans and animals are co-
members of creation;481 that transforming relationships with the animal 
creation is an eschatological act;482 and that, as Christians, our ultimate 
stake is not in our survival but in serving one another and in this way 
serving as signs of the kingdom.483 
If our ultimate stake is not in surviving but in serving, if we recognise 
other animals as relational individuals with whom we share significant 
commonality,484 and if we live in a part of the world where there is minimal 
difficulty in pursuing a vegetarian or even vegan diet, an appeal to sacrifice 
does not negate the radical implications of recognising God’s sanctifying 
grace at work in creation. If necessity is a prerequisite for faithfully using 
the language of sacrifice with regards to humans eating other animals, we 
must remember the ethical pitfalls of recasting specific exceptions as 
general maxims. Here, the danger is that a turn to sacrifice will hamper 
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recognition of nonhuman animals as particular creatures of God, and so 
hinder the attempt to present a holistic theological challenge to flesh-eating. 
Hauerwas and Berkman acknowledge this danger when introducing 
the language of sacrifice, and add further implicit qualification in the article’s 
concluding sentence: “In this time between the times, the good news for the 
other animals is that Christians do not need to ask the other animals to be 
part of a sacrifice that has no purpose in God's kingdom.”485 Giving 
eschatological grounding to a dietary ethic which acknowledges other 
animals as individuals with whom we are called into new and charitable 
relationships, Hauerwas and Berkman provide substantive support for the 
dietary pacifist argument constructed thus far. Their recourse to the 
language of sacrifice, however, is shown – via dialogue with Denton-
Borhaug, Clough, Yoder, and Hauerwas himself – to be no less problematic 
(and, practically, no less open to distortion) than the use of the same 
language in the context of warfare. 
If part of our calling as imago Dei is to tell nonhuman animals what 
they are (a process through which we also learn about ourselves, and our 
common Creator), then if we collapse individual human-animal 
relationships into the consumer-consumed dynamic, we are telling these 
animals that our shared commonality is only significant so long as there is 
something else for us to eat. Whatever (sinful, tragic) compromises might 
need to be made in the unknown future, we are called to rejoice in all 
creation’s relational networks. If circumstances of genuine necessity 
compromise human-animal relationship to the extent that an individual 
animal is reduced to a food source, this can be accepted with confession 
and lamentation in the secure knowledge of God’s justifying grace; the 
same grace that exhorts us to relate to nonhuman animals in the image of 
Christ and the hope of the kingdom. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, Hauerwas’ nonviolent, narrative-grounded, and 
communitarian theology has provided the framework upon which dietary 
pacifism can be constructed, in conversation with chapter 3’s theology of 
human-animal relationality. If we trust in God’s power to bring peace and do 
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not insist on our own,486 we are freed to no longer be selfish and 
exploitative ‘individuals’ but to truly follow Jesus’ example in our creaturely 
relationships; particularly with those animals (including humans) we 
recognise as being relational and responsible. The life of Jesus Christ 
reminds us of the importance of suffering servitude, the necessity of self-
sacrifice – to be understood in stark contrast to the imposition of ‘sacrifice’ 
on others – and also that the power of our dominion can only be 
understood through the New Testament inversion of hierarchy. This is not 
our world, but God’s, and we are animals in it: our differences from other 
animals neither abrogate that reality nor limit the exercise of right 
relationship with them. This exercise, for Christians who understand their 
creation imago Trinitas through the lens of Christ’s life and ministry, 
necessarily involves nonviolent living. 
 In conversation with “The Chief End of All Flesh” – and, before that, 
Jeffrey Stout’s critique of Hauerwas – I suggested that the Hauerwasian 
framework itself can legitimate understandings of witness and mission 
which obstruct the work of grace; understandings which could potentially 
limit the extension of right relationship beyond church boundaries, let alone 
species boundaries. Dietary pacifism does not follow in this direction – 
neither does it walk the same individualist path as the language of ‘rights’. 
Our focus should not be on ‘rights’ for animals, and the anthropocentrism 
rights-language underwrites; but rather on the dawning of the new creation 
as prophesied by Isaiah. In this way Christian vegetarians are able, through 
their diet, to recognise their responsibility to the animal creation; and in this 
way live in anticipation of God’s peaceable kingdom, and the end to 
violence we hope it will bring. In chapter 5, I develop and explore the 
dietary pacifist ethic thus far constructed, by considering some embodied 
and practical questions which arise whenever the attempt is made to make 
practice out of theory: questions of realism and idealism, and questions of 
degree and purity. To construct a theological-ethical framework for 
Christian vegetarianism is one step: to think through how dietary pacifism 
works in practice is another, which chapter 5 will take. 
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5. To Eat, or Not to Eat 
The Complexities of Dietary Pacifism 
 
In the last chapter, I considered the work of Stanley Hauerwas through the 
prism of chapter 3’s relational theology, outlining an ethic of dietary 
pacifism. Here, I turn to consider some of the more practical questions that 
arise whenever one attempts to situate and embody a particular moral 
theory. Dietary pacifism arises from recognising other animals as relational 
individuals, with whom we share commonality as creatures of God; moving 
from this to argue that we should not kill and eat our animal fellows if we do 
not need their death to secure our life. If, however, our theology is to be our 
ethics – as Hauerwas argues it must be – then how this will work in specific 
situations is not adequately or helpfully covered by a categorical maxim. 
There is a need for informed, prayerful, reflective engagement with specific 
cases:487 in this chapter I attempt to perform that engagement for some 
questions and complexities around the dietary pacifism articulated in 
chapter 4; and in chapters 6-8, I will look at how churches pray and reflect, 
as communities, on questions of animal and dietary ethics. Even the 
relatively straightforward suggestion of ceasing to eat meat raises 
questions over realism and idealism: is vegetarianism an ‘ideal’ diet; and if 
it is not, why is it worth practicing? It also raises related questions of degree 
and purity: are some diets, some ways of relating to nonhuman animals, 
theologically and ethically superior to others; and if they are, does that 
mean there is a dietary line beyond which Christians should not cross? 
In this chapter I will also outline (in conversation with David Clough) 
one possible typology of pacifisms, a necessary step in order to justify my 
claim to most appropriately extrapolate a theological pacifism into the 
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context of dietary ethics. It is worth clarifying at this juncture what I mean in 
reference to dietary pacifism and Christian vegetarianism; beyond the 
elemental level of referring to a Christian who does not eat animals. In 
talking of dietary pacifists, or Christian vegetarians, I refer to individuals 
who practice a vegetarian diet for reasons connected to their Christian faith. 
Note that this does not require knowledge or acceptance of the theology of 
chapter 3: this move is not intended to claim more adherents than my work 
deserves, but simply to acknowledge that many different casuistical and 
theological processes might lead one to abstain from animal flesh. 
‘Vegetarian’ is here used as a blanket term for any diet free from animal 
flesh: in instances where ‘vegan’ (understood as abstinence from animal 
flesh and all animal products) is used simultaneously, ‘vegetarian’ will be 
taken to refer more specifically to diets which contain no animal flesh but 
some animal products.488 
By defining Christian vegetarianism and then acknowledging that 
veganism is a distinct practice within vegetarianism, the complexities of 
dietary pacifism are foregrounded. Do vegans perceive the boundaries of 
what is acceptable relationship with nonhuman animals differently? Are 
they purer, or holier, or more sanctified in their engagement with the animal 
creation? In this chapter, I argue that questions concerning diet, like all 
questions of embodied living, are not best answered with deontological 
maxims and absolute boundaries. Karl Barth’s criticism of vegetarianism as 
wanton anticipation of the kingdom (and Norman Wirzba’s related criticism 
that Christian vegetarianism romanticizes a fallen creation); the different 
‘types’ of pacifism and how they relate to my work and Hauerwas’; parallels 
between dietary pacifism and military pacifism; Paul’s dietary advice to the 
Roman church; questions over degrees and purity; even the tension for 
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vegans concerning honey will be addressed in the attempt to nuance 
dietary pacifism without lapsing into legalism. Proceeding from this, a 
critical and relational comparison of Hebrew Bible animal sacrifice and 
modern factory farming will provide a situated theological case study 
concerned with the value of dietary pacifism as a Christian ethic. 
 
Wanton Anticipation? Eating for the Kingdom in a Fallen World 
Any theologian interested in vegetarianism must at some point engage with 
Karl Barth’s famous warning against it, as “a wanton anticipation of what is 
described by Isaiah 11 and Romans 8 as existence in the new aeon for 
which we hope.”489 He refers to Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom to come and 
Paul’s depiction in Romans of the present creation groaning in bondage: 
vegetarianism is wanton anticipation of the kingdom for Barth, even as he 
recognises its value as a radical protest against the routine exploitation of 
animals.490 He even goes so far as to state this in terms sufficiently strong 
that, out of context, he seems at once amenable to dietary pacifism: “If 
[humankind’s] lordship over the living beast is serious enough, it takes on a 
new gravity when he sees himself compelled to express his lordship by 
depriving it of its life. He obviously cannot do this except under the pressure 
of necessity.”491 This fundamental element of necessity, recognised by 
Barth as a key precondition for killing a fellow animal, was mentioned in 
chapter 4’s initial outline of dietary pacifism. Here Barth’s argument 
becomes almost paradoxical: if conditions of necessity must be met for 
flesh-eating to be acceptable Christian practice, can vegetarianism so 
easily be dismissed as wanton anticipation? 
It would surely be blasphemous to disagree that we cannot 
approximate the kingdom here on earth; but it seems that Barth goes too 
far in dismissing the practice of vegetarianism on the grounds that it is 
anticipation. As Christians we anticipate the kingdom in so many ways – 
through practicing and worshipping as a community of character, charity, 
forgiveness, repentance, and so on – that it becomes arbitrary to dismiss 
any individual Christian practice on the grounds that it anticipates the 
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kingdom. Should Christian vegetarians espouse as their aim a desire to 
bring about the kingdom, Barth’s criticism might hold more merit. Neil 
Messer engages Barth on this point: recognising that there are bad reasons 
for Christians to be vegetarian – he has in mind primarily “a pseudo-ascetic 
flight”492 from the world as it is, the total subversion of the penultimate to the 
ultimate – he nonetheless takes up Barth’s own stress on necessity when 
he writes that 
It has to be said that much present human use of non-human 
animals has the appearance of humanity sicut Deus [like God]: an 
exercise of raw power that hardly seems to reflect the imago Dei. It 
also has to be acknowledged that much of what the Christian 
tradition has in the past taken to be proper dominion reflecting the 
imago Dei looks, with hindsight, much more like the kind of 
domination characteristic of humanity sicut Deus. We might say that 
the tradition has often failed to appreciate the difference made by 
the agnus Dei [incarnate God] in this sphere.493 
Messer’s criticism of the anthropomonist ignorance of God’s love for all 
creation parallels David Clough’s stress on the cosmic nature of Incarnation 
and redemption, discussed in chapter 3. Relationships with other animals 
which are rooted in power and domination are hard to synchronise with the 
inversion of hierarchy and end to sacrifice inaugurated by Christ. Dietary 
pacifists should rightly be cautioned to use the language of anticipation, 
rather than approximation – something Messer notes the danger of in 
reference to Andrew Linzey’s work494 – but those who wish to agree with 
Barth that vegetarianism is “wanton” would do well to be careful that they 
do not arbitrarily limit what grace is capable of. 
Questions over the sufficiency of pacifism for a responsible dietary 
ethic might offer Barth’s accusation of “wanton anticipation” more traction: 
any attempt to live a life absolutely devoid of harm to animals will fail, 
unless one takes the extreme and impractical measure of sealing oneself 
away from all life. Insects will be unintentionally stepped on or swatted on a 
daily basis; and this is to say nothing of the far greater number of animals 
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who become collateral damage in crop farming, killed by tractors and 
pesticides and threshers. It must be remembered, therefore, that dietary 
pacifism – as a good Christian ethic – is not about purity. The extension of 
pacifism to nonhuman animals is an exercise of relationship lived imago 
Christi; but that does not mean absolute asceticism is the goal, such that 
one is obligated to withdraw from all networks wherein animals suffer. Take 
military pacifism as a parallel: being a military pacifist does not leave one 
unable to live in any nation involved in warfare – this would be an 
unrealistic and irresponsible idealism – and neither does dietary pacifism 
require one to (for example) cease shopping anywhere animal produce is 
sold. 
The goal of a dietary pacifist is not to attain personal purity, but to 
serve as a sign of the kingdom in one’s worldly relationships, by rejoicing in 
the God who loves humans and other animals as individuals and in 
relationship. This is not to be achieved through legalistic striving for an 
unobtainable ideal, but through recognising our limitations and opposing 
the destructive forces at work in the relational networks of the world. The 
choice is not a binary one between ‘harming animals indiscriminately’ 
against ‘never harming animals’; and if we accept that we are fallen – the 
prerequisite for receiving grace495 – we can anticipate the kingdom through 
our relationships with humans and other animals, without believing we are 
capable of never causing harm. 
Norman Wirzba’s criticism of Christian vegetarianism is 
fundamentally similar to Barth’s accusation of wanton anticipation (although 
it should be noted that Barth is not cited during Wirzba’s critique): 
It is tempting to think that a vegan or vegetarian diet can avoid the 
concerns raised about sacrifice and the life and death character of 
life. This is an illusion... A strictly vegetable diet cannot avoid the 
death of a great number of creatures ranging from microorganisms 
in the soil to rodents and other small animals above the ground.496 
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Quite so: but, as Wirzba himself goes on to acknowledge, “not all deaths 
are the same.”497 Should there exist a model of Christian vegetarianism 
which conformed to its representation by Barth and Wirzba – an idealism so 
removed from the reality of our fallen creation as to be at right angles to it – 
it would surely be an unsustainable ethic, not only within the standards of 
good theology but for any sane person. It is doubtful, however, whether 
such a model really exists; and if it does, dietary pacifism is not it. It should 
be noted that Wirzba is in broad agreement with the most common pro-
vegetarianism arguments (that “not eating meat contributes to better 
personal health, prevents cruelty to animals, and saves the earth”498), and 
is primarily concerned to evaluate whether eating meat can ever be thought 
of as being in all times and all places problematic for Christians. The dietary 
pacifist ethic outlined thus far does not make such a claim, however; and by 
performing his evaluation over-against a stylised and one-dimensional 
understanding of Christian vegetarianism, serious concerns are raised 
concerning his theological method; or, at least, about the validity and 
generalizability of his conclusions. Wirzba is correct that it is “impossible to 
hide or escape from death”499 – but given that dietary pacifism’s concerns 
are less with purity or perfection, and more with striving prayerfully towards 
sanctified relationality, one need not hide from anything to think that killing 
other animals without necessity is a problematic and sinful act. 
 Wirzba is right to highlight that Jesus was not vegetarian, and did 
not endorse a vegetarian lifestyle for his followers; but to extrapolate from 
this to the argument that vegetarianism cannot therefore be an ideal for 
Christians is unhelpfully dismissive.500 Should we consider the abolition of 
slavery to be something which Christians should be uninterested in, 
because Jesus did not condemn the centurion in Luke 7 but simply healed 
the man’s property (that is, his human slave)? Or should we instead note 
the spatiotemporal context within which God’s Word became Incarnate, and 
seek through prayerful reflection to better understand the relationship 
between revelation, virtue, and context which faces us when we read the 
gospels today? Jesus Christ himself is not blind to the complexities of the 
cosmic Incarnation being grounded in a particular time and space: John 
records him telling the disciples, “I still have many things to say to you, but 
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you cannot bear them now” (Jn. 16:12). Is it beyond the bounds of reason 
to suggest that, in an agrarian society rooted in subsistence living, in which 
animal flesh (particularly fish) was necessary to human survival, the 
liberation of our nonhuman brothers and sisters might have been one of 
these things? 
 Building on his own understanding of animal sacrifice (examined in 
more detail later in this chapter), Wirzba attests that when it comes to 
eating other animals, “We must – through care-full and compassionate 
living – learn to accept and honour the gift of the death of others as God’s 
means of provision and salvation for the world. All sentimental and romantic 
notions of faith and life are brought to ruin at the cross.”501 The two 
sentences quoted here appear to contradict one another, despite both 
being theologically appropriate when considered independently. Chapter 
4’s critique of “The Chief End of All Flesh” involved the argument that to 
depict the killing of another animal for human appetite as sacrifice was 
romantic and unrealistic in the extent to which it bypassed questions of 
willing and self-offering. Wirzba here defines sacrifice similarly, as the 
death of one for the benefit of another, without involving questions of willing 
or necessity: the implication that it is the vegetarians who are in this 
instance being sentimental and romantic is ironic, indeed. To once more 
quote Wirzba contra Wirzba, “not all deaths are the same” – and indeed, in 
an article written elsewhere, Wirzba affirms the self-giving logic which must 
underpin any Christian understanding of sacrifice, arguing that “The cross 
is... where God reveals definitively that true and abundant life consists in 
the complete and costly giving of oneself to another,” and that “There is no 
resurrection life without the self-giving that the cross reveals.”502 
 To nuance this criticism of Wirzba, it needs to be recognised that he 
is neither advocating a thoughtless use of nonhuman animals nor leaving 
existing animal farming practices unexamined. His “sacrificial logic,” which 
leads him to the conclusion that “animals can be eaten in ways that respect 
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their integrity and well-being and that honour God,” also leads him to the 
conclusion that “a great deal of industrial agriculture, livestock production, 
and slaughter practices must stop.”503 I am in agreement with all of these 
points: in instances where the death of a nonhuman animal is necessary for 
the survival of a human animal, it is theologically appropriate to take their 
life prayerfully and with sacrificial understanding, in a spirit of combined 
thanksgiving (for sustenance) and lament (for the fallenness of creation). 
But for those of us blessed to live in a time and place where such an 
instance is highly unlikely, let alone a daily reality – which includes most 
academic theologians, including myself and Wirzba – to omit conditions of 
necessity from such a “sacrificial logic” is an affront to the particular 
situatedness of our nonhuman brothers and sisters. The reduction of 
individual animals to ‘potential sacrifices’ might even be deemed an affront 
to God; who made us all, brought us into relationship with each other, and 
inaugurated and showed the way to our ultimate reconciliation. 
It remains true, however, that violence is part of the world we know, 
whatever we believe about God’s original intentions or the kingdom to 
come. The verses immediately preceding Isaiah 11:6-9 are instructive in 
this regard,504 reminding us of the violence inherent to the fallen world 
which exists before the eschaton. Isaiah's vision serves as a reminder that 
violence will continue long after God Incarnate revoked it on the cross; and 
if we accept that conditions of dire necessity may legitimate the prayerful 
killing and eating of a fellow animal, might there be other situations where 
limited violence against either individual animals or specific species will be 
necessary? This is a difficult but fair question; and the need for situational 
reflection, key to Hauerwas’ communitarian ethics,505 is vitally important for 
dietary pacifists. In the words of John Howard Yoder, “Only if we recognise 
that ethics is not generalizable are we free to use in a wholesome way the 
concept of virtue, i.e.,, of goodness intrinsic in certain kinds of action or 
character.”506 Responsible and reflective dietary pacifism, then, involves the 
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recognition that pacifism is not an absolute rule in itself (something 
Hauerwas and Yoder would contest), but is the ethical outgrowth of 
attempting to live for others as God is for us. Questions remain, however, 
as to on what grounds one engages in such reflection: by turning to 
consider Paul’s dietary advice to the Roman church, I hope to propose an 
answer. 
 
“The weak eat only vegetables” (Rom. 14:2): Romans and 
Compromised Idealism 
To nuance dietary pacifism it will be constructive to refer to Romans 14, a 
text which has been too often misunderstood and misused in Christian 
conversations about food. Paul’s navigation of an ongoing debate within the 
Roman church, between the weak who “eat only vegetables” and the strong 
who “believe in eating anything” (14:2), should not be mapped directly onto 
modern theological reflection on diet,507 as though the point of contention 
was the ancient equivalent of a disagreement between a meat-lover and a 
vegan today. Instead, we must recognize that this passage is but one part 
of the wider Pauline thesis concerning the tension between Christ and the 
Law; and in particular the debate over the extent to which Christians 
needed to observe prohibitions such as that against eating meat obtained 
via pagan sacrifice. Paul’s primary concern here is to promote church unity: 
the Roman vegetarians refused to eat flesh, not as a relational act, but due 
to a misplaced concern about ritual purity.508 
In this way Romans 14 is related to Hebrews 10’s presentation of 
the crucifixion as the ultimate sacrifice, the command for Peter to kill and 
eat in Acts (10:13), and Jesus’ proclamation that it is what exits, rather than 
enters, the mouth which renders one unclean (Mt. 15:11). In Acts 10, Peter 
sees the old distinction between clean and unclean swept away,509 and is 
told that ‘“What God has made clean, you must not call profane.”’510 This 
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proclamation, however, can only be understood in light of Paul’s reminder 
to the church in Corinth, that “‘All things are lawful’, but not all things are 
beneficial. ‘All things are lawful’, but not all things build up” (1 Cor. 10:23). 
There is an infinite distance between something being ritually pure or legal, 
and that same thing being de facto morally unproblematic. Name-brand 
trainers, for example, are ritually pure and legal to buy; but the corrupted 
and corrupting relationships at the heart of the sweatshop labour behind 
their production might render them morally problematic. The same must be 
said about the unnecessary killing of God’s other relational creatures. 
Commenting on Jesus’ confrontation with the Pharisees in 
Matthew’s gospel, Craig S. Keener elegantly explicates the statement that 
“It is not what goes into the mouth that defiles a person, but it is what 
comes out of the mouth that defiles” (Mt. 15:11) as a condemnation of the 
Pharisaic elevation of law over virtue.511 All of these passages form part of 
the early Christian debates over grace and law, and how to put the radical 
upheaval of creation wrought by Christ’s Incarnation and resurrection into 
practice. To read these texts in the context of modern dietary questions, 
focused on how we are called to live alongside other animals in creation, is 
a serious reflective task. Perhaps most instructive here is the practical 
instruction Paul offers the church: 
Those who eat must not despise those who abstain, and those who 
abstain must not pass judgement on those who eat; for God has 
welcomed them. Who are you to pass judgement on servants of 
another? It is before their own lord that they stand or fall. And they 
will be upheld, for the Lord is able to make them stand. (Rom. 14:3-
4) 
Do not, for the sake of food, destroy the work of God. Everything is 
indeed clean, but it is wrong for you to make others fall by what you 
eat; it is good not to eat meat or drink wine or do anything that 
makes your brother or sister stumble. (Rom. 14:20-21) 
Paul’s message to the Romans seems clear: even if we disagree as to 
food’s significance, it is better to love and respect one’s brothers and 
sisters in Christ than to make them stumble by engaging in practices they 
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see as abrogations of the Lordship of God. More than this, I believe that 
Paul speaks here against un-nuanced idealism. “Who are you to pass 
judgement on servants of another?” he provocatively asks (ironically doing 
so immediately after labelling the Roman vegetarians “weak”). In his 
instruction to the Roman church he is profoundly realistic; but it should be 
noted that Paul’s realism, although acknowledging the temporality and 
fallenness of the world, does not affirm it. I would like to suggest Paul 
stands in a position of compromised idealism: that is, an idealism which 
explicitly recognises that sinful creatures will always fall short of the ideal. 
Although we cannot today ‘be perfect, as our heavenly Father is perfect’ 
(Mt. 5:48), it is something we are called to work towards as we are justified 
and ultimately sanctified by God’s grace and the movement of the Spirit. 
Confident in the justifying action of grace, as disciples of Christ we must, as 
Serene Jones puts it, “strive for excellence of practice, knowing that we can 
never earn the excellence of grace.”512 
This is not, it should be said, to completely divest compromised 
idealism from either realism or idealism: rather, it is a particular 
manifestation of Christian realism, which aims to balance recognition of 
creation’s fallenness and human sinfulness with a refusal to justify in 
principle any particular outgrowths of our fallen condition. Defending his 
pacifist idealism, Hauerwas argues in The Peaceable Kingdom that “when 
violence is justified in principle as a necessary strategy for securing justice, 
it stills the imaginative search for nonviolent ways of resistance to 
injustice.”513 Violence, on small and large scales, will occur in the world; 
and sometimes, as in the case of some American military action overseas, 
it will indirectly benefit Hauerwas and his compatriots. To recognise and 
accept the reality of this, however, is not the same thing as to implicitly or 
explicitly affirm it. 
The Spirit of Christ sanctifies us not when we capitulate to the 
‘realities’ of the world – so-called realities including ‘free’ market capitalism 
and factory farming – but when we try to live in Christ; to conform our will to 
that of the triune God who is for creation, regardless of the extent to which 
we ‘succeed’ in any tangible or measurable sense. This emphasis on 
truthful discipleship over worldly impact is a hallmark of both Hauerwas’ 
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and Yoder’s theology: Hauerwas’ call for Christians to live out of control, 
“recognising that our task is not to make history come out right,”514 
proceeds naturally from Yoder’s claim that “the cross of Christ is the model 
of Christian social efficacy.”515 It is not what we achieve in the world that 
defines our relative success as disciples of Christ – rather, it is who we are, 
and how we try to live in the world. Theirs is a theology of idealism quite 
opposite to the realism of (for example) Stephen Webb: in “Against the 
Gourmands” he writes that dietary decisions should “flow naturally from 
acts of worshipping God, not efforts to change the world.”516 Webb is 
absolutely right; but if worship does not include the hope that our will might 
be more closely conformed to God’s, that we might come to live more truly 
the life of the kingdom in the world as it is, then it is manifestly not worship 
of the God who created, affirmed, and will redeem all creation. Good 
worship will involve – or will lead to – efforts to change the world, in the 
hope of the kingdom. There is not the delineation between worship and 
practice that Webb here implies there is. 
If our belief is to be our practice, and if we are – pace Webb – to 
accept the fallen realities of the world without becoming defeatist or 
complacent, the need for serious theological engagement with specific 
dietary questions is emphasised. Compromised idealism (realism which 
laments reality and works to show another way; idealism which recognises 
that we are not ideal) is the practical-ethical foundation for doing this 
thinking. Compromised idealism is a foundation which is less concerned 
with purity than it is with working for transformed relationships. It is ironic 
that, in Good Eating, Webb outlined an argument in favour of Christian 
vegetarianism which explicitly affirms the compromised idealism that his 
more recent political realism undermines: 
The Bible is full of wars and battles, just as the Bible is full of meat-
eating, but that is because the Bible is a realistic book, written about 
and to a fallen humanity. We should not take the biblical description 
of human behaviour as our norm and goal. Instead, we should look 
to the biblical prescriptions found in the accounts of what God 
originally intended and what God promises for the world. 
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Vegetarianism is not a prerequisite for Christian faith, but it is a 
consequence of the Christian hope for a peaceable kingdom, where 
God will be all in all and all violence will come to an end.517 
Striving for sanctification as we work to heal the fractured relational 
networks of creation, knowing that we can never earn the justification of 
God’s grace,518 the virtue of humility communicated to us by the Christian 
narrative teaches that our praxis need not be founded upon efficiency. 
Christian pacifism, including dietary pacifism, should not be about 
purity: the ideal of nonviolence is manifestly not one that fallen humans can 
live up to at all times. The necessity of a situational and dialectical 
approach, and the reality that we ourselves as well as others will fall short 
of the ideals we hold, means that instances of compromise and mediation 
will be as inevitable and necessary as they are regrettable. But there is an 
infinite distance between accepting one’s inability to always perfectly 
adhere to an ideal, and writing off that ideal as impracticable and therefore 
lowering one’s standards, so that deontology might replace responsibility. 
To draw an admittedly rough parallel, those churches which remarry 
divorcees are not denying the value of marital fidelity. In light of events 
beyond their power to alter – the breakdown of virtuous relationship which 
divorce is – they are taking a situational approach and performing the 
action which, they believe, best stimulates the growth and sustenance of 
new relationship and transfigured responsibility. Like Paul writing to the 
vegetarians and meat-eaters of Rome, theirs is a community-centred and 
pastoral response, responding with love to individuals in the complexities of 
their person and relationships. The reflective engagement with military 
pacifism which follows serves to further nuance this understanding of 
compromised idealism, in the context of outlining the plurality of ways in 
which so-called ‘military’ pacifism can be understood and so translated into 
a dietary context. 
 
A Plurality of Pacifisms: Translating from the Dietary to the Military 
In constructing an ethic of dietary pacifism, it would be remiss to try to do 
so without engaging with Christian military pacifism (and its primary 
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opponent and dialogue partner, just war theory). In order to do this 
productively, it is first necessary to outline one possible typology for 
understand the varieties of Christian nonviolence, so that the ‘type’ of 
pacifism I am extrapolating into a dietary context is both appropriate for 
dietary thinking and consistent with Hauerwas’ own conception of pacifism.. 
Yoder’s Nevertheless is one notable attempt to create something 
like a taxonomy of pacifisms, and as a major influence upon Hauerwas it 
might seem most fitting to use his as the normative typology for this work. 
However, the reality that his typology is essentially rhetorical – the twenty-
ninth of his twenty-nine types, “the pacifism of the messianic community” 
mentioned briefly in chapter four, is declared the right and proper pacifism 
for followers of Christ519 – means this should be augmented by engagement 
with another, more value-neutral typology. To this end, I have elected to 
consider David Clough’s typology of pacifisms, which arose from a project 
to “recognise the diversity of the pacifist positions by plotting their position 
on four independent axes” and so provide “a framework for assessing their 
commonalities and differences.”520 
Clough’s four independent axes can be summarised as 
principled/strategic (which might also be called idealist/realist); 
absolute/classical (concerning the degree to which one recognises 
legitimate uses of violence, e.g. in policing); separatist/integrationist 
(concerning the degree to which responsibility to non-members of one’s 
community is affirmed); and communal/universal (i.e., the extent to which 
pacifism is deemed imperative for non-members of one’s community).521 
Having outlined Hauerwas’ pacifist ethic and made the theological 
case for extending it into dietary ethics in the preceding chapter, I would 
tentatively locate Hauerwas’ Christian nonviolence as principled, absolute, 
separatist, and communal. Hauerwas calls Christians to live nonviolent and 
counter-cultural lives, regardless of the actual efficacy of so doing, and 
seeks to avoid admitting any exceptional circumstances to his theological-
ethical argument. Sharing as I do the concerns of some of Hauerwas’ critics 
– particularly those who feel he over-emphasises the church’s separation 
from the world, and that he writes for the ideal at the expense of 
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considering the lived reality – it is my hope that my pacifism ultimately sits 
less resolutely at the extreme of each axes than does Hauerwas’, but this 
classification is one I broadly adhere to in the attempted translation from 
the military to the dietary that follows. 
I write for the church as it is with a view to the church as it is called 
to be: my understanding of pacifism cannot be universal; and neither can it 
be purely strategic, for such an ethic would neglect the reality that we 
cannot establish the kingdom through our own power. My compromised-
idealist position – from which I built a dietary ethic upon a relational 
theology – necessitates principle having primacy over strategy, even if 
some exceptional circumstances to my dietary pacifism might ultimately be 
admitted. The only axes upon which my pacifism could claim to truly 
diverge from Hauerwas’ is the separatist/integrationist,522 for by its very 
nature dietary pacifism and the relational theology upon which it is built 
seeks to extend Christian moral concern beyond the human community to 
encompass God’s other relational creatures. On this point, I have already 
critically engaged with Hauerwas, in chapter 4’s discussion of “The Chief 
End of All Flesh”. 
How, then, does my understanding of pacifism relate to pacifisms’ 
primary dialogue partner in a military context – “just war theory”, the idea 
that under certain circumstances and conditions, a war can be permissible 
and just (although still a sinful endeavour in a fallen world).523 Just-war 
theorist James Turner Johnson offers one such “realistic” contrast to the 
compromised idealism outlined above: 
We may still yearn – and work – for a world without war, for an end 
to the menace of catastrophic nuclear war, for an end to the arms 
race; yet with such military capabilities we would be the better 
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prepared to meet morally the threats to value that may be expected 
to be inevitable so long as these ideals are not achieved.524 
The danger in this line of reasoning lies in how, with little to no 
substantiation, one is able to override all considerations of responsible 
relationship simply by invoking creation’s fallenness. While an appeal to the 
perpetuality of sin might be used to account for why an individual strayed 
from nonviolence in a particular instance, its blanket use to justify a whole 
host of un-Christian acts – including acts which explicitly anticipate future 
destruction of relationship – seems disingenuous. The charge might even 
be made, in addition to the noteworthy criticism that just-war rhetoric is too 
often used retrospectively to justify crusading or national-interest wars,525 
that just war theory’s primary function is not to defend one’s fellows but to 
justify the church acting in complicity with the world. 
Is it ever better to take the fallen path without first stretching for the 
redeemed one? Is it not closer to the life of Christ, more fully seeking to live 
out in practice the sanctification that comes through grace, to strive for 
peace – not pax Romana but true peace – and accept any consequences 
as the result of looking towards the kingdom in a world that is not yet 
there?526 This does not necessarily preclude all violence, but it strongly 
warns against using sinfulness, or natural proclivities or human 
creatureliness, as an ontological justification for sinful acts. If we deny 
pacifism as an ideal we begin down a slope whereby we increasingly justify 
irresponsible action in the name of living in an irresponsible world. 
A parallel might be drawn here: if we allow a substantialist reading 
of the imago Dei, for example, to obscure the commonality we share with 
other animals, we are already on a ‘slippery slope’. This is because, under 
such conditions, any attempt to talk about transformed relationships with 
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other animals will be de facto abnormal.527 Treating pacifism as an ideal – 
albeit an ideal we will sometimes fall short of – keeps us safer from our 
natural and fallen proclivity for violence than can any approach which 
defines when and how we may use violence before the fact. Hauerwas’ 
concern that the justification of war in general can still the imaginative quest 
for nonviolent alternatives to conflict is pertinent here; as is Yoder’s lament 
that the majority of Christians “think the fact that there exists a doctrine of 
just war constitutes a justification of war in general, whereas, in fact, it 
constitutes a denial that war can ever be generally justified.”528 
 What must be remembered, if dietary pacifists are to argue along 
these lines, is the fundamental connection between our practices and our 
beliefs, recognised by Carol Adams in her interweaving of ontology and 
epistemology.529 As animals we are bodily creatures, and our embodied 
actions impact upon our beliefs as much as the reverse is true. With 
regards to food, whatever thinking happens beforehand cannot obscure the 
reality that we eat with our bodies: humans become physically and mentally 
accustomed to eating flesh by the simple physical process of eating flesh, 
in this process becoming habituated to the activity so that flesh-eating 
becomes an apparent part of the normal order of things. The act itself can 
desensitise us to its moral significance; and by being situated in daily life, 
dietary ethics are more prone to exceptions and allowances than are 
military ethics. During pregnancy or foreign travel, to take two common 
examples, it is not uncommon for vegetarians and vegans to relax their 
dietary restrictions: whether one is a dietary pacifist or a vegetarian for 
medical reasons is here of secondary practical relevance. We are not souls 
existing in bodies, but embodied souls: our beliefs and our practices cannot 
remain so separate as to not touch one another for long. What we say, 
what we think, and how we live exist in a mutually reconstructive network. 
With this fundamental relationship so identified, I turn now to look more 
closely at some specific questions of degree: is it the case that certain 
dietary practices – and, therefore, certain ways of indirectly relating to 
nonhuman animals – are purer, or more amenable to this thesis’ theology 
of human-animal relationality, than others? 
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Degrees and Purity in Dietary Pacifism 
Having noted, above, the distinction to be made between veganism and 
vegetarianism, a question of degree is raised: does recognition of other 
animals as relational individuals draw one beyond abstinence from flesh 
towards the rejection of all animal products? I would like to suggest here 
that veganism is not more pure than vegetarianism; but it can be thought of 
as a distinct ‘level of practice’. Dietary pacifism involves abstention from 
killing and eating animals; divesting oneself as far as one is able from the 
corrupted relational networks which produce meat; and working to heal this 
corruption when possible. Given the strong connections between modern 
meat and dairy industries, however – and the violence inflicted upon 
animals within both – the conclusion might be reached that veganism, 
rather than vegetarianism, is necessary to live responsibly for other 
animals. This is not to say that veganism is a ‘superior’ formulation of 
dietary pacifism: just as Christian pacifists are not called remove 
themselves from relationships of coercion and death to the end of 
maintaining their personal holiness, dietary pacifism is not about personal 
purity but the living out of novel relationships in creation. 
If, however, one feels called towards a vegan dietary pacifism, there 
remains the question of how to delineate what is and is not an animal 
product; and the further question of whether all animal products are de 
facto morally problematic. Honey is one example of an animal product that 
might remain on the prayerful and casuistical dietary pacifist’s menu. 
Concerned with the declining honey bee population in Europe and North 
America, the apiologist Elke Genersch argues that, “Although the 
phenomenon ‘decline of honey bees’ is far from being finally solved, 
consensus exists that pests and pathogens are the single most important 
cause of otherwise inexplicable colony losses.”530 Their decline, although 
possibly the indirect result of human interference (as was argued in chapter 
2, we are almost blind to the long-term impact of our actions upon creation), 
is not directly caused by human violence. Indeed, the work of beekeepers 
and honey producers as well as that of apiologists serves to counter this 
trend of decline: at the very least it seems reasonable to assume that those 
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profiting from the sales of organic honey have a strong vested interest in 
preserving the honey bee population. The question for dietary pacifism here 
is one of purity against practicality; or, put another way, of deontology 
against teleology. Is the maintenance of a rigidly ‘pure’ veganism more 
important than seeking to live for our animal fellows as God is for us? In the 
case of honey, concern for our bee brothers and sisters would seem to 
dictate that purity give way to practical service.531 
The question of honey relates to the consumption of animal 
products: with regards to human involvement in the killing of other animals, 
the significance of animal particularity and relationality is best represented 
in cases of the euthanasia of pets;532 those animals with whom the reality of 
our relational interconnection is most immediately apparent. Situations will 
arise where those committed to dietary pacifism will feel they have little 
choice but to practice or sanction violence against animals. Following 
Hauerwas’ stress on truthfulness over efficacy, the dietary pacifist might 
conclude that the end cannot justify the means. In such an instance, 
however – euthanasia performed for a member of the family – the end and 
the means are more difficult to delineate. This is not the case of killing one 
to save another, or killing many to preserve ‘freedom’ – it is the case of 
killing one to save that one from great suffering.533 The phenomenological 
chasm between humans and other animals means that we cannot know, as 
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we can know with fellow humans, that euthanasia will ever be a nonhuman 
animal's preferred choice;534 but we can hope to recognise, while fully 
admitting the possibility that we are wrong, when the pain in one creature's 
life renders that life miserable and hopeless. The exercise of just and loving 
responsibility towards one’s fellow in such a case dictates that absolutist 
pacifism will be no less problematic than euthanasia. In the absence of a 
legalistic approach, prayer and self-reflection remain paramount; and, 
should it need to be said, the situational acceptance of the tragic necessity 
of killing in a specific case in no way furnishes an argument for always 
killing under similar circumstances.535 
But perhaps the euthanasia of a beloved pet is too easy an example 
with which to consider dietary pacifist involvement in the destructive 
relational networks that constitute the flesh-food industry. What, then, of the 
example posed in the person of Aaron Gross, whose work is cited in this 
thesis? An academic and an activist, Gross has campaigned for PETA as 
well as working towards better treatment of animals in kosher 
slaughterhouses.536 Although vegan himself, Gross enters into conversation 
with a system – that of kosher slaughter – he wishes abolished. To use the 
language of just war theory, a critic might argue that Gross violates jus ad 
bellum by so conversing: if we have no justification to kill other animals, we 
are equally unjustified in debating the mechanics of killing them. While 
particular situations, such as euthanasia or human starvation, can rightly 
lead to jus in bello discussions about violence to animals, the 
slaughterhouse cannot. Are we really living for our animal brothers and 
sisters, however, if we do not strive to alleviate their suffering, even 
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(especially?) in situations where it is outside our power to alter their fate? 
As Gross himself argues, lifespan and life quality are both welfare issues.537 
However much the suffering of animals in kosher butcheries is reduced, 
though, they are still to be butchered: at what point does pragmatism 
override principle? 
It can be assumed that if you are an ethical vegetarian, you would 
prefer slaughterhouses were not operational: working in a way which might 
present the public with an image of acceptable and ‘humane’ slaughter, 
then, might be deemed not only irresponsible but counter-productive. In this 
sense, Gross might also be criticised for placing immediate and temporal 
effect over truthful and productive witness. Similarly, schemes such as the 
RSPCA’s Freedom Food farm assurance programme might be criticised on 
the ground that they are presenting certain instances of killing and eating 
animals as de facto morally unproblematic;538 an image wherein only the 
treatment of the animal during its life is relevant, and its untimely death is 
not. A theology of relationship which does not seek to limit grace to 
humanity stands firmly against such an image. 
How, then, should dietary pacifists relate to slaughterhouses? The 
line between recognising that we will fall short of an ideal, and actually 
counteracting that ideal in the name of realism, is a thin and dangerous one 
– but there will be situations where relationship demands a clearer line be 
drawn. For the pacifist who wishes to discuss the ethics of warfare, such a 
line might be the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants: debating the 
extent to which non-combatants can be tortured before being killed would 
presumably (and rightly) be anathema to such an individual. For dietary 
pacifists, the line might potentially be debate over slaughterhouse 
practices. It seems uncharitable, however, to indict Gross for his 
commendable work on behalf of his nonhuman brothers and sisters: 
indeed, to do so would be to neglect to attend to Gross’ own particularity, 
as an American who works where he can to better the lives of individual 
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animals presently in the American farming system and those who are yet to 
be born into it. In such a case, perhaps debating the killing of non-
combatants is an inappropriate parallel: a better one might be that of 
bringing food and water to a wrongfully imprisoned fellow. In so doing, one 
neither endorses nor accepts the terms of the other’s imprisonment, instead 
recognising the other as an individual with whom one is called to 
relationship, and so serving him or her in the image of the God who 
became flesh for us all. 
Vegetarianism, for Christians, can be a dietary choice which puts 
into practice a theology concerned with the particularity and flourishing of 
other animals. Like all Christian ethics, it is eschatologically-oriented, but 
this does not render it “wanton anticipation” of the kingdom – at least, it is 
no more ‘wanton’ than living as a peaceable community of character in a 
world at war. Dietary pacifists are called to see the world for what it is: 
fallen, permeated by sin, corrupted, violent. But this recognition of the 
realities of sin is no reason to capitulate to those realities: rather, Christians 
are called to be compromised idealists, recognising our own corruption but 
striving to work past it, secure in the knowledge of grace and the victory 
over sin painfully won through the crucifixion. Through considering the 
situated examples of pet euthanasia, vegans eating honey, and vegetarians 
working with slaughterhouses, I have made the case that dietary pacifism is 
an ethic consistent with compromised idealism. I move now to a 
comparative analysis of Hebrew Bible animal sacrifice and modern factory 
farming, informed by the constructive work of the thesis thus far: in this 
way, I will expand and extrapolate dietary pacifism’s practical framework, 
as well as testing the claim that animal sacrifice is more relational and 
responsible than factory farming. 
 
Animal Sacrifice and Factory Farming 
In the brief discussions of Hebrew Bible animal sacrifice conducted up to 
this point, it has been suggested that God’s allowance for humans to eat 
animals (Gen. 9:3-5) is a concession to human sinfulness,539 akin to the 
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Mosaic divorce laws.540 Mark McEntire disagrees, arguing “that if the flood 
signals a new beginning then the vegetarian diet of Genesis 1 is judged as 
a mistake that is corrected in Genesis 9.”541 His claim falters, however, in 
light of the observation that God simultaneously allows ritualised animal 
slaughter and sanctions capital punishment (9:6). God attempts to limit the 
extent of human sinfulness and violence, and so bring humans into 
relationship with God, through legislation; and the proximity of animal 
sacrifice to capital punishment here strongly suggests that flesh-eating is 
one kind of undesirable violence.542 For sure, it is not as undesirable as 
killing a human (it carries no capital punishment, even if practiced non-
ritually); but, set against the peace of the original creation and the 
reconciliation to come, it is undesirable killing nonetheless. 
Simultaneous legislation against killing humans and other animals 
makes sense in the context of Genesis 9’s covenant involving all animals. 
God appears realistic about the capacities of human moral progress (which 
is why in 1 Samuel 8 the people are allowed a king despite not needing 
one), and there are many biblical events which demonstrate how gluttony is 
part of human nature (e.g. Num. 11).543 The biblical provision concerning 
animal sacrifice, then, is not a licence to kill and eat as one wishes but is a 
concession to sin – a divine act of compromised idealism on behalf of 
humanity – and one concerned with animal welfare even then. 
Respecting the blood of an animal as the life-force shared with 
humans is a fundamental feature of the Hebrew attitude to animals 
and this attitude is manifest in the laws about kindness and respect 
to living animals. The conditions laid down by the law for animal 
slaughter also reflect compassion and respect. Thus, for example, 
mother and young are not to be killed in sight of each other.544 
It is unfortunate, in light of this, that the language of sacrifice is still applied 
to animals as a way of justifying their unnecessary deaths: “The language 
of voluntary and generous acts of sacrifice is imposed on animals, who are 
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sacrificed, obviously, against their will.”545 The argument that we can eat 
animals if we understand their deaths as a sacrifice for our survival remains 
resilient, despite so many of us having the luxury of being able to lives 
healthy and fulfilled lives without animal flesh (or products). As was 
demonstrated to be the case in chapter 4’s conversation with Hauerwas 
and Berkman, such arguments neglect the significance of willing and self-
offering for Christian sacrifice, while giving no attention to the particularity of 
the animal other, nor to the ways in which our humanity is bound up with 
their animality. 
It might seem peculiar to find such a positive review of animal 
sacrifice in a theological work concerned with nonhuman animals. 
However, through recognition of our mutual dependence on God,546 
admission of human responsibility for the animal’s death, and the strict 
command to only eat the flesh without its nephesh,547 the sacrificial 
legislation shows clearly the significance of the individual animal. In this 
way, the multidirectional responsibility – to God and to other creatures – 
that stewardship theologies so often neglect is affirmed by Hebrew Bible 
animal sacrifice. 
Building on the argument that Genesis 9’s allowance of flesh-eating 
is a “regulatory measure,”548 Jonathan Morgan presents Levitical sacrifice 
as a ritual which affirms, rather than destroys, the human-animal 
relationship; emphasising as it does “the profundity of the impact of human 
sin on the wider created order, and on the relationship between humans 
and non-human animals in particular.”549 Offered as expiation for human 
sin, the death of the sacrificial animal is to be lamented as a tragic 
consequence of sin’s omnipresence in the relational networks of creation. 
Morgan goes on to emphasise that the animal is more than a member of 
the covenantal community: in the Hebrew Bible context, he or she lives 
alongside humans in local community. Although in modernity farmed 
animals occupy a space quite separate from human society,550 “the realities 
of ancient Near Eastern life would have meant... that such animals lived in 
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a fashion much more in line with our notion of ‘domestic’ animals.”551 
Wirzba agrees, attesting that “A goat or sheep, though clearly not a pet, 
was nonetheless an important member of a household economy... [to] be 
treated with respect and care rather than contempt.”552 
 In Morgan’s presentation, the sacrificed animal is liminal – it spans 
two realms – and in this way it makes possible a movement from the divine 
to the mundane, cleansing sins and restoring relationships.553 “It is only by 
virtue of being a member of the (covenant) community that desires the 
presence of God and would suffer from its withdrawal, but not a member of 
the community of (immediate) culpability for sin that the animal can play 
this vital role.”554 The animal performs a role which humans cannot: it is 
more ritually capable and significant, and so it can heal the corrupting 
effects of sin upon the relational network that is the (human-and-
nonhuman) community. One could even argue that it is relationship itself – 
the relationship between one member of a community and the community 
as a whole – that is sacrificed, marking the act as ritually significant and an 
appropriate response to the God upon whom all life depends. 
 I believe Morgan goes too far when he concludes that, although 
beginning as a victim suffering the effects of a particular sin, the sacrificial 
animal “ends by dissolving the very context of the victimhood of all 
concerned.”555 It remains the case that the particularity of the sacrificed 
animal is insufficiently recognised, being collapsed into its relational 
significance for the whole community. The healing function of the animal’s 
death is deemed more valuable than its continued existence as a relational 
individual – there remains cause to lament, and to work for greater 
recognition of our animal fellows. To focus on the quality of the relationship 
at the expense of considering the individuality of the animal, questions of 
willing, and the destruction of relationship that killing always is, is to move 
back towards an anthropomonism which recognises value in the nonhuman 
only when it serves a human interest. As an example of the scriptural 
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significance of animals, however, and for its profound recognition of the 
ways in which human and animal flourishing are bound up together, 
Morgan’s analysis is helpful. The contrast with factory farming, a holistically 
negative and ignorant means of relating to nonhuman animals, is 
significant. Before considering in more detail the vicarious destruction of 
God’s creatures that factory farming is, however, I will think about animal 
farming more generally. 
In discussing Proverbs 12:10 in chapter 3, it was suggested that 
right relationship with nonhuman animals involves recognition of our shared 
mutuality. The “mercy of the wicked,” oppositely, was deemed “cruel,” being 
concerned only with how the wicked might benefit. There is something 
deeply relevant to animal farming here: if one raises an animal with the end 
of profiting from its death, it seems tenuous to describe any feeding or 
caring for that animal as an act of hospitality. Feeding a sow and treating 
her for illnesses, for example, is reduced to a fundamentally economic 
action as soon as you decide to ultimately sell her for slaughter. Instances 
of small-scale or family farming, where a small number of animals (even 
just one) are raised and cared for at a relational level, are less clearly 
obstructive to the existence of genuinely positive human-animal 
relationships: the ‘mercy’ visited upon such animals is ambiguous at worst, 
not fundamentally cruel. But if the end product of such small-scale and 
relational farming is the death and resultant consumption of the animal(s) 
so raised, it remains the case that such farming is neither merciful nor 
conducive to the transformation of our natural proclivities. 
Arguing against vegetarianism, Christopher Southgate points to the 
small hill-farming community from which he hails as an example of farmers 
caring for their animals.556 Although Southgate is specifically only referring 
to free-range (and, presumably, organic) farming,557 the natural concern 
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raised by his argument is that it takes him to a dangerously vague 
conclusion: Southgate’s concern is to defend free-range farming, but by 
leaving the contours of what kinds of farming are problematic undefined, 
the implicit conclusion seems to be that because some kinds of animal 
farming are acceptable, Christians have no good reason to avoid eating 
meat. Southgate also neglects to answer the question of whether a 
relationship is genuinely ‘caring’ if it is destined to end in one party profiting 
from the death, evisceration and consumption of the other. The claim that 
“the relationship between farmers and their animals... is more than a 
commercial one”558 is certainly of little comfort to their animals come 
slaughter time. Indeed, it might even be suggested that such a claim draws 
an unfortunate parallel with nineteenth-century defences of human slavery: 
in 1855, William Grayson claimed that 
Among slaves... Every one is made to work, and no one is 
permitted to starve. Slavery does for the negro what European 
schemers in vain attempt to do for the hireling. It secures work and 
subsistence for all.559 
As was the case among slavery’s defenders less than two hundred years 
ago, Southgate is concerned to depict animal farming as – at worse – a 
necessary evil which ensures the survival and flourishing of both the 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ being; and at best, as an unobtrusive fact of nature 
(nature in this usage being synonymous with the way things should be).560 
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Our complicity in creation’s fallenness, and the potential for our 
sanctification into new relationships via grace, find no place in such a 
worldview.561 
The recognition of human responsibility for the animal’s death – and 
our mutual dependence upon God – within Hebrew Bible animal sacrifice 
leads to the claim that it is more conducive to responsible relationship with 
nonhuman animals than is modern factory farming. In Animals and World 
Religions, Lisa Kemmerer compiles a number of sources, gathered by 
animal welfare organisations,562 which highlight the invisibility of animals 
within factory farming, and the systemic lack of compassion for their 
suffering. Analysed theologically, Kemmerer highlights the extent to which 
sin corrupts the relational networks of the farming industry, and the 
negative and destructive human-animal relationships which result. 
Kemmerer reveals that “Every year, thirty-five million cattle are destroyed 
for beef, nine million cows are exploited for milk (and soon destroyed), and 
one million calves are exploited for veal.”563 She cites a Washington Post 
article which illustrates the invisibility of the nonhuman animal, but also the 
complete absence of concern the mechanised industry of animal farming 
has for the humans who are drafted to serve as its killers: 
The cattle were supposed to be dead before they got to Moreno. 
But too often they weren’t... ‘They blink. They make noises,’ he said 
softly. ‘The head moves, the eyes are wide and looking around.’ Still 
Moreno would cut. On bad days, he says, dozens of animals 
reached his station clearly alive and conscious. Some would survive 
as far as the tail cutter, the belly ripper, the hide puller. ‘They die,’ 
said Moreno, ‘piece by piece.’564 
It is feasible and possible for a dietary pacifist, informed by relational 
theology, to accept the theoretical necessity of some animals dying in 
specific situations – if absolutely necessary for human survival, or (as 
considered above) in the case of euthanasia. Faced with the uncaring, 
unseeing cruelty at the heart of modern factory farming, however, it seems 
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difficult for any Christian to reconcile faith in the triune God with the horrific 
stories which emerge from factory farms – places which are embodied 
examples of the fallacious Cartesian notion that animals are only machines. 
Such stories are neither place- nor species-specific: 
Deprivation, chronic pain, and frustration causes sows to adopt 
neurotic coping behaviours. Sows would normally build a nest of 
leaves or straw before giving birth. In their barren cells, sows 
repeatedly and desperately try to build a nest, and often fall to 
moving their heads backward and forward pointlessly in a rhythmic 
fashion, gnawing on surrounding metal bars. Overcrowding and 
boredom also cause aggression, which is why pigs’ tails are 
chopped off and their teeth cut at birth (without anaesthesia). Giving 
pigs more space would allow them to create nests, root, and wallow 
– normal pig behaviours – which would also prevent neurotic 
behaviours and aggression. But from an economic point of view, it 
is cheaper to dock tails and cut teeth than it is to provide pigs with 
adequate space.565 
The newborn turkeys were dumped out of metal trays, jostled onto 
conveyer belts after being mechanically separated from cracked 
eggshells, then sorted, sexed, debeaked and detoed, all without 
anaesthetic. Countless baby turkeys were ‘mangled from the 
machinery,’ suffocated in plastic bags, and dumped into the ‘same 
disposal system as the discarded egg shells they were separated 
from hours earlier.566 
Factory farms and large confinement feeding operations regularly 
crowd and restrict animals so that they cannot live their God-given 
potential but are made – in some cases genetically engineered – to 
grow to slaughter weight as quickly as possible. ‘Life’ for these 
animals is so stressful and damaging that they could not survive 
without a steady diet of steroids and antibiotics. Of the billions that 
do survive this industrial ordeal, even death becomes a shame. 
Describing the slaughter of cattle, Foer observes that a typical steer 
enters a chute in which a ‘knocker’ shoots a steel bolt into its skull, 
rendering the steer unconscious or dead. The steer is then hoisted 
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up by a leg and sent down a disassembly line so it can be skinned, 
gutted, and carved up. In many instances ‘animals are bled, 
skinned, and dismembered while conscious’ (Jonathan Sarfran 
Foer, Eating Animals (London: Little, Brown 2010), 230).567 
The numerous regulations attached to animal sacrifice are, on at least one 
level, about responsibility to the individual animal;568 as well as being an 
explicit recognition of the ways in which human and animal flourishing are 
bound together. Although the particularity of the sacrificed animal is 
obfuscated, we have seen how the sacrificial system can in fact affirm the 
significance and value of positive human-animal relationships, calling God’s 
people to attend more closely to other animals than their own natural 
inclinations might demand of them. What is there equivalent to this in 
modern factory farming? 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to nuance the dietary pacifism outlined in 
chapter 4 (and constructed on the theological foundation of chapters 2-3). 
To this end, I have engaged with a range of criticisms of Christian 
vegetarianism, as well as looking more closely at some specific 
complexities within pacifist and dietary ethics. The first major conversation 
of this chapter, with Karl Barth and Norman Wirzba, addressed concerns 
that vegetarianism is “wanton anticipation” of the kingdom and/or 
excessively romantic about creation – in other words, that it is too idealistic 
to be practicable. Recognition of the transformative power of grace – the 
justification which leads to sanctification – coupled with a realistic 
awareness of creation’s and our own fallenness, leaves such charges 
looking anaemic. We are called to live like Christ, aware that we will get 
there through the grace of God only, and aware that we will repeatedly fall 
short. To discount vegetarianism on the grounds that it is not perfect, and 
not everyone can practice it, is no different from discounting pacifism on the 
grounds that it is not a perfect politic, and not everyone can practice it. 
Christianity is a religion of compromised idealism, wherein lament over our 
sinfulness goes hand in hand with joyous thanksgiving for grace and the 
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transformation it can bring, should we truthfully invite it to do so. Indeed, 
dietary pacifism is shown to be realistic precisely at the point of our lived 
relationships with other animals – this is also the point at which my dietary 
pacifism diverges from Hauerwasian pacifism on the four-dimensional 
typological map constructed by Clough. Being integrationist rather than 
separatist with respect to other species (as well as non-Christian humans), 
dietary pacifism includes the claim that without absolute necessity, killing of 
any kind is a rejection of grace. Certainly, the repurposing of ancient 
traditions of animal sacrifice to exculpate unnecessary killing and eating of 
animals seems closer to unreflective romanticism than the theology which 
asserts that God’s other relational creatures should be loved and protected, 
so far as is practicable. 
If we are to truly follow Christ’s example and realise our place as 
imago Dei, the extension of Christian nonviolence to the animal creation, as 
an embodied practice of transformed relationality, is one conclusion. This 
does not, however, mean that Christians can never and will never be 
involved in systems which cause harm to animals. Recognition of our 
creatureliness and dependence involves humble acceptance of our sin and 
limitation; which is not to say that we should not strive to live for other 
animals as God is for us, attending to them as individuals and striving to 
heal the sin-wrought corruptions of our cohabited relational networks. If, 
while occupying the privileged position wherein we have no need of animal 
flesh for survival, we neglect to consider dietary pacifism at all, we place 
limits on which creaturely relationships can be transformed by grace. To 
neglect to even consider the ethical issues related to diet cannot help but 
be seen, in light of the theological work undertaken thus far, as a failure to 
respond with adequate joy and thanks to the One who created, affirmed, 
became Incarnate for, and will redeem all flesh. In chapters 6-8, I look more 
closely at those instances where Christians do refuse to consider dietary 
ethics; asking why, and how, Christians are called to think and pray about 
all their creaturely practices – including diet. 
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6. Creaturely Church 
Ecclesiology and Communal Discernment on Animal and 
Dietary Ethics 
 
In my argument thus far, I have proposed that – in light of the commonality 
we share with other animals, and the transformation of relationship grace 
can work – there is a moral impetus for Christians to consider the ethical 
issues surrounding animals and diet. In order to explore in more detail the 
theological and practical mechanics of responding to this impetus, I turn in 
this chapter to ecclesiological reflection; the end goal of which is to outline 
in greater depth how Christians are called to reason and discern in 
community. In chapter 5 it was suggested that, although dietary pacifism is 
not about personal purity, a dietary pacifist might proceed from a vegetarian 
to a vegan diet as a result of thinking ethically about the connection 
between the dairy and flesh-food industries. Such a situational and 
deliberative response is an appropriate living out of the Christian calling to 
work and pray for transformed relationships within creation: it is unfortunate 
that the church has so infrequently deemed other animals, and how we 
relate to them, as acceptable topics for moral discernment. 
This chapter will explore in more detail the theology and mechanics 
of church casuistry,569 considering its place within the relational theology 
(chapter 3) which informs the dietary pacifist framework outlined thus far 
(chapters 4-5). This task will be performed in conversation with Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology, in particular through raising concerns with his understanding 
of casuistry – consideration of the ecclesiology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer will 
also be instructive on this point. The problems that can arise from local and 
situated failures of communal discernment will also be considered: the work 
of Carol Adams, and her description of how nonhuman animals are 
rendered invisible by the language we use, will inform the latter part of this 
discussion. 
Chapter 6 lays the ground for this thesis’ latter part, wherein I will 
theologically engage with a series of conversations with Christian 
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vegetarians. By considering their theological understanding of nonhuman 
animals, justification for their dietary choices, ecclesiology, and situated 
church experience, I aim to draw out fresh insight for churches seeking to 
live for God in creation. I also hope to in this way demonstrate the 
systematic integrity of the relational theology employed thus far in service 
to nonhuman animals. This thesis is not a liberation theology for animals – 
which is not to say there would be anything wrong with such a project – so 
much as it is a constructive theology of human-animal relationality, 
concerned to draw out and consider its dietary and ecclesiological 
implications. 
 
Dietary Ethics or Animal Ethics? 
As already mentioned in the introduction to chapter 4, throughout this thesis 
I refer to both animal matters and dietary matters. As already stated, the 
two terms are not used interchangeably; but they are fundamentally linked 
in a relational sense. As an embodied practice, eating is an important locus 
for reflection on our relationships with other animals; and in the context of 
thinking about communal discernment, the interplay between animal ethics 
and dietary ethics is ecclesiologically important, too. If an individual 
Christian or church community does not recognise our relationships with 
other animals as a topic worthy of serious moral reflection, the way in which 
that individual or community thinks about dietary ethics will differ 
significantly from an individual or community which does. 
In the interest of exploring the relationship between animal ethics 
and dietary ethics more closely, some questions can be posed. Do some 
people, and/or some communities, differentiate between dietary and animal 
ethics? If so, why? When and if a church is deemed to have fallen short in 
its dietary casuistry, is it a failing of moral discernment in general, or are 
animals a casuistical blind spot for that community? This chapter’s 
preliminary discussion of casuistry conducted below will inform chapters 7-
8, wherein the theological ethic of dietary pacifism and the mechanics of 
church casuistry will be further explored in conversation with a number of 
“ordinary”570 Christian vegetarians. In short, I am interested to explore how 
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the church relates to creation; not merely to the world-understood-as-
human-public.571 
 
Casuistry and Relationality 
John Howard Yoder, Mennonite theologian and major influence on Stanley 
Hauerwas (among others), stressed the necessity that the church be the 
nonviolent community of voluntary commitment he saw called into being in 
Luke’s gospel572 and elsewhere. For him, the church is to exist outside 
sociocultural norms,573 a body comprised of individual members with 
individual gifts (Rom. 12; 1 Cor. 12-14). Yoder placed Romans 12’s ‘rule of 
Paul’ at the heart of the church: this is the notion that when believers meet, 
each brings a distinct contribution574 that affirms both their individuality and 
their status as part of the whole. Commenting on Yoder’s ‘believers church’, 
James McClendon writes that “The biblical priesthood of all believers grows 
from practicing the way of Jesus: it is not that each of us makes his or her 
way to God independent of all the rest of us; rather such priesthood means 
we are members one of another in Christ.”575 The priesthood of all believers 
is in this way understood as an expression of the radical transformation of 
relationship that comes through grace. 
In a community where corporate life and practice are theologically 
significant, and religious authority is recognised outside the ordained,576 the 
church’s authority comes in part through its formation of Christian 
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characters, equipping individual Christians to discern and act honestly and 
reflexively. Hauerwas writes that “Christian ethics must serve and be 
formed by the Christian community, a community whose interest lies in the 
formation of character and whose perduring history provides the continuity 
we need to act in conformity with that character.”577 This focus on character 
formation stresses the link between theology and ethics: as Christians are 
inducted into the narrative of God and God’s people,578 learning to see the 
world through the eyes of the church,579 the intimate relationship between 
one’s intellectual and spiritual beliefs and one’s embodied practices is 
made clear. Theology is ethics580 – our confessional beliefs should be 
significant for every aspect of our creaturely lives. For his part, Hauerwas 
laments what he sees as the historic separation of theology from ethics, 
arguing that its consequence has been that claims about the Christian life 
have too often appeared to be assertions that certain kinds of 
behaviour or actions were to be done simply because “that is the 
way Christians do things.” The relationship between behaviour and 
belief was assumed rather than analysed. This has had many 
unfortunate consequences, as it has often created the context for 
and even encouraged the growth of legalism, self-righteousness, 
and a refusal to analyse the rationality of Christians' moral 
convictions.581 
If our theology is not embodied and reflexive, it is not only dry but can 
actively contribute to the conflation of sociocultural norms with responsible 
Christian practice. If, instead, our theology is to be our ethics, 
generalisations and maxims will only take us so far: as described in chapter 
5, situational and prayerful reflection will be required in specific situations. 
Thus, there is a vital need for casuistry. Yoder defines casuistry as 
“decision making by open dialogue and consensus”;582 Alisdair MacIntyre 
describes it as “tradition-constituted, craft-constituted enquiry.”583 What 
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MacIntyre means, for a church context, is that although communal acts of 
discernment will be rooted in scripture and tradition, the reason and 
experiences of the individuals involved are also significant. “Not Scripture 
alone, not the individual interpreter of Scripture, but the discerning church 
in union with the living Christ guides Christian ethics.”584 For Yoder, this 
enactment of the ‘rule of Paul’ sees the Spirit work “in and with, through 
and under what men and women do.”585 Stephen Fowl and L. Gregory 
Jones join Yoder, Hauerwas, and MacIntyre in calling for the church to 
engage in casuistry; “the hard process of conversation, argument, 
discussion, prayer and practice.”586 
It is important for the church, as a counter-cultural community of 
character, that casuistry takes place in an environment amenable to 
difference. This is not to say that all theologies and ethics are equally valid, 
but that disagreeing with one’s fellow in love – and not allowing divergent 
positions to become justification for the absence of charity – is a profound 
act of character formation. In the words of Hauerwas, “It is through the 
other that I am finally able to make peace with myself and thus have the 
power to make my life my own.”587 The act of relating to others, whether 
their difference from us lies in a difference of theology or a difference of 
species, is an embodied practice which enacts the transformative power of 
grace. 
 Such an ecclesiology places a strong impetus towards honest and 
open casuistry upon the church community; and if the individual members 
of the community are concerned to reflect their theology in their ethics, this 
casuistry will involve questions of animal and dietary ethics. Christians are, 
after all, followers of a God who created and affirmed creation and 
everything in it;588 a God who covenants not only with Noah and not only 
with all humans but with all animals;589 a God who cares for the individual 
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members of creation590 (even when God’s prophets don't themselves591), 
who became Incarnate for all flesh,592 and who will redeem the whole 
groaning creation593 that looks now towards the kingdom.594 If our theology 
is our ethics, and the church is the community of character that Hauerwas 
says it is, to reject animal matters as unworthy of serious reflection is to 
claim – implicitly or otherwise – that there are elements of one’s embodied 
life that do not need to be touched by grace. 
 
Social Boundaries 
If church casuistry is limited to particular ‘worthwhile’ ethical questions, the 
absence of a communitarian corrective for the theology and ethics of 
individual Christians can easily lead to a divorce between professed belief 
and embodied practice. If not arrested, this can even lead to social and 
cultural norms and boundaries being normalised as distinctively Christian 
practice. The danger of theologically endorsing sociocultural norms has 
been highlighted by David Clough, in his criticism of Nicolas Malebranche’s 
denial of the possibility of nonhuman suffering; a denial Clough roots in as 
a preference “for the coherence of a particular thought-world over attending 
properly to the lives of other[s].”595 Without genuine casuistry, the church is 
unable to truly work out how to live (as best fallible creatures can) the 
transfiguring Yes that God offers to humanity: as Amy Plantinga Pauw 
observes, critical reflection on both belief and practice is necessary to 
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ensure the mutually constructive relationship between the two remains 
healthy.596 
If we discourage casuistry and so avoid facing the transformation 
grace can bring, we risk simply rubber-stamping whatever practices society 
deems acceptable. If, for example, flesh-eating is the cultural norm, as it is 
in Britain, then it can become enshrined as a Christian norm for British 
Christians if critical reflection is avoided. As Hauerwas and Berkman 
recognised in “The Chief End of All Flesh”, (in agreement with Carol 
Adams’ claim that our practices ground our ontology597), “Our practices with 
regard to other animals shape our beliefs about them.”598 In this case, if 
what individual Christians practice is the unreflective patronisation of the 
factory farming industry, the church will come to endorse the belief that the 
industry’s denial of animal relationality is morally irrelevant. If individual 
Christians wish to eat animals, the call to relate to them in the light of the 
kingdom requires, at the very least, reflection as to which animals will be 
eaten, and how their flesh will be procured. To do less than this – for 
example, to buy factory farmed meat without reflection – is to make the 
claim that there are aspects of our creaturely lives which do not need to 
change, and over which grace has no power. 
The avoidance of communal reflection on animal and dietary ethics 
goes some way to explaining why, in some communities, animal matters 
are so frequently displaced. To take the popular Christian debate between 
just war and pacifism; although a number of different positions will likely 
coexist in one church community (ranging from pro-military nationalist to 
absolutist pacifist), it would be expected that each individual would not 
merely have an opinion but be able to justify it. This is not to say that every 
member of the church would know every other member’s position on war; 
but it is to say that, in debate, interlocutors can expect reasoned responses 
from each other. With animal and dietary ethics, such an expectation rarely 
exists: a position in favour of eating animals is assumed to be the default, 
needing no specific justification in any context. In chapter 4, I noted Aaron 
Gross’ lament that Jews and Christians familiar with “good shepherd” 
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imagery could be indifferent to the anti-relational and abusive practices of 
modern factory farming.599 To use the metaphor of the good shepherd 
without considering the distance between the shepherd-sheep relationship 
and the relationships enacted by factory farming is symptomatic of the 
failure of responsibility which occurs when specific topics for reflection are 
deemed off limits. Casuistical blind spots such as these leave the church 
captive to the norms of the world: by next looking at the ways in which the 
world linguistically removes animals from its vista of moral concern, the 
danger this poses other animals – and our responsibilities to them – is 
further explored. 
 
The Language of Invisibility 
In her critique of modern factory farming, Carol Adams suggests another 
element behind the church’s avoidance of casuistry on animal and dietary 
ethics. She terms this the “absent referent”:600 “When we turn an animal 
into ‘meat’, a relational creature with a very particular, situated life, a unique 
being, is converted into something that has no distinctiveness, no 
uniqueness, no individuality.”601 The mass term ‘meat’ robs the life and 
death of individual animals of significance, reducing them to a product for 
consumption and so collapsing their individuality into the specific and 
deadly function they are conscripted to serve. Adams grounds this 
language of invisibility in the wider spectrum of “arrogant-eye gazes,” 
including sexism and racism,602 in an argument which anticipates Slavoj 
Žižek’s drawing-together of speciesism and colonial racism.603 Naming 
practices like these serve an exculpatory function, brushing over the 
agency of those who kill and consume other animals:604 if a cow is not a 
cow but ‘beef’, a food product, its telos is to be killed and eaten, and 
therefore those who necessitate and fulfil that end do not bear the burden 
of responsibility. Commenting on the sinful and inhuman relational networks 
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of factory farming (discussed in chapter 5), Žižek claims that this invisibility 
is necessary for a human society which has determined to attend neither to 
the particularity nor the relationality of its nonhuman animal members: 
Human industry alone is continuously causing immense suffering to 
animals, which is systematically disavowed – not only laboratory 
experiments, but special regimes to produce eggs and milk (turning 
artificial lights on and off to shorten the day, the use of hormones, 
etc.), pigs which are half blind and barely able to walk, fattened up 
fast to be slaughtered... [A]lthough all of us know what goes on in 
such places, this knowledge has to be neutralized so that we can 
act as if we don’t know.605 
In Genesis, Adam gives all animals a name (2:19), recognising their 
individuality and the relationship he has with them as a fellow member of 
creation. In the modern era, humans use mass terms like ‘meat’ to remove 
the name given by Adam, reducing sentient and relational creatures to 
foodstuffs.606 This use of the language of invisibility might be termed 
speciesism, defined as human avoidance of respect for “the feelings and 
sensate experiences of those they maltreat or kill.”607 The semantic 
connection of speciesism to racism, sexism, ageism, and other ‘isms is not 
mere rhetoric. To avoid treating animals as morally serious beings is to 
deny individuality, relationality, and commonality in the same way as racism 
and sexism. Rachel Muers gives an illustrative example of this, pointing to 
the many ways humans have performed the anthropological task using 
animals as convenient symbols. From defences of a substantialist 
understanding of the imago Dei that cast humans as rational and beasts as 
mechanic,608 to modern day uses of “bitch” and “monkey” to denigrate the 
human other,609 Muers argues that when we use animals to define the 
human we deny the animals the chance of appearing as themselves.610  
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This exemplifies Adams’ “linked oppressions”:611 to call a woman a bitch, or 
a black person a monkey,612 is to refuse to acknowledge commonality with, 
responsibility to, and the particularity of the offended human party and the 
animal reduced to an insult. “The point to be grasped,” for Andrew Linzey, 
“is that these are not just libels on human beings.”613 
When nonhuman animals are used as negative foils for humanity, 
we not only neglect valuable lessons which might be learned from our 
relationships with them. We also pass over the task of telling animals what 
they are, and where they stand in relation to us – according to Hauerwas 
and Berkman, a theologically important task.614 Instead, we corrupt Adam’s 
naming of the animals, imposing function where he acknowledged 
relationship, denying commonality with other animals without admitting to 
ourselves what we are doing. This incurvature of relationality invokes 
Luther’s description of sin as humanity curved in on itself:615 the denial of 
the particularity of the other in a manner which also neglects to attend to 
the relational networks in which both one’s self and the other move.616 
Žižek argues that such negative characterizations of animals, which work to 
“engender the appearance of positive determinations which are false,”617 
are functionally analogous to the reductive and illusory distinction between 
colonizer and colonized in “traditional Eurocentric anthropology... Is it not 
the same to oppose the Western Judeo-Greek legacy to the ‘Oriental’ 
stance, thereby obliterating the incredible wealth of positions covered by 
                                                          
611
 Adams, Neither Man nor Beast, 168. 
612
 Carmody Grey makes the point that, problematic as such ‘animal insults’ are, they 
serve to demonstrate the point that nonhuman animals are psychologically and 
philosophically important to human identity. Carmody Grey, “Nonhuman Beings in 
Eschatological Perspective: some reasons to take them seriously”, paper at Postgraduate 
Theology and Religious Studies conference, March 2013. 
613
 Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 45. Prior to this, Linzey asks us to “Consider the 
historic language we use about animals: ‘brutes,’ ‘dumb brutes,’ ‘unfeeling brutes,’ 
‘critters,’ ‘sub-humans,’ ‘beasts,’ ‘wild beasts,’ and the adjectives ‘brutal,’ ‘beastly,’ and 
‘bestial.’ [...] By definition, it is difficult to champion the rights of ‘beastly,’ ‘brutal,’ or 
‘bestial’ life” (44). 
614
 Hauerwas and Berkman, “The Chief End of All Flesh”, 199. 
615
 Matt Jenson, The Gravity of Sin: Augustine, Luther and Barth on Homo Incurvatus In Se 
(London and New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 77-91. 
616
 Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in 
Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 236. David Clough 
discusses the inadequacy of animal classifications which collapse the multiplicity (and 
commonality) in the animal creation into a bifurcation of “human” and “animal”. See 
David L. Clough, On Animals: Volume One: Systematic Theology (London and New York: 
T&T Clark, 2012), 74. 
617
 Žižek, “The Animal Gaze of the Other,” 229. 
Page 186 of 287 
the term ‘Oriental thought’?”618 The same process – wherein one elevates 
oneself and one’s immediate comrades over those who occupy a different 
place, or gender, or ethnos, or species – is at play in colonial racism as is 
present when humans dismiss and diminish their nonhuman brothers and 
sisters; and this process is the perpetual work of sin in fallen human beings. 
As Leon Hynson has written, 
Sin is not attached to our nature as an alien substitute in the 
vacuum of lost righteousness. Sin is deprived human nature acting 
out of itself, rather than out of the Spirit. Without the Spirit, every 
human expression is bent; bent away from God and toward self.619 
The language of invisibility has the power to obscure the commonality we 
share with other animals – how my flourishing as a human being is 
coincident with theirs as animals – and so keep human minds and hearts 
focused on how animals can benefit them: to mimic Hynson, it allows 
deprived human nature to act out of itself, rather than out of the Spirit. This 
power to obscure mutuality is eloquently illustrated by Douglas Adams in 
The Restaurant at the End of the Universe, when Arthur Dent and his ‘alien’ 
companions are confronted with a (talking) cow which has been bred to 
want to be eaten. The aliens respond with appreciative hunger – Arthur, the 
only human present, reacts somewhat differently. 
"I just don't want to eat an animal that's standing here inviting me 
to," said Arthur, "it's heartless." 
"Better than eating an animal that doesn't want to be eaten," said 
Zaphod. 
"That's not the point," Arthur protested. Then he thought about it for 
a moment. "Alright," he said, "maybe it is the point. I don't care, I'm 
not going to think about it now. I'll just ... er ..." 
The Universe raged about him in its death throes. 
"I think I'll just have a green salad," he muttered.620 
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The Dish of the Day will presumably not suffer, given that he leaves and 
shoots himself (promising to be “very humane” about it),621 but this is not 
Arthur’s concern. Rather, Arthur is motivated by an apparently instinctual 
reaction to seeing his meal has a face and a voice: his confrontation with 
the Dish of the Day brings into sight that which was previously invisible, and 
despite his best efforts to not think about it, he finds himself unable (even if 
only temporarily) to be complicit in a system which ensnares one of his 
fellows in a relational network which destroys for profit. The fact that the 
Dish of the Day speaks leaves Arthur no alternative to acknowledging his 
particularity: in societies where the language of invisibility serves to remove 
the individual animal from view, until a part of it appears on our plates, the 
alternative Arthur gropes for is provided and encouraged. Holistic casuistry, 
undertaken in the presence of a creative and redeeming God – in full 
awareness of how little we deserve grace – will challenge contemporary 
Christians parallel to how the Dish of the Day challenges Arthur Dent. This 
is the challenge to look at one’s animal fellows with open eyes; and for 
Christians, if not for Arthur, to will as God wills in relationship with them. 
Adams writes that, “When we make animals’ experiences visible, 
we expose traditional ethical, moral, and religious discussions that ignored 
animals.”622 Visibility is key to defending animal and dietary ethics as 
morally important (and so is also key to the promotion of dietary pacifism): 
without it, ‘out of sight’ will continue to mean ‘out of mind’ with regard to the 
institutionalised exploitation of nonhuman animals, as the language of 
invisibility encourages the acceptance of cultural norms as ‘Christian 
practices’. Failures of casuistry and the language of invisibility are mutually 
reinforcing: avoiding reflection on dietary ethics both contributes to, and is 
reinforced by, the invisibility of nonhuman animals. If we do not recognise 
other animals as relational and morally significant creatures, there is no 
need to debate whether or not we should eat them; and if casuistry is not 
performed in this way, our invisible brothers and sisters have no hope of 
becoming visible. Statements and practices which describe animals as 
objects inherently deny the need to question their objectified status. As 
belief shapes practice, the language of invisibility is shaped by the rejection 
of dietary matters as ethically important. 
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Having described the language of invisibility and its connection with 
failures of church casuistry, I will now look more closely at how churches 
might practice good casuistry. One of the central questions here is how an 
individual or community identifies something as an ethical question (or not). 
Hauerwas’ argument, rooted in his criticism of “quandary ethics”,623 is that 
casuistry best serves the church when it is situational (responding to 
specific instances) and holistic (open to discussion of any ethical 
question).624 Within such an ecclesiology, how the church responds and 
relates to its minority members and voices becomes highly important: in 
beginning to think about how a relational church might practice casuistry, I 
pay particular attention to the link between communal discernment and 
Hauerwas’ call for churches to value their heretics.625 
 
Casuistry and the Heretic 
In chapter 4, I cited Aaron Conley’s criticism of Hauerwas’ “master 
narrative” of Constantinianism; that the Constantinian narrative is 
maintained by obscuring or ignoring those elements of history which do not 
fit it (such as the tradition of liberal Christianity).626 This kind of distortion is 
also at work whenever casuistry on dietary ethics is avoided on the grounds 
of a loosely-defined ‘Christian freedom’; while sexual ethics, to take a 
counter-example, is distinctly not a topic where ‘Christian freedom’ is 
deemed to be relevant. We do a disservice to the church cosmic if we 
ignore or obscure the numerous Christians who have engaged in dietary 
reflection throughout the church’s history. The Desert Fathers,627 
Benedictine and Cistercian orders,628 John Wesley,629 the Victorian-era 
                                                          
623
 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 117-25. 
624
 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 119. 
625
 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 107. 
626
 Aaron D. Conley, “Injustices of an Outdated Historiography: Or how Christian pacifism 
does not translate easily across two millennia”, paper, Society of Christian Ethics Annual 
Meeting (2012). 
627
 Blake Leyerle, “Monastic Formation and Christian Practice: Food in the Desert”, in John 
Van Engen (ed), Educating People of Faith: Exploring the History of Jewish and Christian 
Communities (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 87-111. 
628
 Dianne M. Bazell, “Strife Among the Table-Fellows: Conflicting Attitudes of Early and 
Medieval Christians toward the Eating of Meat”, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 65 (1997), 73-99. 
629
 See for example Wesley’s discussion on fasting in John Wesley, Works Volume I: 
Sermon 27: Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Seventh (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1975). 
Page 189 of 287 
Bible Christian Church630 and Order of the Golden Age,631 Seventh Day 
Adventists,632 and Christian Vegetarian Association (USA633 and UK634) are 
some examples of this. With the exception of the Christian Vegetarian 
Associations, none of these examples cited could be claimed as dietary 
pacifists – but Christianity’s established precedent of moral reflection on 
dietary practices is evident. 
Given Hauerwas’ theological debt to Yoder – through whom can be 
traced his emphases on nonviolence and communitarian character 
formation – it is ironic that his ecclesiology might isolate those who hold 
unorthodox or minority positions within their church community. If casuistry 
is a communal practice, then individuals at odds with the majority are in 
danger of not being heard; regardless of how their position, or the majority 
position, is substantiated. Should any minority not be heard, this would 
surely be the result of malfunctioning theology: living imago Trinitas, we are 
not called to surrender our individuality, but to recognise the balance 
between affirming ourselves and relating to others. An idealised image of 
communal discernment, which emphasises the virtuous community by 
understating the tensions present in any grouping of individuals, can 
damage this balance and so marginalise minority voices. In a contemporary 
British church (at the very least) this will include vegetarians. 
Hauerwas himself anticipates something like this, writing in The 
Peaceable Kingdom that: 
The church is the extended argument over time about the 
significance of [the story of Jesus Christ in the world] and how best 
to understand it. There are certainly differences in the church which 
may even cause separation, but that is why the church should learn 
to value her heretics. We never know what it is we should believe or 
be until we are reminded to by another.635 
Implicit in the call to casuistry is the call to value the “heretics” within one’s 
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community – those minorities in the church whose personal theology differs 
from the majority’s. An emphasis on communal casuistry, without parallel 
recognition that churches are constituted by individuals with different 
perspectives, can (and does) lead to heretics being marginalised. 
Michel Foucault roots intra-national racial strife in the modern move 
from monarchy to democracy: where once a single authority figure spoke 
for the nation, and the enemy was that which fell outside the borders 
designated by the monarch, the shift to the rule of the majority meant that 
the minority within the nation’s borders became more dangerous than the 
enemy outside.636 Could it be that similar dangers exist for churches 
practising communal casuistry? What happens to the only pacifist in a 
community which believes that Christians have a responsibility to engage in 
just war? What about the one republican in a church where the majority 
recognise the Queen as church sovereign? What of the lone vegan in a 
church where most Christians read Genesis as legitimating human 
exploitation of creation? These ‘heretics’ should not go unchallenged in 
their theology; but neither should the majority. Without reflexive attention to 
the natural (which is to say sinful) tendency towards conformity, the church 
is vulnerable to a majority rule which silences challenging voices. In such 
an environment, the Spirit cannot be seen to move; and it is the movement 
of God’s Spirit, dwelling in us (Rom. 8:9), which is needed for the church to 
be a community which values its heretics.637 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, writing during the years of Nazi rule in 
Germany, was intimately concerned with questions of community and 
discernment, and reflected on them while embedded in the practical and 
spiritual life of the Confessing Church. His ecclesiology is profoundly rooted 
in his Christology: in Sanctorum Communio he asserts that the church is 
Christ acting as community.638 A sermon preached in 1940 makes this 
clear: “The Spirit will not permit our community to grope about in darkness, 
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if only we are willing to take the Spirit’s teachings seriously. But every 
lesson of the Holy Spirit remains conjoined to the words of Jesus.”639 What, 
then, is the church community – led by the Spirit, centred in Jesus Christ – 
to be? How is it to discern? In an essay written while a student at Berlin 
University, Bonhoeffer emphasised the importance of “Supplication to the 
Holy Spirit which alone, as it pleases, gives [scripture] the hearing and 
understanding without which the most highly intellectual exegesis is 
nothing.”640 The Spirit guides reflection as it shapes those in the church to 
see the world through the eyes of Christ.641 But Bonhoeffer was also 
awake, arguably more so than Hauerwas, to “the ethical potholes that can 
open up when the Holy Spirit is so identified with the church community.”642 
A tyrannous majority might claim the inspiration of the Spirit for themselves, 
denying its presence in the community’s heretics; and so the Spirit’s 
mission to the community is to work against this, moving believers to see 
others “as love, as Christ.”643 
But what, then, of communities which do not reflect in this way? 
What of churches where majority rule is seen as, if not ideal, at least 
acceptable? For Bonhoeffer these questions were immediately relevant: 
when his Confessing Church decided the oath of fealty to Hitler was to be 
left to individual conscience, he asked in frustration, “Will they ever learn 
that majority decision in matters of conscience kills the Spirit?”644 
Bonhoeffer’s anger here is not directed against majority decisions as such, 
but the reduction of a complex theological and ethical conversation to a 
binary vote. How, though, are we to distinguish between church 
communities where casuistry is truthfully practiced, and those which “kill the 
Spirit” by leaving ethics to a majority decision informed more by social 
norms than by the gospel? Incidentally, any binary division of church and 
world falls down on this issue: counter to the claims made sometimes by 
Hauerwas (and frequently by those who situate themselves within “radical 
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orthodoxy”),645 it is not only the secular which can quash difference. 
It seems instructive here to refer again to Bonhoeffer’s simple 
assertion that the Spirit of Christ frees us to be for others.646 A character 
formed in and by the Spirit is a character formed not merely to debate, but 
to serve; and it is from this basis that we can approach questions of 
discernment. A community practicing majority rule is a community which 
dictates to itself as a corporate tyrant; a community practicing casuistry in 
the Spirit is a community that sees Christ in every individual – including 
those with a personal theology divergent from the majority. 
So we can discern between a reflective community and one 
tyrannized by the majority. But what are we to do about genuine and 
foundational disagreements? For Bonhoeffer, the question of allegiance 
was such a disagreement: the Reich Church declared its allegiance to the 
Fuhrer, which for Bonhoeffer was an unconscionable abrogation of the 
Lordship of God. Yet even here the Spirit is active: as Geffrey B. Kelly and 
F. Burton Nelson ask in their excellent spiritual overview of Bonhoeffer’s life 
and work, The Cost of Moral Leadership, “Is there community in the Holy 
Spirit without the Holy Spirit at the same time having the power to separate 
and divide?”647 We are called to love and forgive those with whom we 
disagree; but if some members of the church are unwilling to do the same, 
it is our responsibility to them as much as to the wider church to call them 
to question.648 
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Implicit in the call to casuistry is the call to value the heretic; to hear 
and engage with the position of even the smallest minorities in the 
community. How, though, does Hauerwas’ idealized picture of communal 
discernment fit with this call? Writing for the ideal should be the heart of all 
Christian writing; but if it is not tempered by awareness that people are not 
ideal, it can ultimately reinforce anti-relational attitudes and practices. In 
this case, an emphasis on casuistry-in-community without a parallel 
emphasis on the reality that churches are made up of individuals – some of 
whom will find themselves in a distinct minority on some issues – might 
lead to heretics being summarily rejected in an exercise of majority rule. 
This might take the form of their being given scant opportunity to discuss 
their theological and ethical convictions; or perhaps the community at large 
will even come to reject food as a topic Christians need to think about. 
Wherever the church does not perform casuistry – where its 
casuistical blind spots are – the ground is fertile for the normalization of 
sociocultural beliefs and practices as ‘Christian’. This happens not because 
the belief or practice in question is theologically warranted, but because we 
are embodied creatures whose beliefs and practices shape each other. If 
culturally normative practices are unreflectively engaged in by church 
members, these practices will eventually become as normal for the church 
as they are for the world outside it. The gap in the casuistical blind spot 
becomes filled by sociocultural norms and presumptions, and worldly 
practices are left to distort our Christian beliefs. To recognise the blind spot 
is to admit the need for fresh moral reflection – but if the majority stance on 
the relevant issues is not theologically but culturally rooted, resistance to 
any effort to illuminate the blind spot can be expected. 
 A situated example can be drawn from Robert Jones’ account of the 
casuistry of a church community in Oregon, USA, concerning proposed 
healthcare changes which would add physician-assisted suicide to the list 
of state-sponsored treatments at the same time as removing other 
treatments (including heart and blood pressure medications, and 
treatments vital to those with certain disabilities).649 Jones’ theological 
reflection on the church’s discernment led him to conclude that the absence 
of disabled narratives in many middle-class white churches severely 
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hampered their casuistry on disability issues; even to the extent of not 
recognising them as morally significant.650 A church community of healthy 
and wealthy individuals needs a serious commitment to self-critical 
casuistry – particularly on those issues which do not directly affect the 
community’s individual members – if they are not to make similar 
oversights. If an absence of disabled stories is something a church can 
recognise and work to adjust for in its acts of moral discernment, a theology 
of human-animal relationality prompts the question: should the same 
recognition and adjustment be made by churches without animal stories? 
Paying close attention to Hauerwas’ call to value heretics – perhaps 
closer attention than he has sometimes paid himself651 – is one affirmative 
way for a church community to approach casuistry on less orthodox 
matters. One example of this unorthodox casuistry might involve the New 
Testament passages referenced in relation to animal sacrifice and human-
animal relationality: Hebrews 10:12-14, Romans 14, Acts 10:10-15, and 
Matthew 15:11. It is not reflection on these passages in themselves that 
constitutes unorthodox casuistry – rather, it is the discussion about their 
significance for the dietary practices of contemporary Christians. Three of 
these four passages make direct reference to eating, while Hebrews makes 
the claim that Christ was the final sacrifice. In debate over dietary ethics, 
Hebrews 10 and Romans 14 (the latter discussed in detail in chapter 5) are 
readily cited by Christian vegetarians; while Acts 10 and Matthew 15 lend 
themselves more readily to non- or anti-vegetarians. In many cases, 
however – and from multiple directions – there is a tendency towards using 
the texts non-reflectively and out of context; which does more to confirm 
dietary ethics as a casuistical blind spot than to illuminate it. 
If Christ’s sacrifice ended the need for animal sacrifice, can we no 
longer eat the flesh previously regulated by sacrificial law?652 If it is not 
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what goes into the mouth that makes one unclean, do Christians have any 
moral responsibility when it comes to food? Both questions massively over-
simplify the issues present; but if dietary ethics continue to be a casuistical 
blind spot, further simplification and a poverty of moral discernment will 
follow.653 Communal discussion of questions such as these is not the end 
towards which churches should aim, but rather the beginning of a process 
concerned with situating the church as a relational community concerned 
for creation – and for their fellow relational animals in particular. 
 
Conclusion 
The church claims at least some of its authority on the grounds that it bears 
the responsibility for the formation of truthful Christian characters. Upon this 
foundation, I have argued in this chapter that casuistry, practiced holistically 
and relationally, is vital for the church’s belief and practice. Animal and 
dietary ethics fall within this holistic casuistry, as does the question 
underlying dietary pacifism, about the extent to which grace can transform 
our natural proclivities and responsibilities in relationship with our animal 
brothers and sisters. 
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The millennia separating us from our Christian forefathers; the vast difference in farming 
practices, and the way humans perceive and relate to the world-as-ecosystem; the relative 
ease of removing meat from one’s diet (in a modern British context) – there are many 
serious practical reasons, beyond the fundamental theological premise of grace’s 
transformative power, which demand more nuanced and truthful engagement on 
questions of dietary and animal ethics. 
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In conversation with Carol Adams, the language of invisibility’s 
power to obstruct truthful casuistry was explored. The mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the language of invisibility and the refusal of dietary 
ethics as something worth talking about suggests a preliminary answer to 
one question posed in this chapter’s introduction: if a church falls short in its 
casuistry on dietary matters, is it a failing of casuistry in general, or are 
animals a particular casuistical blind spot for that community? The latter 
seems more likely to be the case, but general failings of casuistry and 
specific casuistical blind spots exist in a mutually reconstructive 
relationship: if animals are not recognised as morally important – a 
recognition which should include some appreciation of their particularity 
and our shared mutuality – this will have a major detrimental effect on any 
communal discernment on dietary and animal ethics. 
Bonhoeffer’s Christocentric pneumatology, which grounds the 
inspirational action of the Spirit in the person of Christ, ties together 
communal reflection with the call to love and serve our fellows – and this 
means attending to them as relational individuals. Accepting grace’s 
transformative potential for our lives and responsibilities, we are freed to 
live for others. The tyranny of the majority, a danger to any community, is 
hamstrung by the justification and sanctification Christ opened for us. 
A lack of commitment to casuistry can lead to the acceptance of 
sociocultural norms (such as eating flesh) as distinctively ‘Christian’. If 
dietary questions are allowed to become a casuistical blind spot, efforts to 
engage in moral discernment on diet may come to face opposition from the 
church majority, as well as needing to engage with relatively 
unsophisticated readings of scripture on food. If, however, the church is 
able to promote and practice truthful casuistry, honouring and valuing its 
unorthodox members (such as vegetarians) in the process, animal and 
dietary ethics might be returned to the table of Christian moral discourse. 
The result of this would not be that all Christians become vegetarians: a 
situation parallel to the debate over just war and pacifism, wherein a variety 
of positions may be defended within any one community, is the more likely 
(and desirable) outcome. Engaging in communal exegesis and cultivating 
personal and corporate reflexivity are two ways in which individual 
churches might attempt to broaden their casuistical horizons. 
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In chapters 7 and 8, through reflecting on conversations with 
Christian vegetarians about their beliefs, practices, and church 
experiences, I will continue this chapter’s argument in support of dietary 
casuistry; while applying this thesis’ relational theology to the 
ecclesiological conclusions of these conversations. In chapter 9, I will then 
syncretise this thesis’ theological work – the theology of human-animal 
relationality, and the dietary pacifist ethic and casuistical ecclesiology built 
upon this framework – to answer the question I first posed in chapter 1. 
How should the church live and eat as a community which attends seriously 
and holistically to the all-pervasiveness of sin in the relational networks 
which constitute creation, in the hope of sanctification by grace and the 
ultimate hope of the kingdom? 
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7. Ordinary Dietary Pacifists 
Talking to Christian Vegetarians 
 
In this chapter I outline the methodologies – theological and sociological – 
underlying a series of interviews with Christian vegetarians, which will be 
explored in detail in chapter 8. Both these chapters draw upon the work of 
this thesis thus far – chapter 3’s theology of human-animal relationality, 
chapters 4-5’s dietary pacifist ethics, and chapter 6’s relational and 
casuistical ecclesiology – and attempt to think in a more situated way about 
the issues raised thus far. If I want to say that the church is called to be a 
community of creatures, attending to other animals as relational individuals; 
and if I want to defend vegetarianism as a legitimate Christian act of 
relationship with God’s other animals, it seems prudent to reflect (in concert 
with scripture and tradition) on the theology and lived experiences of 
Christian vegetarians. In the course of this chapter’s methodological 
outline, I outline the thinking behind bringing my theological project into 
conversation with social science methodology, and reflect on the issues 
raised in making this move; a move which is becoming increasingly 




In order to test and develop the theological, ethical, and ecclesiological 
work of the thesis thus far, I turned to a series of semi-structured qualitative 
interviews performed with Christian vegetarians.654 Drawn from a variety of 
denominations, and professing a range of different affiliations to Christian, 
vegetarian, and Christian vegetarian organisations, I engaged my dialogue 
partners in conversation concerned to explore a range of issues. These 
included 
 Why individual Christians are vegetarian 
 How they relate their Christianity to their vegetarianism (and which 
came first) 
                                                          
654
 In the interest of methodological clarity, I have largely refrained from using both 
‘dietary pacifism’ and ‘Christian vegetarianism’ in this chapter, sticking to the more literal 
‘Christian vegetarian’ unless the use of ‘dietary pacifism’ is necessary. 
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 How they feel their diet is viewed by peers in their church 
community 
 Whether they feel marginalised 
 What their beliefs are regarding nonviolence 
Conducting the interviews along these lines was intended to procure 
adequate material with which to test and develop the work of this thesis, 
while simultaneously providing my interlocutors with sufficient space to 
express their personal theology.655 In the words of Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, a 
theologian who utilises social-science methodology: 
Intensive [qualitative] interviewing is an appropriate technique... 
because it provides an opportunity for the interviewees to articulate 
their lived-experience, to tell their own story... Whereas structured 
questionnaires tend to mould answers, intensive interviews allow for 
free flowing answers which are not unduly directed or shaped by the 
questions.656 
There was no sampling process in the conventional sense to obtain a base 
of respondents: to engage with Christian vegetarians is to engage with a 
very specific minority of the church population (and an even smaller 
minority of the general population). Given that a randomly-selected 
participant would be unable to actually participate unless he happened to 
be both Christian and vegetarian – and to ideologically connect the two – 
probability sampling was infeasible. A self-selection approach proved the 
most workable option: to this end, I approached Christian vegetarians who 
had already identified themselves as such through membership of 
organisations such as Christian Vegetarian Association UK (CVAUK), and 
put out an open call for Christian vegetarian respondents657 on Christian 
message boards such as the Student Christian Movement (SCM) forum 
and Ship of Fools. The initial approach was to identify myself and provide a 
neutrally-worded information sheet about the study: individuals who read 
                                                          
655
 Having structured my ‘interview outline’ in such a way that one question proceeds into 
another, I hope that my dialogue partners might have been indirectly prompted towards 
fresh insight. See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 320. 
656
 Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, Elaborating a mujerista theology – En la Lucha/In the Struggle: A 
Hispanic Women's Liberation Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 78-9. 
657
 Christian vegetarian respondents self-identifying as such were taken at their word: that 
is, I did not attempt to verify their dietary practices. My concern is with how and why 
Christians come to be vegetarian – occasional lapses in dietary observance will not impact 
on answers along these lines. Intention is more important than content for this aspect of 
the research. 
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the information and agreed to participate were provided with a consent form 
and invited to provide a short written statement about their personal 
connection between faith and diet.658 Having obtained consent and a 
written statement, the conversation could begin in earnest: this was a one-
on-one659 semi-structured interview,660 lasting around an hour, all but one of 
which was conducted by telephone (the exception being conducted in 
person).661 
The final sample size was twelve respondents, this number being 
chosen in large part due to time and work commitments: as twelve 
respondents provided an adequate spread of denominations, ages, 
genders, and affiliations, it was decided that a larger sample, while 
desirable, was not necessary. Only one of my dialogue partners was born 
outside the United Kingdom: Alison,662 a woman raised in the American 
south who currently lives in London. It is with regard to age that the 
respondent base exhibits the greatest breadth, with an even spread of ages 
between early twenties and late sixties. Nine of the twelve respondents 
were women: in strictly quantitative work, this would be more problematic 
than it is for the present study – my respondent base is not intended to be 
quantitatively representative of either Christians or vegetarians at the 
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 The length of this written statement was (deliberately) not specified: responses ranged 
in length from one paragraph to two sides of A4. 
659
 I opted to pursue individual interviews as opposed to using the focus group format, 
believing that the potential benefit to be gained from group development of ideas and 
themes would be outweighed by the potential for the suppression of minority views (and 
for individuals to dominate the discussion). For example, all but one of my dialogue 
partners identified compassion for animals – as individuals and in relationship – as 
important to their vegetarianism. The one respondent who was exceptional in this case, 
identifying his vegetarianism as an act of environmental stewardship, explicitly did not 
consider concern for individual animals part of his vegetarian theology. In a focus group 
scenario, it seems unlikely that there would have been sufficient time afforded him to 
outline and explicate his ideas. 
660
 I avoided the use of a questionnaire, even as a precursor to a more involved discussion. 
As outlined above, my engagement with Christian vegetarians is an engagement with a 
very specific minority. There is little point to a large-scale questionnaire if the majority of 
respondents will be unable to answer the bulk of the questions due to not belonging to 
the particular group I am interested in. A questionnaire, particularly an online one, might 
have been used as a way of identifying respondents to approach concerning a qualitative 
interview, but given the presence of other options I deemed equally efficient and less 
time-consuming, this did not seem a worthwhile addition to the process. 
661
 Regarding the contested issue of interviewer self-revelation, I did not explicitly state or 
reveal my position on Christianity and/or vegetarianism to the respondents. If directly 
asked, I stated the bare truth: I am a Christian, and I self-identify as a ‘vegan’ dietary 
pacifist. 
662
 In the interest of confidentiality, all respondent names are pseudonyms. 
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national level.663 This study is not concerned to speak to what Christian 
vegetarians think in general: rather, I am seeking to examine Christian 
vegetarianism in a situated and embodied way; with a view to its 
theological, ethical, and ecclesiological dimensions.664 
 
Why Qualitative Research? 
It would have been quite feasible for me to produce a theological ethics 
thesis concerned with human-animal relationality and dietary pacifism 
without straying from my comfort zone into the social sciences. Why, then, 
did I do so? There are two key reasons. The first concerns the contrast 
between ordinary and academic theology: engaging with ordinary 
theologians not only allows me to further my own work, but also enables my 
thesis to be a test of Jeff Astley’s argument in favour of doing theology in 
conversation with non-experts.665 The second reason concerns the 
awkward place of vegetarianism and vegetarians within churches. 
It is worth briefly qualifying what I mean by “ordinary” theology using 
the opening page of Astley’s book: “Ordinary theology is [the] term for the 
theological beliefs and processes of believing that find expression in the 
God-talk of those believers who have received no scholarly theological 
education.”666 Ordinary theology in this way involves 
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 The 2008 British Social Attitudes survey suggests that 45% of religious believers within 
Britain are male, while the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ 2007 
“Survey of attitudes, knowledge and behaviour in relation to the environment” suggests 
that 48% of vegetarians (a definition which includes vegans) are men. See “British Social 
Attitudes 1985-2008”, available online at 
<http://www.britsocat.com/Body.aspx?control=HomePage> [accessed 15 March 2013]; 
and DEFRA, “Survey of attitudes, knowledge and behaviour in relation to the 
environment”, cited online by the Vegetarian Society at 
http://www.vegsoc.org/page.aspx?pid=753 [accessed 15 March 2013]. 
664
 In this way, I hope that my use of the interview data gathered is acceptably “grounded” 
– “grounded theory” is defined by Alan Bryman as “theory that was derived from data, 
systematically gathered and analysed through the research process. In this method, data 
collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another.” 
Bryman, Social Research Methods, 390; cf. John Swinton and Harriet Mowat, Practical 
Theology and Qualitative Research (London: SCM Press, 2006), 77-97. If my interview work 
and the dietary pacifist theology it informs are to be reliable, valid and generalizable in the 
sense meant within qualitative research (Bryman, Social Research Methods, 270), a 
grounded approach will be necessary when it comes to the analysis of the data. 
665
 Jeff Astley, Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002). Cf. Christian Scharen and Aana Marie Vigen (ed), Ethnography as Christian 
Theology and Ethics (London: Continuum, 2011); and Pete Ward (ed), Perspectives on 
Ecclesiology and Ethnography (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012). 
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 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 1. 
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religious language as it is used by ordinary believers to speak 
descriptively or expressively of God, Jesus and other transcendent 
categories such as salvation... 
the overtly religious beliefs (beliefs-that and beliefs-in) that are 
manifested in or implied by such language... 
the processes and forms of thought and argument that are 
employed in people's theological reflection on and discussion of 
explicit religious concepts.667 
Ordinary theology is too often disregarded by ecclesial and academic 
institutions. Yet, as Astley reminds us, every believer has a theology; and 
while a lack of formal education may mean that ordinary theologies are (in 
general) less rigorous and more transparent in showing their formative 
influences, it does not follow that there is nothing to be gained from 
conversation with them. John Howard Yoder raised similar concerns when 
he considered the relationship between academy and church on the 
question of nonviolence. Recognising the relationship as problematic, he 
wrote that 
It is a source of deep historical confusion to identify the history of 
Christian morality as a whole with the record of the thought of 
academic moralists... Such academic formulations may, in some 
cultures, make a major contribution to how people will actually make 
decisions in the future, if local preachers or confessors take their 
cues from the professor. But in other traditions, where the 
instrument of enforcement that the confessional provides is not 
used, the relation between the academic articulation and the real 
life of the community is more like that of the froth to the beer.668 
It is worth briefly unpacking Yoder’s metaphor: the froth, after all, remains 
connected to the beer. But with this connection comes debt – the froth 
owes its existence to the beer – and superficiality. Who savours the froth 
more than the beer? If the relationship between theology and church is not 
considered more carefully, academic theology is in danger of this 
superficiality. Christian character is primarily formed in the community, not 
the academy: I hope that by engaging with ordinary theologians I will not 
only find resources and inspiration, but also demonstrate the value of 
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 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 94. 
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 John Howard Yoder, When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking (Eugene, 
OR: Wipf & Stock, 1996), 70. 
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talking (and listening) to those outside the academy. Quite simply, Christian 
vegetarians – be they ordinary, academic, ecclesial, or liminal across these 
crude categories – think about the things I want to talk about; and so their 
insight is potentially valuable regardless of their education. 
It is possible that on such a heterodox (and therefore niche) topic as 
vegetarianism, those arguing in favour are likely to share other beliefs, 
whether their theological background is academic, ordinary, or ecclesial; 
which would limit the usefulness of surveying ordinary theology. While this 
is indeed possible, it remains true that the material read and referenced by 
ordinary Christian vegetarians often differs markedly from that utilised in 
academic work on Christian vegetarianism.669 I make no value claim here; 
only the claim that whatever shared beliefs and practices might exist across 
boundaries, a noteworthy difference between academic and ordinary 
theology remains. As theology and doctrine are at all times influenced by 
environmental and individual concerns, however, it is no good to dismiss 
ordinary theology merely because it is not academic. Such a dismissal 
would in fact run counter to this thesis’ central argument; that living imago 
Dei means living as an individual in relationship, hoping for one’s natural 
tendencies to be transformed by grace, and so seeking to live for others as 
God is for us. To limit theological input to specific sections of the 
community is to forget this fundamental theological truth. 
 
Defending Qualitative Research (and Ordinary Theology) 
Despite being increasingly accepted as methodologically sound, scepticism 
remains within Christian theology regarding the appropriateness of the 
social sciences for theological work. It is perhaps ironic, in the context of 
this thesis, that among contemporary theologians Stanley Hauerwas is one 
of the louder voices declaiming the value of social science methodology for 
the church – a critique consistent with his opposition to the ethos and telos 
of secular liberalism and his (sometimes oversimplified) depiction of the 
relationship between church and world. When Peter Gathje writes on the 
failure of Christian virtue ethics to attend to the virtues in actual 
communities, it is Hauerwas he has in mind: 
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 For a demonstration of this, refer to the Christian Vegetarian Association website 
(<http://www.all-creatures.org/> [accessed 18 December 2012]) and compare the books 
offered and suggested in their store to those on parallel topics in any university library. 
Shared beliefs and goals (between ordinary and academic theologians) do not necessarily 
translate to shared reading material. 
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Christian virtue ethics focuses upon the moral formation of persons 
within a community of faith that takes place through practice of the 
community’s vision. What I have found strange in this field of 
Christian virtue ethics is a lack of sustained attention to the practice 
of actual communities and how that practice does or does not 
shape persons in virtues consistent with a community’s vision.670 
Arguably, this lack of sustained attention arises from the wariness with 
which Hauerwas and others (perhaps most recently the “radical orthodoxy” 
of John Milbank671 et al) view the social sciences. With the Grain of the 
Universe, the edited collection of Hauerwas’ 2001 Gifford Lectures,672 is 
one locus of Hauerwas’ critique of the Christian use of social science 
methodology; and Robert Jones sees Hauerwas’ criticism as proceeding 
from his stark delineation between church and world.673 To analyse the 
church by the standards of sociology, the criticism goes, is to seek and 
produce findings consistent with the narrative of the secular world – a world 
ontologically rooted in systemic violence674 – rather than that of God and 
God’s people. 
Counter to this, Jones cites H. Richard Niebuhr’s claim that “The 
standpoint of the Christian community is limited, being in history, faith, and 
sin.”675 This sin, treated in chapter 3 as both cause and result of the human 
refusal to accept grace, is bound up with our creatureliness: if we refuse to 
recognise our creatureliness and attendant limitations, and as a result 
reject the sanctification grace can bring, we fall short of our calling and are 
therefore in sin. The individual and corporate limitations of any particular 
Christian community suggest that the church should be open to revelation 
from outside itself. The use of social science methodology in theology, 
therefore, 
serves as more adequate starting point for Christian moral reflection 
than a notion that the church simply possesses a witness that it 
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Blackwell, 2006). 
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Theology (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001). 
673
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should deliver to the world. From this perspective, the task of the 
church is not simply to “witness” to the world on a given issue, but 
rather the task of the church is to see where it is already acting in 
sin in order to see how it might begin to act in faith.676 
To be sure, if theologians were to subordinate theology to sociology, the 
concerns of Hauerwas et al might be justified. Among those theologians at 
the forefront of exploring this potentially fruitful overlap, though, this is 
manifestly not the case. John Swinton writes: 
If the church’s task is to bear witness in the ways that Hauerwas 
suggests, then the need to explore the empirical church is of great 
importance, not for sociological purposes but for theological 
reasons... [T]heologians who desire to use ethnography as part of 
their theologizing should approach the issue as theologians.677 
In the introduction to the collection wherein Swinton writes this, Pete Ward 
draws a stark contrast between how theologians relate to other humanities, 
and how they relate to the social sciences: 
When it comes to history or philosophy, we proceed with 
considerable caution. We take great care to make sure that we 
abide by accepted academic convention and we want to 
demonstrate that we are proceeding with academic rigor. Then 
when we talk about the contemporary church, completely different 
rules seem to apply. It becomes acceptable to make assertions 
where there is no evidence. We assume a common perception of 
contemporary church life between author and reader. We base 
whole arguments on anecdote and the selective treatment of 
experience.678 
For Ward, and myself, this dissonance is indefensible. For theologians 
concerned to write meaningfully about the church in the world, it is quite 
simply dangerous to avoid sociology. 
It must also be recognised that Hauerwas’ stress on narrative plays 
a significant role in his desire to keep theology theological. In With the 
Grain of the Universe, he proclaims that “only by writing history on their 
terms can Christians learn to locate the differences between the church and 
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the world.”679 In other words, the church is called to live as a community of 
character which witnesses to God’s Incarnation and resurrection for 
creation – a distinctive theological commitment, not to be compromised by 
sociocultural standards and prejudices. In line with Astley’s stress on the 
unique theology of every believer, however, it needs to be recognised that 
the situated church does not witness as a monolith: individual Christians 
will learn and represent the Christian narrative differently, their personal 
theology being nuanced by and interwoven with other narratives (familial, 
political, sociocultural) to varying extents. Hauerwas does anticipate this 
through his emphasis on casuistry; but if the church adheres to the ideal 
(witnessing to the world in a distinctively Christian language) at the 
expense of understanding the real (all the ways our Christian language is 
influenced by extra-ecclesial sources and relationships), its theology has 
become aberrant. Simplistic understandings of church practices are not 
merely harmful to the relationship of church to world, but (as seen in 
chapter 6) can do significant harm to marginal members of the community. 
 Gloria Albrecht criticises Hauerwas’ lack of engagement with 
concrete examples of actual church communities, arguing that his 
ecclesiology dissuades American Christians from participating in any efforts 
by liberal society to work for social justice.680 For one in Hauerwas’ position, 
such an attitude neglects the reality of oppression and suffering that so 
many Christians and churches (to say nothing of those outside the church) 
face on levels rarely experienced by white middle-class Americans.681 
Claiming to speak to the ideal, and claiming that this liberates one from 
needing to engage with situated examples, is one thing – claiming to speak 
to the ideal while actually speaking to the white American Christian 
situation raises serious questions about power, responsibility, and justice. I 
am not claiming that Hauerwas intentionally ignores his non-American 
brothers and sisters; and none of this endangers the validity of his wider 
theological framework. Rather, the problem is created when he writes 
naturally from his own context without looking at the context of others. 
Albrecht’s criticism is one which could be made more generally of 
Hauerwas’ work: it would be perhaps harsh, but not outlandish, to call it a 
recurrent criticism of his work that he moves too hastily, and without proper 
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substantiation, from abstract claims about the church in the ideal to 
proclamations about how actual church communities should actually live 
and practice. A theological ethic rooted in Hauerwas’ narrative and 
communitarian framework – such as dietary pacifism – therefore stands in 
need of a corrective against this theological pitfall. By conversing with 
ordinary Christian vegetarians, I therefore hope to test the constructive 
work of this thesis – that is, articulating an animal theology and vegetarian 
ethic and calling the churches to new and deeper and more genuine 
casuistry on these topics. Via this critical endeavour, it will also be possible 
and necessary to test the presumptions of Astley’s ordinary theology, which 
informs much of my approach to analysing the data gathered through the 
interviews conducted.  
Astley eloquently confronts a number of criticisms of ordinary 
theology682 – such as its being incoherent,683 anthropomorphic,684 and 
biographical685 – but I don’t believe these criticisms need to be answered in 
great detail for my purposes. If I am concerned with the lives, faith, diet, 
and experiences of ordinary Christian vegetarians, then any incoherence or 
personal biography is part and parcel of what I wish to obtain! As for the 
charge of anthropomorphism, it is hardly a fallacy that academic theology 
has long ago rid itself of; as was demonstrated in the critique of 
substantialist understandings of the imago Dei in chapters 2-3. 
One line of criticism protests there is an irresolvable tension in doing 
ordinary theology in an academic context: to think about people’s ordinary 
theology you have to systematise it. While this is true, it is also irrelevant – 
the same criticism could be levelled at the entire field of ethnography (if not 
sociology as a whole). Academic engagement with non-academic thought 
will necessarily involve some degree of systematisation: this is the point. 
Through systemisation and analysis, new insights may be reached, of 
benefit to ‘ordinary’ and ‘academic’ alike. 
Another potential concern is that interviewing ordinary Christians 
could actually further the divide between the ordinary and the academic, by 
establishing a nonnegotiable gap between interviewer and interviewee. In 
response to this I would emphasise the importance of informality and semi-
structured interviewing to ‘breaking down’ this gap – and I would also point 
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to the common perception of academics as remote and inaccessible, 
something that engaging with ‘ordinary’ people could hardly make worse! 
A criticism with more validity might be that any conversation 
between academic and ordinary theologians will by definition be limited to 
(and therefore privilege) those topics which both interviewer and 
interviewee can talk about. Therefore, while a strictly academic theology on 
a given issue can reasonably be expected to be comprehensive, a theology 
constructed in conversation with ordinary Christians might see the 
contemporary privileged over the context; or the anecdotal over the 
universal. I certainly do not wish to claim that my sample of twelve 
constitutes the voice of British Christianity: neither do I wish, however, to 
reduce their role in our conversation to that of an object to be analysed, 
‘objectively’, by me as a scholar. Here I am in agreement with Jeffrey 
Tribble, who advises that “Wisdom, judgement, love, and respect for 
persons and congregations must guide our representations of communities 
where we, the scholars, are not the only ‘knowers.’”686 
If I am to criticise, lovingly and respectfully, the theological 
commitments of my fellow Christians, I must at the same time be prepared 
to criticise (and be open to criticism of) myself and my theology. Isasi-Diaz 
reminds us of this in her methodological outline: “Who I am, where I am 
coming from and where I wish to go shapes the method and content of my 
theological work.”687 Such an admission is but one element of what Swinton 
and Mowat call “epistemological reflexivity”: 
Epistemological reflexivity requires us to engage with questions 
such as: How has the research question defined and limited what 
can be “found”? How has the design of the study and the method of 
analysis “constructed” the data and its findings? How could the 
research questions have been investigated differently? To what 
extent would this have given rise to a different understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation?688 
There are two further, perhaps less pivotal, methodological questions to 
answer. The first is whether, given the selection process and the small 
sample size, the data gathered is in any way generalizable. As respondents 
were self-selecting, and – by nature of being vegetarian – a minority within 
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the Christian population, it is worth noting the possibility that data obtained 
will be skewed against the church. Individuals responding to a call to 
discuss their beliefs and experiences as a Christian vegetarian are 
presumably more likely to be those who have particular church experiences 
to share. Critical consideration of respondents’ standpoints will be important 
if my work here is to be reliable, valid and generalizable. Also noteworthy is 
Swinton and Mowat’s concept of ideographic knowledge, which “presumes 
that meaningful knowledge can be discovered in unique, non-replicable 
experiences,”689 as well as Astley's reminder that “Studying a person's 
ordinary theology is not the same as agreeing with it.”690 
The final question also concerns context: who is representative, and 
what do they represent? If I am drawing respondents from a variety of 
denominations, is it possible to get any context for comparison? I would 
answer similarly to the above: it will be necessary to obtain as much 
context as possible in the interviews. 
Interviewing people will not reveal their theology in a way that we 
can understand, unless we can get them to talk about what this 
theology means in their practice, in their lives and in their culture. 
Better still, we should also seek to observe that behaviour, life and 
culture, as far as we are possible.691 
Admittedly it would be better “to observe that behaviour, life and culture,” 
but for this thesis the time available in which to do so was limited. The next 
best option – getting respondents “to talk about what [their] theology means 
in their practice, in their lives and in their culture” – was pursued instead, in 
order to furnish each interview with sufficient context for adequate 
comparisons to be made. In addition, interviewing across multiple 
denominations can be as much a help as a hindrance: were I to discern a 
consistent theme of respondents feeling marginalised for discussing dietary 
ethics (for example), this theme will be more reliable and significant for an 
argument about Christian vegetarians in general if it comes from a wide 
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Testing the Methodology 
I hope that my conversations with ordinary Christian vegetarians will serve 
a purpose beyond enabling situated reflection on Christian vegetarianism; 
that my use of social science methodology – informed by this thesis’ 
relational emphasis and Astley’s work on ordinary theology – might be a 
test of the method itself. By doing academic theology in conversation with 
ordinary Christians, I aim to contribute one more case study to the growing 
amount of work being done at the intersection of theology and ethnography. 
Contributing to the development of the method in this way fits (despite his 
own misgivings about social science) with Hauerwas’ notion that theology 
should be constructed in conversation with the church.692 In this way, my 
engagement with ordinary Christians is not merely methodologically but 
theologically consistent with the wider thesis. As already argued, if the 
church is to not just have but be a social ethic,693 its members should be 
doing ethical reasoning. 
Isasi-Diaz, a Hispanic feminist theologian who engages with 
ordinary Christians from the Latino/a diaspora in the USA, is a valuable 
example of someone doing constructive theology in conversation with 
ordinary theologians. My dialogue partners (Christian vegetarians) are 
generally not marginalised in anything like the way hers (Hispanic women 
in the USA) are; and also unlike her respondents, mine are relatively 
privileged in terms of access to education.694 I would contend, however, 
that both groups exist on the margins (even if there is a notable difference 
in degree); and furthermore, that Isasi-Diaz and I share a common subject 
matter in questioning the boundary between the ordinary and the academic. 
In the introduction to En la Lucha she expresses her “hope that mujerista 
theology's method and insistence on the validity and importance of Latinas’ 
religious understandings and practices will impact not only theology but 
also the churches and, through them, society.”695 Abstracted from her 
context, the sentiments Isasi-Diaz expresses here apply just as well to my 
concerns in developing dietary pacifism: I hope that my insistence on the 
validity and importance of Christian vegetarians’ religious understandings 
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and practices will impact not only theology but also the churches and, 
through them, society. 
 
Conclusion 
The use of qualitative semi-structured interviews in service to theology, 
ethics, and ecclesiology is not methodologically perfect. Put simply, this is 
because it spans a variety of disciplines and methodologies. For my 
purposes – reflecting on Christian vegetarianism in a situated and 
embodied way, developing and testing dietary pacifism in concert with 
ordinary Christian vegetarians, and testing both ordinary theology and the 
value of social science methodology for academic theology – engaging with 
the social sciences is necessary, if not uncontroversial. It is possible that 
the small sample size and self-selection mean that my data is not wholly 
generalizable; but neither are my own personal reflections, nor those of 
other academic theologians. That my personal experiences are not 
generalizable is no barrier to their role in informing, testing, and shaping my 
work – and the same is true for the ordinary theology of my interlocutors, so 
long as the data obtained is valid, reliable, and consistent. 
Having reviewed some of the theological opposition to social 
science methodology, I hope that my research might contribute in a small 
way to the growing acceptance of ethnography’s usefulness to theologians 
and ethicists. In the sense that what I am doing remains a relatively 
uncommon practice within theology today, my thesis is able to not only 
reflect on the place of dietary ethics within the churches, but also to test 
and potentially develop this way of doing ‘ordinary’ theology. This will 
involve listening to my conversation partners with an ear at once 
sympathetic and critical, and the analysis of chapter 8 will function as a test 
of their theology as well as mine; in addition to testing my presumptions 
about the former. In this thesis I aim to construct an ethic of dietary 
pacifism, rooted in a theology of human-animal relationality, which functions 
to draw the churches towards an open and reflexive debate which is largely 
not happening at present: my interview work and the analysis thereof will 
contribute to this end, and in so doing will also function deepen 
understanding of how (and/or how not) to do theology in conversation with 
non-academic Christians. 
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8. Dietary Heretics? 
Reflecting on the Conversations 
 
Having outlined the methodological basis for, and theological goals of, my 
engagement with ordinary Christian vegetarians, in this chapter I will reflect 
on the data gathered. In so doing, I am interested to test and develop the 
relational theology and dietary pacifist ethic of this thesis’ first part; to 
further explore how situated church communities perform casuistry; to test 
whether my theoretical claims about church and diet are substantiated by 
lived examples; and to evaluate my methodological approach in pursuing 
these ends. 
After conducting the interviews and performing an initial round of 
coding,696 reflection on the conversations largely proceeded by way of 
identifying and exploring potentially instructive relationships between 
respondents’ beliefs, practices, and experiences. In this chapter, I will 
explore the following relationships, identified through the coding process as 
significant: 
 Relationship between different Christian vegetarian themes 
 Relationship between reasons for (initially) becoming vegetarian 
and Christian vegetarian themes referenced 
 Relationship between thoughts on pacifism and Christian vegetarian 
themes referenced 
 Relationship between personal ecclesiology and situated church 
experiences 
 Relationship between situated church experiences and the danger 
of spiritual pride697 
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I will also, towards the end of this chapter, reflect on the methodology 
employed in the interview work which is this chapter’s foundation; including 
the ordinary theology of Jeff Astley and my own presumptions in 
approaching this aspect of my research. 
The initial reason for talking and listening to ordinary Christian 
vegetarians was to consider how ordinary vegetarian theology related to, 
and differed from, its academic counterpart. The interviews conducted did 
not disappoint on this account, but they did surprise: a surprise that 
stemmed at least partly from my naive assumption that ordinary theological 
reasoning would be substantially different from that conducted in the 
academy. Explicitly contextual698 and relatively unsophisticated699 it may be, 
but conscious and complex engagement with scripture and tradition was 
evidenced by all twelve respondents; and often the end product was closer 
to academic formulations than critics of doing ordinary theology might 
suspect. Alison, raised in a Mennonite context, offers one example of this: 
Alison: The “organic” trend has given people the idea that they are 
making a soundly humane choice of cows are killed in some kind of 
happy way...but my experiences on a very sweet, small Kansas 
farm tell me that it is not just factory farms where abuse occurs. 
Alison recognises the distance between perception and reality, echoing 
Carol Adams’ critique of the farming industry’s ‘language of invisibility’700 
which distances consumers from the animals whose deaths their diets 
depend upon. And reason is brought to bear on experience and theological 
inheritance when, in response to perceived cruelty, violence is disavowed 
with respect to other animals. While Alison does not consider what possible 
failures of casuistry led to abuses on her “sweet, small Kansas farm”, we 
should not think that a lack of systematization equates to a lack of 
theological significance. Indeed, Jeff Astley rebukes criticism of ordinary 
theology as unsophisticated or confused on the grounds that such criticism 
suggests that it is only the academically sophisticated who will be 
taken seriously when they suggest that God does not (or that God 
does) intervene in human affairs – or that God is (or is not) finite, 
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that God is (or is not) a mere concept, or whatever. These 
theological positions, and many others, have been held both by 
academic theologians and by ordinary believers. It is, therefore, 
rather perverse to ignore, and worse to scorn, such beliefs when 
they are expressed by people with no theological education.701 
It is a similar case for individuals motivated by the reality that many of us 
are fortunate enough to live in a context where animals do not need to be 
raised for slaughter in order for humans to survive. Carol, a middle-aged 
woman who attends both Baptist and United Reformed churches, 
demonstrated this when she told me, “I don't believe we should be causing 
death and suffering in animals for something that's going to give us five, ten 
minutes at most pleasure, eating.” To claim that necessity is an absolute 
minimum condition for humans to consider eating animals is to affirm other 
animals as valuable individuals: that this affirmation is not explicit or 
systematised in no way diminishes its centrality to Carol’s personal 
theology. 
 In moving, next, to reflect on the range of different Christian 
vegetarian themes drawn out during the conversations, I shall pay 
particular attention to how these themes interrelate within the personal 
theology of my dialogue partners.702 
 
Relationship between different Christian vegetarian themes 
Coding the way my interlocutors spoke about the connection they saw 
between Christianity and vegetarianism, three major themes – 
environmental, anthropocentric, pacifist703 – were identified to help 
understand how individuals understand and justify their faith-diet 
connection. The majority of my conversation partners spoke about their 
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theology and ethics with a breadth that saw their responses coded under all 
three headings; but four individuals in particular were interesting in that 
their responses were coded under only two. By reflecting on the 
relationship between two distinct themes in an individual’s thought, we can 
hope to understand their ordinary theologies of vegetarianism in more 
detail; and constructively compare these with the animal theology explored 
in this thesis. 
Helena (an Anglican in her twenties) and John (a Methodist in his 
twenties) gave answers coded under the anthropocentric and 
environmental trees. In chapter 2, I explored the relationship between 
anthropocentrism and environmental theology, and the common locus of 
‘stewardship’ where they intersect: in considering how Helena and John fit 
this identified pattern, this earlier conversation is taken up, and its 
conclusions re-examined. Daisy and Kevin were also frequently coded 
under the anthropocentric heading; but instead of professing specifically 
environmental concerns they were also coded as pacifist. By considering 
Daisy and Kevin in contrast with Helena and John, the contrast between 
stewardship and dietary pacifism might be clarified; and an example of an 
anthropocentric pacifism concerned also for other animals might be 
provided. 
 
Anthropocentric + environmental = stewardship? 
Helena: Animals are a part of God's creation and we're stewards of 
that creation and so we need to care about all of it, not just a little 
bit... I think that's part and parcel of being a Christian is being 
compassionate on all creation. 
John: I'd like to cut down my carbon footprint in any way I can, but 
ever since I heard how much carbon that the meat industry knocks 
out that I thought okay I can't legitimately be not a vegetarian 
anymore. So I think that'd be the core reason, I mean obviously 
beyond that there's a lot of good reasons for being vegetarian 
obviously if the whole world became vegetarian there'd be plenty 
more fields to grow crops and world hunger could be solved much 
easier etcetera etcetera but yeah primarily it's the carbon footprint 
really. 
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For Helena, vegetarianism proceeds from stewardship; defined as “being 
compassionate on all creation.” Other animals are to be cared for – whether 
one recognises them as relational individuals or not – because they are 
part of what has been entrusted to humanity by God. This is a hierarchical 
theology: humans top the created order, and for that reason bear the 
responsibility of stewardship. John emphasises the duties of stewardship 
yet more strongly: the impetus to steward creation ties into environmental 
motivations for vegetarianism and global justice concerns, like relieving 
world hunger. No specific mention of nonhuman animals is made. 
 In chapter 2, it was argued that stewardship theologies emphasise 
our responsibility to God to the extent that our shared mutuality with other 
animals is obscured. Without recognition of their relationality, the possibility 
of working for transformed relationships with our animal brothers and 
sisters is simply not an option. To see animals as our fellows is an 
eschatological act, dependent on God’s transformative grace; but it also 
depends on seeing nonhuman animals as relational individuals, in relation 
with whom – as a human creature of God, created imago Dei and so called 
to live for others as God is for me – my very humanity is at stake. 
 To make a specifically inter-human human parallel; in seeking to 
be the church, we are called to live for our fellow Christians as God is for 
us. This is an act of responsibility to God – it is what God calls the church to 
be – but at the same time it would be unusual for an individual Christian to 
see this as an act of relationship with God only. When we serve another, 
we are responding to God and relating to whoever we serve: the core 
theological argument of this thesis is that the same thing happens when we 
seek transformed relationships with other animals. 
 Helena’s and John’s primarily anthropocentric-environmental 
stewardship models fit broadly within the understanding of stewardship 
used in chapter 2. Helena does feel compassionate towards animals, but 
her definition of stewardship does not depend on concern for individual 
animals. John does not mention other animals when outlining his 
stewardship theology, and later declared he’d have no problem shooting a 
wild rabbit – particularly if said rabbit was a pest to farmers. This does not 
(necessarily) mean John is unconcerned with animal suffering: given the 
major environmental impact of the mass farming industry, clear delineation 
between concern for animals and concern for the environment is difficult. 
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 Helena and John are not merely theologically consistent but are in 
the theological mainstream. The question for dietary pacifism, a model 
which exhorts and depends upon recognition of other animals as relational 
individuals – whose flourishing is furthermore bound up with our own – is 
whether stewardship is consistent with this recognition.704 
 
Anthropocentric + pacifist = dietary pacifism? 
Matthew: What would you say is central to your vegetarianism? 
Kevin: I would say a love of God, and the world he has made, and 
the sort of creatures he has brought into being, um, through love of 
God love and respect for them ... 
Kevin’s written statement: My basic feeling and belief is that all life 
is ‘good’ and has value in the eyes of God, and the ‘dominion’ we 
have been given as human beings implies a duty of care. Lordship 
and authority, in the light of Jesus the Servant-King, is seen to be 
characterised by service rather than exploitation. My guiding 
principles, therefore, are that I should play my part in caring for 
Creation, only take life where it is necessary for health or survival, 
and work to minimise suffering. 
Kevin – a middle-aged member of the Anglican Society for the Welfare of 
Animals (ASWA) – was typical of my conversation partners, in that he 
expounded a personal theology drawing on scripture and tradition, 
demonstrating serious ethical reasoning. In articulating a “duty of care” 
(similar but different to a ‘duty of stewardship’ in being explicitly relational) 
to other animals, expanding it to include avoidance of harm unless 
“necessary for health or survival,” Kevin draws together anthropocentrism 
and pacifism into something like an ‘ordinary’ formulation of dietary 
pacifism. 
In Ordinary Theology, Astley distinguishes between primary and 
secondary learning of faith. The primary stage is learning about religion; 
being inducted into the narrative and language used to speak about God.705 
The secondary stage is embracing the faith; seeking to understand what 
                                                          
704
 Further discussion of stewardship, and how it might be redeemed in a relational 
direction, is undertaken in chapter 9. 
705
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 25.  
Page 218 of 287 
has been learned on a deeper level, and “to behave in a manner 
appropriate to the beliefs and affects that we have learned.”706 Besides 
being the stage at which genuine formation of character takes place, it is 
through embracing one’s learning that ordinary theology becomes personal: 
“The nature of this second learning will depend much more on the nature of 
the person and personality of the learner than does the first learning, in the 
sense that it will be more affected by our attitudes, emotions, cognitive 
skills, and so on.”707 Kevin’s testimony displays the learning context within 
which his Christian character was formed,708 while simultaneously 
embracing and embodying his faith by internalizing and acting on it in a way 
meaningful (and therefore, within Astley’s framework, salvific709) for him. 
For Kevin, knowledge of God’s love, creation’s goodness, and Jesus-as-
servant could not be limited in their ethical significance to only the human 
part of creation. His dietary practice is in this way shaped by his “tradition-
constituted, craft-constituted enquiry.”710 
 Daisy, a charismatic evangelical in her fifties, shares Kevin’s 
concern to live peaceably alongside God’s other animals. 
Daisy: They're not just a commodity, they're sentient beings and 
they feel pain, and they're God's creatures, particularly as they're 
God's creatures... I can't see that a God of love would put animals 
on this earth for us to eat, I cannot see it. 
Daisy and Kevin support my earlier suggestion that dietary pacifism might 
act as a theological corrective to problematically monodirectional models of 
stewardship. Both affirm commonality between human and nonhuman 
animals, recognising them as fellow creatures of God who are therefore 
deserving of love and respect and service. This commonality does not 
mean we are no different from other animals: it is a theological 
commonality, which sees us linked in the webs of relationship that 
constitute creation. 
 To return to chapter 2 of this thesis: “Our responsibility is to God, 
at the level of worship, and from there to all creatures, in both their 
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particularity (in so far as we can understand it) and their involvement in the 
wider networks of relationship which constitute creation.” In the time 
between resurrection and reconciliation, our stewardship is better 
understood in the language of 1 Peter 4:10 than of Genesis 1:28. We are 
not mere fillers and subduers but “good stewards of the manifold grace of 
God,” called to live out grace’s transformational potential with our human 
and nonhuman animal fellows. Kevin and Daisy provide two excellent 
examples of how anthropocentrism is not inherently problematic: as 
stewards of grace following Christ the Servant-King, we are freed to live for 
our animal brothers and sisters; not as custodians, but as partners. 
 
Relationship between reasons for (initially) becoming a vegetarian 
and Christian vegetarian themes referenced 
Cross-referencing the stories of how and why people first became 
vegetarian with the Christian vegetarian themes their conversation was 
coded under offered a straightforward way to consider the causal 
relationships between belief and practice (in this case, faith and diet). It 
should not be surprising to learn that those with formative concerns about 
animals and violence were much more likely to reference pacifism in 
relation to their vegetarianism. Those whose initial motivation for becoming 
vegetarian was not directly related to animals – such as those influenced by 
friends or family members – were more likely to reference environmental 
themes. 
 Carol, a middle-aged Methodist woman whose responses were 
primarily coded under pacifist, offers an example of the former: 
Carol: I had for a long time thought about meat and where it came 
from, but I loved meat, loved eating meat and the taste of it and 
everything and cooking with it and everything, but later on moving 
towards Christianity and seeing the connection there and the 
suffering and everything that the animals went through... it was just 
so awful, and then I couldn't make the connection between being 
Christian and eating meat where so much suffering has gone. 
What is arguably most notable about Carol’s response here is that, for her, 
becoming Christian and going vegetarian happen simultaneously! The 
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connection between animal suffering and the Christian call to lived 
transformed lives in creation was not something Carol put together over 
time, but was from the start a key element of her discipleship. Through 
learning the faith and learning about the treatment of food animals, she 
came to abandon the practice of eating meat – an example of the 
transformed relationality (and casuistry) this thesis argues for. 
In all, seven respondents (Alison, Becky, Carol, Daisy, Fiona, Kevin 
and Mary) identified concerns about other animals and a belief in 
nonviolence at the genesis of their faith-diet connection. Three respondents 
(Erin, Helena and Lianne) evidenced a causal relationship between 
becoming vegetarian for reasons unrelated to other animals and justifying 
Christian vegetarianism using anthropocentric and environmental language 
(i.e., the language of stewardship).711 Take Helena, quoted above for her 
belief that “part and parcel of being a Christian is being compassionate on 
all creation.” 
Helena: So I have a friend who is a vegetarian, she was actually 
vegetarian first and then became a Christian, and maintained her 
vegetarianism, and it's interesting because I think her reasons for 
being vegetarian have probably changed slightly in light of her 
becoming a Christian... she always challenged me on numerous 
issues, vegetarianism being one of them, and it was just one of 
those things that kinda niggled me really and I felt like actually 
reading a bit..  
It is also worth noting that two respondents cited scripture when explaining 
their reasons for initially becoming vegetarian. Carol referenced the sixth 
commandment,712 arguing for its extension beyond the merely human. 
John, a vegetarian out of concern for the environment, referenced Mark 
16:15713 to support a claim that “the gospel is good news for all creation.” In 
both cases, scripture is cited to support the respondent’s understanding of 
Christian vegetarianism: Carol considers the sixth commandment a 
disavowal of all violence, while John uses the symbol of ‘spreading the 
good news’ to advocate the expansion of Christian care for creation. The 
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exegeses performed by Carol and John are open to debate (as are all 
exegeses), but for the purposes of this analysis they demonstrate the claim 
that a causal relationship, between how and why one became a vegetarian 
and how one theologizes about it afterwards, exists. 
Hauerwas’ stress on casuistry, character formation, and learning 
from the community’s saints714 is consistent with the existence of a causal 
relationship between the example of friends and family members, and the 
decision to become vegetarian. Our character is shaped by our 
experiences and our relationships, and within the church these 
relationships are themselves informed by scripture, tradition, reason, and 
grace. If theology and ethics are linked in communal casuistry, and if 
exemplary Christians play a significant role in character formation, then it is 
to be expected that exemplary Christians who are also vegetarian might 
shape the characters of their brothers and sisters in this way.715 From here, 
individuals who have come to understand their vegetarianism as 
theologically-motivated will further develop their personal theological ethics 
within the Christian narrative context. 
We need to remember, though, that the process of formation is 
more nuanced (i.e., more messy) than Hauerwas describes: as an 
individual existing in the world as well the church, the Christian is rarely 
formed exclusively by the narrative of God and God’s people. The language 
of narrative is useful for unpacking this: we might speak, for example, of a 
vegetarian narrative existing in relationship with the individual’s Christian 
narrative. One’s theology and one’s dietary ethics change and develop 
simultaneously; and should the individual be concerned to live out the claim 
that theology is ethics, these two narratives need not develop along parallel 
lines but may converge and grow together. The story of one’s diet and the 
story of one’s faith – even if proceeding from entirely distinct starting points 
– ‘overlap’ both practically and theologically. Casuistry is paramount here: 
reflecting on our embodied commitments through the lens of the Christian 
narrative, we ask how the former fit into the latter. Dietary practices are one 
such embodied commitment, which Christians are called by grace to 
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examine critically and with love. A vegetarian who is also a Christian716 
might, through a process of discernment, come to understand their dietary 
ethic as one expression of a life lived in and for Christ: this was the case for 
Alison, who (as has been mentioned) learned and embraced her faith in a 
Mennonite context. 
Alison: I've always admired the Mennonites I was raised amongst... 
many of my relatives are of a more conservative sect who are very 
obviously removed from mainstream life, and the strong 
commitment to pacifism. I have been confused, however, about 
the pacifist disconnect when it comes to animals and food. I really 
appreciated your emphasis on this point and the encouragement it 
gives me to re-brand my background into something that fits me 
better today. 
Through personal casuistry, Alison has come to understand vegetarianism 
as an expression of Christian nonviolence, leading to her perceiving a 
“disconnect” between Mennonite theology and Mennonite dietary practice. 
Encouraged, by the simple opportunity to discuss her faith-diet connection, 
to “re-brand” her theological inheritance, she intends to engage with this 
disconnect and so move towards a more holistic outliving of her pacifist 
theology. The “pacifist disconnect when it comes to animals and food” 
which Alison perceives in her home church is one example of the 
casuistical blind spots discussed in chapter 6,717 potentially leading to her 
feeling distanced from the community which first shaped her as a Christian. 
The church’s call to form truthful Christian characters includes the call to 
illuminate casuistical blind spots, enabling the bringing together of divergent 
narratives718 by facilitating individual and communal moral discernment. 
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also pacifism itself, are rarely deemed suitable for church casuistry. 
718
 This weaving together of narratives is not the preserve of ordinary Christians: the same 
occurs ‘behind the scenes’ of academic theology. It is true, however, that ordinary 
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But what, then, of those who became vegetarian because of the 
formative influence of friends or family members, and who later espouse a 
vegetarian theology devoid of concern for individual animals? What would it 
mean for my thesis – and my twinned arguments for relational dietary 
pacifism and church-centred casuistry – if those Christians shaped by good 
casuistry were actually less likely to become dietary pacifists than those 
initially influenced by concern for animals? I would cautiously suggest that 
such examples might actually emphasise the importance of communal 
casuistry, and of recognising other animals as relational individuals. If one’s 
church community does not see the individuals outside its boundaries as 
morally significant,719 and so does not engage in truthful casuistry on issues 
pertaining to them, one will be left to articulate their Christian vegetarianism 
with the conceptual and theological tools available to them. If, in such a 
situation, one adopts vegetarianism at the urging of a friend or relative, 
rather than as a result of seeing other animals face to face, then it logically 
follows that one will be less likely to develop a dietary pacifist ethic than a 
Christian who became vegetarian through personally experiencing and 
relating to other animals and their suffering. If church casuistry is to bring 
Christians to seriously consider dietary ethics, it is vital that it also brings 
them to see other animals as moral subjects; and therefore, at some level, 
as relational individuals. 
 
Relationship between thoughts on pacifism and Christian 
vegetarian themes referenced 
I turn now to consider the interplay between pacifism in general and the 
Christian vegetarian themes referenced by my dialogue partners. The 
seven respondents who referenced pacifist themes in defining their 
vegetarianism are, as one might expect, against the use of violence. This is 
not to say they are absolutist pacifists: all seven admitted exceptional 
circumstances under which the use of violence would be necessary, 
although tragic. World War II, and threats on one’s life or the lives of one’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
theology most readily displays its inner workings, its “learning process” (Astley, Ordinary 
Theology, 60) – this is why there is much to learn from talking with ordinary theologians. 
719
 See the conversation with Hauerwas on abortion in chapter 4, and the argument that 
casuistical blind spots lead to the exclusion of ‘heretics’ in chapter 6, for examples of how 
those outside the church’s boundaries are never only nonhuman animals. 
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family, were the most common circumstances cited. Becky, a middle-aged 
Anglican, offers one example: 
Becky: [On vegetarianism] It's such a horrific thing that goes on, I 
can't think that God would be happy... for example, the chicken 
factory farming, and the slaughter of the sheep and how they have 
their throats cut without any, any warning, get herded up and killed 
and I just don't think he'd like it at all... 
 [On pacifism] I think if it was the First or Second World War, 
and you saw someone coming towards you with a gun - which of 
course they did in those days - or bombs, maybe you'd have to 
retaliate? And I think to myself would I, or wouldn't I? I don't know. 
The presence of potential exceptions to her military pacifism, without 
accompanying exceptions to her dietary pacifism, might suggest for Becky 
the existence of a ‘necessity clause’: perhaps conditions of extreme 
necessity, for example, would legitimate the killing and eating of a fellow 
animal. As discussed in chapters 4-5, such a clause might be thought of as 
an analogue to just war theory, in that it establishes a general rule of 
nonviolence, to which there might be exceptions under certain conditions. 
For just war theory, the conditions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are well-
established (although still debated)720 – for dietary pacifism, the exceptional 
condition which might override nonviolence towards nonhuman animals is 
human survival (note: survival, not luxury). This argument from necessity 
was made by Kevin, cited above for the connection he draws between 
following Christ and serving creation: 
Kevin: I'm not, I wouldn't describe myself as completely pacifist 
actually, I'm from a military family, my dad was in the army, and I've 
always regarded as far as war is concerned that kind of thing that in 
a sort of, for want of a better word a fallen world, that uh 
government has a limited but legitimate role in maintaining a degree 
of order and peace within the world, and in order to do that I think 
it's only realistic that uh a measure of force needs to be used... you 
can't sort of obtain the kingdom of God in that way, but you can uh 
put the lid if you like on some of the worst of evil. And I think it can 
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 For a recent contribution to, and expansion of, the debate, see Mark J. Allman and 
Tobias L. Winwright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante bellum, jus post bellum, 
and Imperfect Injustice”, Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32.2 (2012), 173-91. 
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be the lesser of two evils, sometimes, to do these things, and I'd to 
some degree take the same approach with animals... there can be 
situations I can foresee where sometimes taking life is the lesser of 
two evils and can be kind of necessary.... 
 If I was uh in a plane crash in the Andes, uh I wouldn't, and 
there was no kind of food, vegetables or anything like that, from a 
vegetarian point of view to eat, then um I would not have a problem 
morally, even if I had a problem some difficulties emotionally, I 
wouldn't have a problem morally in eating dead passengers or 
indeed catching any sort of game that might be around if the 
vegetable sort of option was not there. 
Violence is seen by Kevin as being in some cases necessary, although only 
ever as “the lesser of two evils” – a Christian realist position comparable to 
that of Reinhold Niebuhr.721 This position finds support in chapter 5’s outline 
of compromised idealism, both being rooted in Hauerwas’ claim that 
Christians do what they do, “not because it is effective, but simply because 
it is true.”722 
Kevin’s argument from necessity extends to his diet, although the 
moral and relational esteem in which he holds nonhuman animals is 
suggested by his claim that conditions of extreme necessity would justify 
the eating of a dead human as much as it would the eating of a nonhuman 
animal. We can, however, infer that hunting a living human would not be 
legitimated in the same way that “catching any sort of game that might be 
around” would. A sacrificial understanding of flesh-eating, such as that 
advanced by Hauerwas and John Berkman723 or Norman Wirzba,724 is 
appropriately situated within the kind of argument from necessity Kevin 
advances. The foundational difference in willing between Christian self-
sacrifice and the ‘sacrifice’ of an unwilling animal renders the sacrificial 
understanding of flesh-eating suspect in the context of (for example) 
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 The debate between Reinhold Niebuhr and his brother H. Richard, concerning the 
extent to which U.S. military involvement in Japan’s invasion of China would be just, 
produced an exchange of articles which remain key texts in Christian debates over 
violence and pacifism. The articles can be found online at 
<http://www.ucc.org/beliefs/theology/two-famous-brothers-debate.html> [accessed 19 
December 2012]. 
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 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 151. 
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 Stanley Hauerwas and John Berkman, “The Chief End of All Flesh”, Theology Today 49.2 
(1992), 196-208 at 208. 
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 Norman Wirzba, Food and Faith: A Theology of Eating (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), chapter 4. 
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everyday British life – but in conditions of extreme necessity, a sacrificial 
understanding of the animal’s death leaves room for recognition of the 
animal as an individual, confession of responsibility for his or her death, 
and thanksgiving to God for one’s continued survival. 
 Interestingly, only one respondent was absolute in his defence of 
human pacifism as a Christian ethic. This was John, whose environmental 
motivation meant that he was not vegetarian out of concern for animals in 
themselves. 
John: [On vegetarianism] I'd be very happy to go hunting and kill 
and eat an animal myself and that doesn't bother me whatsoever. 
And actually having said that the meat I possibly would consider 
eating would be things like, um, 'cause I used to know a farmer I 
don't see him very often anymore, and he would go hunting wild 
rabbits which are just considered pests to the local farmers, so he 
shoots them and then gives them to people and that, so on the 
whole I haven't got a big problem with that, 'cause obviously the 
carbon emission of going out into a field near your home and 
shooting them. So those kinds of things I wouldn't have a problem 
with at all... 
 [On pacifism] Sunday just gone we got onto the topic of 
World War II, and we were saying what would it have been like if 
people had said no we're not gonna fight, and after that discussion I 
don't think there particularly is an excuse to fight in any 
circumstances... as an example the German people obviously were 
told by the Nazi government that people in Europe... are evil people. 
So therefore if the German army marched on these evil people it's 
okay to kill these people 'cause they're evil and we're just fighting 
for good. If they'd met thousands of people who said shoot us if you 
want, but all we want to do is show you love and kindness, then 
suddenly the whole Nazi argument that you know these countries 
are evil suddenly starts to fall apart in the eyes of the troops, and 
then if you don't have an army then there's nothing you can do... 
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Military pacifism, even in the face of mortal danger, is supported by John as 
a truthful outliving of Christian faith; and also as a strategy that can work725 
in practice. This concern with practical impact diverges from Hauerwas’ 
truth-centred idealism, and is potentially instructive in unpacking why the 
only respondent who advocated absolute human pacifism was theologically 
uninterested in dietary pacifism. For John, military pacifism can work, not 
only as a witness to the transformed relationships we hope for come the 
eschaton, but as a strategy to stifle war. To use Clough’s typology outlined 
in chapter 5, John’s pacifism is strategic where dietary pacifism is 
principled.726 His vegetarianism, as has been outlined, is motivated by the 
environmental concerns of stewardship: the concern here is not for 
individual animals but for creation-as-ecosystem.727 Understood in this way, 
universal pacifism practiced in relation to nonhuman animals is undesirable 
and unsustainable, if one is concerned with (among other things) 
functionality. In John’s words, rabbits are “pests” – living nonviolently 
towards them can compromise both human flourishing and the ecosystem. 
Within his vegetarian theology, dietary pacifism quite simply does not 
work.728 
 In closing, a word should be said about George, a middle-aged 
member of Catholic Concern for Animals (CCA), whose vegetarian 
theology explicitly affirms the eschatological significance of nonviolence. 
Like Hauerwas in his foundational work,729 George invokes Isaiah’s image 
of the peaceable kingdom, wherein the relationships between individual 
animals (including the human ones) will be transformed by their Creator.730 
George: Perhaps being vegetarian could be described as a faith-
based persuasion: in that hordes of humans will never care less 
about other creatures or the eventual destruction of the earth, 
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 Given the small sample size – John is one of only three men interviewed – substantive 
claims cannot be made, but it is interesting that the only respondent who situated 
themselves as a pragmatist was male. For discussion of the intersection between gender 
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therefore vegetarianism could be understood as a choice for the 
Kingdom rather than worldly ways. 
Just as it is proper and Christian to work for sanctification in the church and 
the world – and just as the impossibility of absolutely attaining this does not 
render it wanton but rather faithful anticipation of the kingdom731 – so it is 
with the call to live out transformed relationships with other animals. The 
struggle for existence is a feature of the fallen world,732 but our inability to 
approximate the kingdom in no way means we should not strive for a 
foretaste of it. In moving from a lament that “hordes of humans will never 
care less about other creatures,” to the more optimistic belief that 
“vegetarianism could be understood as a choice for the Kingdom,” George 
succinctly summarises the compromised idealism underpinning dietary 
pacifism (see chapter 5). Ultimately, dietary pacifists look not to humans to 
end the suffering of other animals, but to God; without allowing recognition 
of our dependence to halt our efforts to work for God’s ultimate intention for 
creation. 
 Thus far, I have surveyed the personal theology of my ordinary 
respondents; looked at the relationship between different Christian 
vegetarian themes referenced, and how their initial reasons for becoming 
vegetarian fit with their wider theological commitments; and engaged with 
their beliefs about pacifism. Next, I will consider their reception – as 
Christian vegetarians – in their local church communities. Beginning with a 
consideration of their situated church experiences and their understanding 
of church, two avenues proceeding from this will be explored: the 
movement of ostracized ‘heretics’ into alternative communities of character; 
and the danger of spiritual pride which can arise when one is made into an 
outsider. 
 
Relationship between personal ecclesiology and situated church 
experiences 
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Page 229 of 287 
In chapters 4 and 6, Hauerwas was criticised for writing on the church as it 
should be (the ideal) at the expense of examining the church as it is (the 
real). In considering the relationship between the situated church 
experiences and personal ecclesiology of my conversation partners, I am 
interested to see how the ideal and the real shape each other: how are the 
individual’s beliefs about the church be shaped by their experiences within 
it? 
Ingrid, an older Baptist woman, outlined a personal ecclesiology 
which shares much with Hauerwas; particularly regarding the role of the 
church in forming Christian characters, and the importance of truthful 
casuistry rooted in scripture and tradition. Ingrid recently stopped attending 
her local church, feeling that neither casuistry nor communal respect were 
being practised. 
Ingrid: I once suggested that we could have for Sunday lunch 
spaghetti bolognaise made with soya. Oh my goodness! That was 
my only venture into ... how can you have this as a Sunday meal? 
You know, and then you would need to have different food for 
different people, um, now how can you – you need to have roast on 
Sunday, of course! But nut roast was not considered as an 
alternative either, you know ... 
The rejection of soya bolognaise as an option for the communal lunch may 
seem, at an academic level, a minor issue. Such a presumption, however, 
would only emphasize the need for a more nuanced understanding of 
communal casuistry: in the everyday life of real churches, such issues can 
have significant and potentially destructive impact. It is worth contrasting 
Ingrid with Kevin, who reported no strong feelings of exclusion as a result of 
his diet. 
Kevin: I see the church as there to, people coming together to 
worship, for teaching and, well you know working together in 
mission, uh supporting encouraging each other, uh being a sign of 
God's love in the community, all kinds of things... 
 I think we should be uh counter-culture, I think that we 
should be thermostats and not thermometers... 
 I think it's uh, well currently people are quite polite about it. I 
think it's not totally understood by a lot of people. I found there's a 
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lot greater understanding now than when I first started, huge 
change over the years, big improvement. 
For Kevin, the church is a counter-cultural community; an ecclesiological 
claim he does not use in any dietary critique of his church. One potential 
reason for this lack of criticism is that, in his own words, “there’s a lot 
greater understanding [of Christian vegetarianism] now than when I first 
started.” It certainly seems to be the case, at the national level, that 
vegetarianism is less counter-cultural than it has been in the past.733 This is 
not necessarily to identify the shift in attitude as proceeding from a 
generation gap; something Lianne, a young Anglican woman whose church 
contains a number of vegetarians, would reject in any case. 
Lianne: I don't think it's a young, like a young-old divide like I think 
there are quite a lot of the older congregation that are vegetarian. 
Generation gap or not, it seems it is decidedly less controversial now to be 
a Christian vegetarian than it has been in the past. Alison, who intends to 
“re-brand” her vegetarian theology in opposition to the “pacifist disconnect” 
she perceives between Mennonite theology and Mennonite dietary practice, 
offers an interesting contrast. This is because her home church is in 
Kansas, and there are no vegetarians there: 
Alison: It’s kind of viewed as un-American... many or most of them 
are convinced that God gave us animals to eat and that it is 
practically sacrilege not to partake... 
Clearly some degree of communal reflection has been performed in her 
home church, although it may be debatable as to what extent their 
discussions have been deductive rather than inductive. Put another way, is 
Alison’s hometown a small farming community because it believes it 
“sacrilege” to not eat animal flesh? Or did the narrative of a small farming 
community intersect with their Christian narrative, leading to an 
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interpretation of Acts 10:13734 which reads it as commanding, rather than 
allowing, the killing and consuming of other animals? 
The interview data threw up many examples of communities which 
do not seriously engage with those members who have well-developed 
vegetarian theologies; and almost as many examples of this behaviour 
generating dissatisfaction and resentment in those pushed to the margins. 
Daisy spoke of being seen as “extreme, or a bit wacky,” and of being 
accused of misinterpreting scripture: having engaged in truthful personal 
casuistry, this was an accusation she felt strongly about, saying, “It’s turned 
me against some of my Christian peers, and I shouldn’t let it do that, but I 
can see how it could.” Fiona, a middle-aged member of ASWA, relayed a 
similar story. 
The church? I think they think we’re all barking ... I do get quite 
irritated I have to say. I get, um, slightly resentful... 
I know there’s quite often you know sort of slightly sarcastic 
comments made about me because I am the one who’s always 
cracking on about animals, and they know that given half the 
chance I will always bring it up, and if ever I’m asked to do prayers I 
will always slot animals into it somewhere. I mean I’m tolerated and 
people aren’t unpleasant but I do think they think I’m a bit of a 
crackpot, and I get very, very little support for anything I do, so you 
know nobody ever comes to my services... that’s quite a depressing 
side of it really... 
Ignorance or rejection of the theology behind one’s ethics – in this case, 
ignorance or rejection of vegetarian theology – is clearly a negative 
experience. Even more troubling are those instances where casuistry on 
dietary ethics appears to have been rejected out of hand, leaving the 
Christian vegetarian with no engagement in his or her community, without 
providing a tangible justification for their isolation. Having criticised Daisy’s 
interpretation of scripture, at least some members of her local church are 
prepared to engage, at some level, in discussion of dietary ethics. Fiona, 
and others among my dialogue partners, felt marginalised without ever 
being engaged in real conversation. Subject in this way to the tyranny of 
the majority, such individuals have no opportunity for sustained dialogue: 
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their learning context, wherein they were formed in such a way that 
personal casuistry led them to adopt vegetarianism, comes to implicitly 
reject their particular way of embracing the faith. When attendances at the 
services in which Fiona is involved are noticeably lower than normal, such 
rejection has arguably become explicit. 
The concerns of Ingrid, Daisy, and Fiona mirror my own, outlined in 
chapter 6: if casuistry is not practiced honestly and reflexively, the 
communitarian idealization of the church can lead to the marginalisation of 
its ‘heretics’, by obscuring the myriad personalities and prejudices present 
in any community of individuals. As noted in that chapter’s discussion, 
Hauerwas anticipated this problem when he wrote that “the church should 
learn to value her heretics.”735 The call to casuistry incorporates the call to 
value the heretic736 – to honestly enter into conversation with those whose 
theology differs from one’s own – and this needs to be taken seriously by 
academic ecclesiology if it is to be relevant for situated churches and 
ordinary theologians. 
As a result of their community’s antipathy, whether reached through 
casuistry or in absence of it, Christian vegetarians can come to feel 
marginalised. More than this, they can become self-consciously aware that 
what they feel convicted to is deemed esoteric or wrong. The peace of the 
kingdom in which we hope, the transformative power of grace, the person 
of Jesus Christ, the relational work of the Spirit, and the communal 
importance of casuistry all indicate that a church which does not work to 
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better incorporate its marginal members is not living out its first social task 
– it is not being the church. 
 Some respondents raised the issue that the reason for their 
marginalisation might run deeper than mere ambivalence: 
Carol: Yeah, in no way do I want to ever cause a rift or anything like 
that, that's what I believe in, and if people want to ask me about that 
that's fine, I'll answer it, but it always seems like they've got to 
defend themselves when they're talking to me, and I find that quite 
odd because they've asked me the question. 
Carol is asked about her diet, explains it, and receives a defence of flesh-
eating in response: while debatably preferable to the total avoidance of 
casuistry, one cannot escape the conclusion that this is not a genuine 
discussion. Rather, it seems to be a result of Carol’s questioners deciding 
that “they’ve got to defend themselves.” The very presence of a Christian 
vegetarian, a member of the community with a heterodox faith-diet 
connection, might be seen as an implicit challenge to unreflective meat-
eating (and the underlying notion that there are elements of our creaturely 
practice which do not need to be touched by grace). This is parallel to the 
way in which military pacifism is an implicit (sometimes explicit) challenge 
to unreflective militarism and patriotism. 
I would like to suggest that one mechanism at work here is that 
identified in chapter 6: the acceptance of sociocultural norms and practices 
as distinctly Christian, something in danger of happening wherever the 
church has a casuistical blind spot. The gap left by the blind spot is filled by 
sociocultural presumptions, which are retroactively defined as ‘Christian’ 
without being theologically defined, or even appropriate. What we eat can 
be one such practice: in seeking to illuminate the casuistical blind spot that 
dietary ethics can be, Christian vegetarians like Ingrid, Daisy, Fiona and 
Carol come to be perceived as heretics. To repeat myself from chapter 6; 
“To recognise the blind spot is to admit the need for fresh moral reflection – 
but if the majority stance on the relevant issues is not theologically but 
culturally rooted, resistance to any effort to illuminate the blind spot can be 
expected.” 
 We find an analogue to this situation in Acts 10:13, wherein Peter is 
told to get up, kill, and eat. As discussed in chapters 5-6, this revelation is 
Page 234 of 287 
one part of the wider narrative of Christ’s loving sacrifice bringing an end to 
the law. Wirzba writes that 
For Peter to protest that he has never eaten anything that is profane 
or unclean is another way of maintaining that he is a good Jew. 
God’s vision challenges Peter to reconsider his dietary practices 
because these are being used as the basis for exclusion. The 
designations clean and unclean are here shown to be an excuse to 
deny fellowship and limit hospitality to others... This is an 
exceedingly difficulty message for Peter to appreciate, suggesting 
how deeply eating practices are tied to personal and ethnic 
identity.737 
As seen in the experiences of marginalization (or hereticization) reported by 
my interlocutors, designations of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ (or ‘clean’ and 
‘unclean’) can become justifications for limiting community with those who 
make one uncomfortable. The reason Wirzba gives for this denial of 
fellowship is distinctly not one tied to the Jewish theology of the time: 
instead, it is a result of eating practices being deeply connected to personal 
and ethnic identity. In a British context at least, ethnic identity may not be 
an important factor in Christian debates over food (despite remaining 
hugely significant elsewhere): rather, personal and national738 identity are 
the factors which can lead to Christian vegetarians being ostracized by their 
brothers and sisters. 
It would seem that holistic and reflexive casuistry is ecclesiologically 
vital if dietary pacifism is to be communicated in the churches. If our 
theology is our ethics, and the church forms our character, animal and 
dietary ethics – like all embodied matters – are questions which casuistry 
cannot avoid. When casuistry is not practiced on topics which are 
religiously significant to individual members of the community, those 
members might come to seek the nourishment and relationship they do not 
find in local church elsewhere, in alternative communities. Fiona, whose 
concerns about being seen as a “crackpot” have been quoted, is one 
example of this: 
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Fiona: It is really quite depressing really, if I think about it too much. 
I mean thank God I've got people, you know sort of like my fellow 
committee members, so I do know that there are other Christians 
who do care about animals, because I think if I didn't have them it 
would actually be quite a lonely old journey actually. 
An avoidance of animal and dietary ethics, to the extent that services by 
“the animal welfare crackpot” are apparently avoided by some members of 
the congregation,739 has caused Fiona to feel frustrated and isolated in her 
local church, leading to her increasingly identifying with ASWA. Like other 
alternative communities of character, ASWA is not part of a defined church 
structure, and does not conform to the paradigm of the local congregation. 
Despite this, shared concerns with extra-ecclesial organisations such as 
ASWA, CCA, and the Christian Vegetarian Association UK (CVAUK) can 
lead marginalized individuals to identify with, and so become shaped by, 
the communities these organizations are. Whether the “lonely old journey” 
to which Fiona refers would be continuing as a vegetarian, continuing as a 
member of her local church, continuing as a Christian, or some combination 
of these is unclear (and so could have been explored further in the 
interview); but what is clear is the community and quality of relationship she 
finds in ASWA, tragically absent from her local church. Carol and Alison 
provided similar testimony, with regard to CVAUK and its American 
equivalent (CVA). 
Carol: I went to a conference last year with the CVAUK ... And I 
must admit that I felt so, so good there because I was with people 
that were like-minded and I’ve never come across people that have 
been, you know, with that kind of attitude before.  
Alison: The CVA group was really encouraging ... Not to feel such 
the weirdo. 
Ordinary Christian vegetarians like Fiona, Carol, and Alison find the 
fundamental ingredients of the church-as-community in organizations like 
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ASWA and CVAUK. Without the physical proximity of typical congregations, 
it might seem that the opportunity for such alternative communities to be 
involved in Christian formation is limited. The learning context of CVAUK, 
for example, can play an important role in developing the character and 
theological ethics of its members: however, except for notable exceptions 
like Carol (for whom adult conversion to Christianity and the adoption of 
vegetarianism are related), or instances where a new member is the 
offspring of one or more CVAUK parents, it is unlikely that many will begin 
their education into faith there. This does not reduce the significance of 
what CVAUK does do as a community: character is developed and shaped, 
and casuistry performed. A learning context is provided, rooted in scripture 
and tradition, which is open and sympathetic to the narrative of ordinary 
Christian vegetarians. In short, alternative communities of character can 
become the vital “network of giving and receiving”740 for ordinary Christians 
who feel marginalized in their local church. 
There is, however, a danger that organizations like ASWA and 
CVAUK, being communities oriented to a specific ethic, may invert their 
theology and casuistry so that vegetarianism becomes the end and 
Christianity the means. This natural (which is to say, sinful) temptation is 
memorably portrayed by C. S. Lewis’ Screwtape as “Christianity And”: 
What we want, if men become Christians at all, is to the keep them 
in the state of mind I call “Christianity And.” You know – Christianity 
and the Crisis, Christianity and the New Psychology, Christianity 
and the New Order, Christianity and Faith Healing, Christianity and 
Psychical Research, Christianity and Vegetarianism, Christianity 
and Spelling Reform. If they must be Christians let them at least be 
Christians with a difference...741 
The thing to do is to get a man at first to value social justice as a 
thing which the Enemy [God] demands, and then work him on to the 
stage at which he values Christianity because it may produce social 
justice... You see the little rift? “Believe this, not because it is true, 
but for some other reason.” That's the game.742 
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This temptation is noted by Alison, who is something of an outlier in this 
section, in as much as the negative reception of vegetarianism in her home 
church seems to have engendered few ill-feelings. 
Alison: I think we have to be careful not to feel superior about this 
enlightenment... and ask ourselves if we get some kind of 
secondary gain out of being different. 
Alison is more wary about this “secondary gain” than others among my 
conversation partners, cited below in considering the danger of spiritual 
pride which can arise from experiences of rejection and marginalisation. 
Ultimately, hers is a witness which confirms the reality that the church 
needs genuine casuistry – wherein individuals are reflexively and 
relationally open to the other – if it is to avoid resentment and ill-feeling 
between vegetarian and meat-eater alike. This is a message that extends 
far beyond dietary ethics, and it is one the church needs to take on board 
sooner, rather than later. 
 
Relationship between situated church experiences and the danger 
of spiritual pride 
It should be noted that reports of negative experiences in particular 
churches do not necessarily indicate something negative about those 
communities. Such reports might equally indicate that the churches are 
being held to an unfair standard. This is not to deflect the reality of what the 
interview data suggests;743 that many church communities are uninterested 
in casuistry on animal or dietary ethics, a position which indicates a lack of 
loving concern not only for other animals but for the Christian vegetarians 
marginalised as a result of their heterodox beliefs. That said, certain 
statements by some of my dialogue partners, examined in the context of 
their situated church experiences, suggest that negative communal 
experiences may foster feelings of pride in those rendered outsiders on 
account of their diet. 
 Consider Lianne, the only respondent whose local church contained 
a significant number of vegetarians. Lianne reported the most positive 
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church experiences, at the same time expressing caution about being too 
forceful with her vegetarian ethics: 
Lianne: In my church the majority of people understand why other 
people are vegetarian, and I think it's you know it's very acceptable 
to be vegetarian there... 
 Yeah, I would like it [the Student Christian Movement] to just 
be vegetarian, I think any organisation which claims to be socially 
aware doesn't really have an excuse for serving meat at things, but 
then I'd perhaps say that about individuals which is really 
hypocritical because you know like I said I've only been vegetarian 
since October it took me a long time to get there as well, so you 
know it would be great if it was a vegetarian church but you know I 
totally understand why it's not. And then there's the issue of you 
know imposing your views on other people as well. 
Lianne’s humility, arising from recognition of her own recent adoption of 
vegetarianism, gives rise to both patience and forgiveness with respect to 
her meat-eating brothers and sisters – a way of relating to them which 
respects their individuality and recognises shared mutuality. Becky, who 
shares Fiona’s negative experiences of discussing dietary ethics in a 
church context, offers an interesting contrast: she wants her church to get 
involved with vegetarian campaigns, claims to “never hurt or do anything to 
anybody,” and expresses the belief that her illness is a punishment from 
God for having eaten flesh in the past. 
Becky: If they could think hard about what they're doing... Like the 
Veg4Lent, try it see how you get on...  
 I can honestly say I never hurt or do anything to anybody or 
anything, and I save every blinking insect in the world, everyday I'm 
getting things out of the house and putting them out, and if I see 
other people doing it I say stop stop please let me deal with this, 
even if it's a really big spider I have to go and save it. I think I'm like 
that with most things, I have to save things... 
 Yeah, I want to say about the MS I've got and vegetarianism, 
I was a complete carnivore when I went MS. In my local group, 99% 
of the people attending are carnivores, so I wonder even if it has a 
bit of a bearing on me developing MS, and I think well maybe that is 
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another punishment from God for always having the meat, and not 
many people even have organic! They do have the traditionally-
reared – horribly – meat. 
This is not a straightforward case, and the suggestion that Becky here 
exhibits a blind spot about her pride is a subjective one. However, the 
possibility of her illness being a punishment for meat-eating indicates a 
belief that to do so is an abhorrent and anti-Christian sin. This casts stern, if 
implicit, judgement on “99%” of her local MS group; particularly so if the 
“99%” have the “traditionally-reared – horribly – meat.” Without debating 
her retributive account of divine justice, it should simply be noted that 
Becky’s theology of judgement is significantly divergent from the relational 
theology underpinning dietary pacifism: chapter 3’s theology suggests that 
the balance of divine justice is the creation and restoration of right 
relationship; anticipation of which should lead us to treat other animals 
better than fear of punishment ever could. 
It is an unfortunate but regular consequence of disenfranchisement 
that those so disenfranchised will come to identify themselves over-against 
that from which they have been excluded. This identity-through-opposition 
is precisely what Yoder warns his Mennonite community – and the church 
catholic – against: 
Such a systematic rejection of the wider world becomes a hidden 
dependence upon it. Whatever the outside society does, we must 
do otherwise. Thereby the church is dependent upon the world 
which she rejects but which she still permits to dictate the patterns 
of her rejection.744 
This dependence on defining oneself by what one is not stifles genuine 
casuistry: a refusal to countenance what the other does, solely because the 
other is doing it, is a move away from any truly situational approach to 
moral reasoning. In the words of Lewis, speaking through Screwtape, 
Any small coterie, bound together by some interest which other men 
dislike or ignore, tends to develop inside itself a hothouse mutual 
admiration, and towards the outer world, a great deal of pride and 
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hatred which is entertained without shame because the ‘Cause’ is 
its sponsor and it is thought to be impersonal.745 
Pride, understood in the Augustinian sense as “putting oneself (or the 
group identity one represents) in God’s place,”746 is destructive of right 
relationship with our fellows; both human and nonhuman. In this thesis, I 
have argued that grace’s transformative potential calls us to perceive 
particularity and relationality outside the merely human; but if concern for 
one’s animal brothers and sisters leads one away from right relationship 
with one’s fellow humans, then the sin of pride is still at work in the 
relational networks that constitute church and world. We are called to live 
for others as God is for us – whenever we live only for other humans, or 
look down on our human brothers and sisters for not eating like we do, we 
fall short of this call. Romans 14 is not only pertinent to the meat-eating 
majority: the compromised idealism which beckons us to not “do anything 
that makes your brother or sister stumble” (14:21) swings both ways. 
 When casuistry is performed inductively rather than deductively, in 
avoidance of the critical balance that comes through reading scripture 
against as well as for oneself,747 all that can be achieved is at best a kind of 
sham reflection, its conclusions sketched in outline before ‘debate’ begins. 
To take one representative example, in a CVAUK newsletter Genesis 1:29-
30 is referenced, without further substantiation, as leaving “no doubt that in 
God’s perfect world, all living creatures were created as vegans, except 
humankind, they were created in God’s image, so their diet was more 
stringent; seeds and fruit, a fruitarian diet, a diet that did not even kill 
plants.”748 In another example from the same newsletter, Jubilees 6:6-8749 
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is manipulated to argue that God commanded vegetarianism in Genesis 
9:3-4750: 
God did not want man to eat anything, no thing, that contained 
blood; flesh with its blood means just that. The original text was 
compromised to make it appear that only ‘blood’ was the sin, while 
all along, the killing of any living thing with blood was the real 
crime.751 
Such a reading (exclusively for oneself) runs close to what Webb calls the 
“conspiracy-theory” model.752 Given the broad consensus in the Jewish 
tradition about what the prohibition of blood constitutes, to argue that the 
real intention was a total prohibition of meat is a bold and contentious 
claim, lacking historical and scriptural support. This criticism, however, 
does not obscure the other side of the problem – church communities that 
marginalize those members with heterodox dietary ethics. If we are to note 
where alternative communities of character fall short of the paradigmatic 
church community, we must remember that ‘real’ churches fall short too – 
something of which conversation with ordinary theological ethicists is bound 
to remind us. 
 
Evaluating the Methodology 
Near the beginning of this chapter, I noted that my ordinary Christian 
conversation partners shared personal theologies which were more 
consistent with the tradition and academia than expected. Although 
(arguably) more informed by personal experiences, and less critically 
rigorous, most of the theological and ethical claims made stand up to 
theological scrutiny (which is not to say that extrapolation or expansion was 
never necessary for this to be the case) and are consistent with currents in 
contemporary academic theology. Simultaneously, there were a small 
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handful of theological claims – most notably Becky’s implication that MS 
might be a divine punishment for eating meat – that stood outside 
mainstream Christian traditions and theologies in such a fashion that the 
possibility of reconciliation with these would seem remote. It remains the 
case that engaging with ordinary Christian vegetarians was a necessary 
step to protect my thesis against the ecclesiological pitfall of moving too 
quickly from theoretical claims to practical proclamations; but in light of the 
breadth and depth of responses, I would suggest that academics seeking to 
engage constructively with ordinary theological voices view their data 
gathering as foundation and start point, rather than critical conversation 
partner for a constructive theology. It should also be remembered that, 
although the effort is commendable, some ordinary theological claims (as 
with some academic theological claims!) may not be reconcilable, even 
within a theological methodology (such as mine) sympathetic to engaging 
with theologians outside the academy. 
 One place where my conversation partners diverged from my own 
constructive work in this thesis was on the topic of stewardship. In addition 
to my presumption that ordinary Christians would impart theologies quite 
different to theologies emerging from universities (including but not limited 
to my own), I was surprised at the strong presence the language and 
theology of stewardship had within the personal theologies of a number of 
my conversation partners; particularly Helena and John. While in chapter 2 
I argued against the relevance of stewardship theology for dietary pacifism, 
on the grounds that it undermines human-animal relationality – and, 
therefore, the potential for grace to work to transform how we see ourselves 
relating to them – this was manifestly not the case for the ordinary 
theologians I spoke to. If Christian vegetarians are content to use the 
language of stewardship, it seems sensible to assume that the non-
vegetarian mainstream will be no less comfortable; and so, for the good of 
the constructive and debate-stimulating ends of this project, it will be 
necessary to ascertain whether a more sympathetic understanding of 
stewardship theology is possible (assuming, that is, that stewardship and 
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Conclusion 
Talking to ordinary Christian vegetarians, and reflecting on the 
conversations, has enabled me to draw a number of conclusions, and 
identify a range of topics for further theological exploration. Perhaps most 
importantly, failures of casuistry at the local level indicate the need for 
further work to be done, at the nexus of academy and church, to develop 
dietary pacifism and the theology of human-animal relationality which is its 
foundation. Comments about the disconnect made by some Christian 
pacifists with regards to nonhuman animals further emphasise this lack of 
resources; as well as highlighting how, in churches where pacifism is not 
discussed, Christian vegetarianism is even harder to maintain. 
 Casuistry is of vital importance for any church which seeks to 
genuinely be a community of character, forming and shaping its members 
to go into the world as disciples of Christ. As reflection on the relationship 
between personal ecclesiology and situated church experiences revealed, if 
a church engages in honest casuistry, its unorthodox members (which will 
generally include vegetarians) are more likely to be positive about – and 
seek to further understand their discipleship within – the community. If a 
church cannot or will not engage in this casuistry, it can be reasonably 
expected that vegetarians in these churches will increasingly identify with 
alternative communities of character; such as CVAUK, CCA, or ASWA. 
Further to this, experiences of being ostracized for what is essentially an 
act of ordinary theological praxis – witnessing in practice to beliefs about 
God and other animals – can foster the spiritual pride so destructive of 
transformed relationship.753 Truthful casuistry is paramount. 
 Chapter 3’s theology of human-animal relationality is largely 
supported by the data drawn from the conversations. Highlighted at 
numerous points in the analysis of this chapter was the reality that the 
practice of nonviolence towards other animals theologically depends on 
them being recognised as relational individuals. Those who became 
vegetarian as a result of concern for animals were more likely to reference 
pacifist themes than those who did not. John’s environmental concern with 
creation-as-ecosystem meant that he was not concerned with individual 
nonhuman animals, and so practicing pacifism towards them was 
                                                          
753
 It might be suggested (albeit without substantiation beyond conjecture) that Becky’s 
theological claim, that MS might be a punishment for meat-eating, is one by-product of 
her being ostracized and unreflectively criticised for her heterodox dietary ethics.  
Page 244 of 287 
unnecessary. In looking at the dangers of spiritual pride that arise when 
one defines oneself over-against one’s community, the destruction of right 
relationship (understood theologically as a refusal of the sanctification 
grace can bring) that can proceed from this further emphasises the 
centrality of transformed relationality to Christian ethics; ethics of diet 
included. 
 As mentioned above, I was surprised in the course of my 
conversations by the important place stewardship held for a number of my 
conversation partners (primarily, but not exclusively, those who referenced 
environmental themes). Further to chapter 2’s critique of stewardship, it will 
be constructive to return to it in chapter 9 with fresh eyes, given its 
importance for ordinary Christian vegetarians. In the course of this 
examination – taking place as part of a broader consideration of how the 
church should approach its role as a community of relational creatures – 
stewardship’s problems will not be forgotten. If our status as creatures 
made imago Dei is allowed to obscure the mutuality we share with other 
animals, stewardship might still reinforce harmfully anthropomonist 
theological paradigms; but if there is space for recognising other animals as 
relational individuals, stewardship might yet be able to function as part of a 
relational dietary pacifist theology. 
 The compromised idealism at the heart of Christian ethics was 
highlighted in a number of conversations about necessity and meat-eating 
(for more on which see chapter 5). Absolutist pacifism is undeniably a lofty 
goal from which we will inevitably fall short: it is important to recognise this, 
but simultaneously to recognise that violence is not therefore automatically 
legitimated in certain circumstances, and that pacifism is truthful Christian 
practice whether we perform it perfectly or not. Humility and eschatology 
are vital to maintaining a dietary pacifist ethic: we do what we do not 
because it will ‘work’, or because we know we will succeed, but because 
we know it is true. We strive for sanctification in our practices not because 
we think we can achieve it on our own, but because striving in this way is 
an act of thanksgiving to the God whose grace justifies us. To be a dietary 
pacifist is not a claim to sainthood but a claim to sinfulness; with the 
attendant desire to work earnestly for reconciliation in full awareness of the 
fact that, without grace, we will never get there.  
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Chapter 9, this thesis’ conclusion, will take up the range of 
ecclesiological and theological topics raised above – and, by bringing them 
into dialogue with the theological and ethical work of this thesis thus far, will 
furnish an answer to the question first posed in chapter 1. How should the 
church live and eat as a community which attends seriously to the all-
pervasiveness of sin in creation, in the hope of sanctification by grace and 
the ultimate hope of the kingdom? 
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9. Conclusion: Radical Inclusivity 
The Church in the Community of Creation 
 
In the interests of correcting, only very slightly and only for my own work, 
Jeff Astley’s observation that ordinary theology more readily displays its 
inner workings (i.e., the process of its formation and development through 
the situated experiences of the theologian) than academic theology,754 I 
would like to begin this final chapter by highlighting that the thesis’ 
relational emphasis was not present at the beginning of my research. This 
is not noted in the interest of self-criticism or false modesty, but to stress 
that the connectivity between theology, ethics, and ecclesiology grew 
organically, so that the very evolution of the thesis became 
methodologically vital to its conclusions. I began by conducting a literature 
review of Christian vegetarian theology and ethics, and from there moved 
to speak to ordinary Christian vegetarians: through reflecting on the 
experiences of rejection and marginalization articulated by my dialogue 
partners, while simultaneously developing the theological framework for 
dietary pacifism, the centrality of relationality became apparent. In other 
words, I started by asking questions about diet, which led to questions 
about difference; which led, in turn, to theologizing about the church-as-
community at the same time as thinking through that same community’s 
relation to nonhuman animals. 
Relationships within the church community (between vegetarians 
and meat-eaters, say) and relationships within the community of creation 
(between humans and other animals, say) are themselves intimately 
related, to the extent that one cannot reflect on human-animal relationality 
and dietary ethics without also thinking through how the church eats 
together as a community (and what they eat, when and why they eat it, and 
how it’s procured). If human flourishing is bound up with animal flourishing 
such that unreflective meat-eating is not simply a destructive means of 
relating to other animals, but is a danger to the humanity we are called 
towards, it follows that the formative human community of the church 
should not be excluded from analysis (even in a project specifically 
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concerned with human-animal relationality). Bringing relational theology to 
bear on these questions made clear the need for a theology that recognises 
human difference – as those creatures made in God’s image and given the 
chance to choose grace – but does not make an idol of it. 
This thesis has attempted to carry the insights of relational theology 
beyond inter-human relationships, into the animal creation; and to explore 
the theological, ethical, and ecclesiological implications of taking such a 
step. In this concluding chapter, I will first present an overview of the 
progression of the thesis up to this point, including a summary of the thesis 
conclusions thus far. I will then proceed to suggest, and begin to explore, 
ways in which theologians and churches might answer the question first 
posed in chapter 1. How should the church live and eat as a community 
which attends seriously to the all-pervasiveness of sin in creation, in the 
hope of sanctification by grace and the ultimate hope of the kingdom? In 
short – how should the church live and practice as a community of human 
animals in the wider community of creation? In answering this question 
attention will be paid to the theology of table fellowship; how humans might 
learn from other animals; lived examples of the church relating to animals; 
and the possibility of ‘redeeming’ stewardship, by moving it out of 
anthropomonism towards the relational theology underpinning dietary 
pacifism.755 The radical inclusivity advocated in this thesis – the extension 
of Christian love across species boundaries – may appear strange to those 
outside the church; but it is my contention that it should not look this way to 
those inside the church, the task of which has ever been to witness to the 
world that its way of doing things is not the ultimate. 
 
Thesis Summary 
Having outlined in chapter 1 the motivation for theologically exploring 
human-animal relationality (and attendant questions of diet), and the 
methodological considerations involved therein, I began in chapter 2 with a 
survey of stewardship theology – arguably the most common Christian 
model for emphasising responsibility to the environment and other animals. 
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The survey concluded that stewardship was inadequate for conceptualising 
how we are called to act in creation, as an elected animal among our fellow 
creatures: stewardship limits relationality and responsibility within creation, 
depicting human responsibilities to other animals as an act of service to 
God alone, and so leaving no room for appreciation or consideration of 
human-animal relationships, or the ways in which our flourishing is 
coincident with theirs. The myriad intertwined relational networks of 
creation – humans, other animals, environment, and God bound up 
together – is reduced by most models of stewardship to a monodirectional 
system of feudal accountability. Recognition of other animals as relational 
individuals cannot be sustained within such a framework: this was 
demonstrated by reflecting on criticisms of ecotheologies which accuse 
them of valuing biodiversity over the welfare of individual creatures. 
 In chapter 3, a theological framework of human-animal relationality 
was developed, to address stewardship’s limitations when it comes to 
talking about nonhuman animals. Examining the doctrines of creation, 
imago Dei, the Trinity, dominion, covenant, incarnation, sin, and 
eschatology, a case was made for viewing other animals as individual 
creatures with relationality and responsibility of a kind; even if this kind is 
not always recognisable or understandable to humans. We are called to act 
in the world, not in accordance with our compromised will but with the will of 
God; and we are to do this by accepting grace, and the sanctification it can 
work. If God’s will – revealed in God’s own nature, covenantal action, and 
the Incarnation – is that we are to live out transformed relationships, living 
for others in anticipation of the kingdom, then to attempt to limit this call to 
right relationship to inter-human interactions only is to profess a disturbingly 
limited understanding of how comprehensively we are in need of 
redemption and reconciliation. How humans relate to other animals will not 
be the same as how they relate to other humans – but this neither means it 
is a non-theological issue, nor that what is ‘natural’ is the same as what is 
right. 
 Chapters 4-5 developed, in conversation with the pacifist and 
communitarian theological ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, an ethical model 
built upon the theology of chapter 3. This is a theological ethic of dietary 
pacifism, rooted in the idea that how we relate to other animals needs 
transformation no less than how we relate to other humans. If the ideal of 
nonviolence is an act of eschatological anticipation, to be understood as the 
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standard for Christians even if we cannot always live up to it, it is suggested 
that – as an act of worshipping our dynamically relational God – pacifism 
might, with some nuance, be extended to human-animal relationships. In 
this way, my theology of human-animal relationality gives rise to an 
argument in favour of pacifism (where possible) towards other animals. 
Dietary pacifism is (compromised) idealist, and communal while being 
integrationist with respect to other species – it is a theological ethic of 
Christian vegetarianism which does not seek to establish the kingdom in 
the world, but anticipates the perfection of nature through grace which 
awaits us at the end of history. 
 Chapters 6-8 expand on the theological ethics of the thesis’ first 
part, moving to consider the testimony of a selection of Christian 
vegetarians, obtained via interview. Their personal theologies of diet, their 
personal ecclesiology, and their situated church experiences as 
vegetarians were all explored, in the twin interests of evaluating church 
casuistry on animal and dietary ethics, and further developing the 
theological ethics of the thesis’ first part. My own presumptions, and the 
(ordinary) theological methodology I utilised in approaching the interview 
work, are also evaluated in chapter 8. Chief among the findings was that 
recognition of nonhuman animals as relational individuals was a 
(theo)logical fit for a dietary pacifist ethic. A major concern was raised over 
the course of these conversations, however, about the neglect of relational 
and casuistical practices in specific church communities, to the extent that 
Christian vegetarians who found themselves in a minority were criticised, 
teased, or even ostracized by their brothers and sisters in Christ. Church 
communities which cannot – or will not – deal with difference among their 
human members will surely struggle to recognise the mutuality we share 
with nonhuman others: these inabilities to relate to otherness are 
theologically linked, and theologically problematic. If grace calls us to look 
anew at how we relate to other animals, how much more than this does it 
place on us the impetus to take seriously the personal theology of our 
fellow Christians? 
 To summarise the conclusions of the thesis thus far, I would point 
first to the conclusions of chapters 2-3 as justifying my theological interest 
in human-animal relationality. The most common formulations of 
stewardship theology, which can serve to obscure human-animal 
commonality, remind us that our historic and popular ways of thinking about 
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animals are overwhelmingly and unjustifiably anthropocentric. If, however, 
we admit animals to our systematic theological thinking – which there is no 
good reason to avoid – then it becomes apparent that it is not only our 
inter-human relationships that can be transformed by grace, penultimately 
in this fallen creation and ultimately come the kingdom. As Stanley 
Hauerwas has argued, theology is ethics; and so the realisation that 
human-animal relationships are subject to grace means we need to look 
carefully at all the ways in which we relate to other animals – including 
dietarily. In chapters 4-5, the argument was made that a theology of 
human-animal relationality, in concert with the Christian ethic of 
nonviolence, calls Christians to at least consider the possibility of 
vegetarianism (dietary pacifism) as a legitimate and theologically-warranted 
act of discipleship. The reality that, as sinful creatures in a fallen world, we 
are unable to practice a perfect diet – even if we wanted to – is insufficient 
reason to avoid striving to live more responsibly to our animal brothers and 
sisters. We will not see an end to war this side of the kingdom, but that 
does not mean we should not work for peace: the same logic holds true for 
dietary ethics. 
Reflexive, communal, and prayerful reflection will be needed on the 
part of those who are looking with open eyes at their dietary practices; and 
this casuistry, this situated moral discernment, is part of the church’s 
authority and responsibility as the body of Christ. As was explored and 
argued in chapters 6-8, however, the church is often not as competent or 
willing in its casuistical practice as one might hope. Casuistical blind spots, 
which are formed whenever a community accepts cultural (rather than 
theological or ecclesial) standards as normative, act as obstacles to 
genuine and holistic casuistry.  Heterodox church members, among them 
dietary pacifists, can struggle to be heard or taken seriously as a result of 
this unreflective acceptance of cultural norms as Christian norms; and this 
is complicated whenever individual churches or Christians would rather 
leave an ethical question unexplored than risk facing challenging questions 
for their own belief and practice. There is a theological impetus on the 
church, at the organisational and local levels, to engage in prayerful and 
reflexive casuistry, which includes the willingness to engage with difficult 
questions, and to treat seriously the theology and ethics of those whose 
views diverge from the majority and/or one’s own. Given the ethical 
conclusion of this thesis (that is, dietary pacifism), this impetus clearly 
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extends to thinking – at the individual and communal level – about 
questions of dietary ethics, being a subset of questions about how humans 
relate to other animals. 
 The church needs to ask how it should live and practice, as a 
community of human animals in the wider community of creation. Through 
exploring table fellowship, relating to other animals, and returning to 
stewardship, I will now present some of the ways in which church 
communities might approach these questions. This will serve the interest of 
bringing the diverse narratives of this story towards a conclusion, while 
simultaneously taking preliminary steps to resource the church to employ 
relational theology in its casuistry on animal and dietary ethics. This chapter 
serves more to open up further areas for discussion which proceed from 
the argument of the thesis, rather than to place a capstone on the work 
done here. For a thesis on human-animal relationality, relatively unexplored 
in both theology and ethics, this seems appropriate. In concluding this 
chapter, I will present a summary of its preliminary explorations, before 
drawing the thesis as a whole to a final conclusion. 
 
Table Fellowship 
The lead title for this chapter, “Radical Inclusivity,” plays on the “radical 
inclusion” which Joshua Furnal perceives in the table fellowship of Jesus 
during his ministry.756 Although Furnal’s particular attention is on the 
sacrament of the Eucharist, I would like to extend his conclusions to 
thinking about table fellowship more generally, with a view to demonstrating 
how our eating as a community reflects and impacts upon how we relate to 
the nonhuman other in creation. This is not, should it need to be said, to 
deny the centrality of the Eucharist to the life of the church: as Stephen 
Webb has argued, it is indeed the one meal which puts all other meals into 
perspective.757 But if, as Hauerwas argues, the church’s temporal 
significance is that it is a “community of character”,758 shaping the 
characters of those within it so they view the world through Christian 
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eyes,759 then it follows that all the church’s meals – from catering church 
councils to informal cafe bible studies – are material for the development of 
a deeper understanding of our place alongside God’s other relational 
creatures. 
Noting that, “In Mark’s brief account of Jesus’ ministry, there is a 
significant place given to the role of food or eating,”760 Furnal draws this 
recurrent theme into continuity with the overarching scriptural narrative, 
pointing to the food of Eden, mannah in the wilderness, and the diet 
prescribed in Leviticus as Hebrew Bible instances of God hosting God’s 
people around the dinner table: “By providing food for His people, God 
teaches them what it means to rely on Him for their sustenance each day. 
In and through these meals, God invites His people to join Him in an 
intimate fellowship, by which I mean partaking of a meal where He is both 
host and provider.”761 Commenting on Jesus’ table fellowship, Norman 
Wirzba appears sympathetic to such a reading, writing that, “The gospels 
frequently show Jesus eating with people because table fellowship is 
among the most powerful ways we know to extend and share in each 
other’s lives.”762 
 Pointing to the apparent offensiveness of Jesus’ radically inclusive 
table fellowship in the eyes of certain Jewish authorities, Furnal discards 
interpretations which see this offensiveness as lying in a rejection of the 
Pharisaic conception of ritual purity.763 Rather, he accepts E. P. Sanders’ 
idea that conflict with the Pharisees, in the context of table fellowship, came 
about because Jesus was “associating with, and offering the kingdom to 
those who by the normal standards of Judaism were wicked.”764 The 
kingdom of God, represented in table fellowship, is extended beyond the 
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boundaries of those who are seen as morally upstanding – in Jesus’ choice 
of dinner partners, the radical inclusivity of the eschaton is laid bare, and it 
is scandalous. In the words of Jan Michael Jones, the table fellowship of 
Christ “recreated the world, redrew all of society’s maps and flow charts.”765 
 Warning that “the mistake of the church has been to think that the 
Eucharist is the only table fellowship”766 – a mistake which neglects all 
other meals, as well as those humans outside the church – Furnal goes on 
to propose that Jesus’ table fellowship in fact collapses the boundaries of 
church and world. The radical inclusivity of the table stresses that, in the 
end, church and world are imperfect human designations: what we live, and 
hope, and work towards is neither church nor world but the kingdom of 
God. A direct revelatory example of this, explored in chapters 5 and 8, is 
found in the proclamation to Peter to get up, “Kill and eat” (Mk. 10:13), 
which Peter interprets as God demonstrating how the kingdom spreads 
beyond Jewish tables into the rest of the world (10:28). The table fellowship 
of Christ is 
not an exclusive membership where only some are invited. Rather, 
it is a radically inclusive process that changes our behaviour 
towards being for other people and opens up dialog between 
persons... [T]his table fellowship is not only a representation of the 
kingdom of God but also an embodiment of it. When Jesus said to 
his disciples at his last meal, “Do this in remembrance of me,” it was 
not a command to institute merely a religious ritual, but rather an 
instruction to the Church to continue embodying the kingdom of 
God through table fellowship which is open for all the world.767 
Furnal argues convincingly that table fellowship was theologically and 
ethically central to Jesus’ ministry, and is now a primary embodiment of the 
kingdom in the world – the radical inclusivity that invites all to eat around 
the table, regardless of status. One is reminded of Paul’s scolding of the 
wealthy and greedy Corinthians who brought plentiful and exotic fare to 
communion which they did not share with their fellows (1 Cor. 10:23-32, 
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11:18-29)768 – if we do not strive to overcome, through grace and reflexivity, 
our sinful proclivities towards self-preservation and tribalism, we implicitly 
reject the grace which God miraculously offers us. 
Two key points from the thesis are pertinent to these observations: 
the first is the call for humans to pray and work for sanctification in how 
they relate to other animals (human and nonhuman); the second is human 
distinctiveness within creation, as creatures with the power to relate to our 
animal fellows destructively or charitably. Parallel to Alistair McFadyen’s 
claim that it is through communal participation in the dynamic relationality of 
the triune God that one comes closer to being fully human,769 Furnal 
contends that Jesus’ table fellowship gives us “a picture of the fulfilment of 
what it means to be human.”770 I would not wish to diverge from their 
argument so far as to argue that the radical inclusivity of the table be 
extended so that all animals are invited to share in meal times (although 
there would be nothing sacrilegious about doing so). Rather, it is my 
contention that just as it is through table fellowship that we come closer to 
being fully human, so it might be that the practice of table fellowship around 
a vegetarian table – where as few as possible of our animal brothers and 
sisters have suffered and died to provide the fare – extends the table 
fellowship of Christ and the radical inclusivity of the kingdom to all our 
fellows, beyond boundaries not only of race, nationality, age, gender, class, 
and acceptability, but also of species. 
The physical location of the nonhuman animals we extend 
fellowship to, when it comes to eating, is irrelevant. That is, it is not 
necessary for a place to be laid at the dinner table for pigs and cows and 
chickens in order for our eating – understood in the language of self-giving 
– to make room for others. In a world where most of the cruelty inflicted on 
our animal brothers and sisters remains invisible, their narratives unheard 
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and their selves uncared for, the very act of eating sympathetically is 
radical inclusivity of the kind typified in table fellowship of Christ. To invert 
the admonition of Jesus to the Pharisee who invited him for dinner (Lk. 
14:12-14), it might be suggested to modern eaters that, “When you give a 
banquet, don’t invite the cow, the pig, the chicken, or the fish. And you will 
be blessed, because they cannot repay you, for you will be repaid at the 
resurrection of the righteous.” Again, this is not the same thing as saying 
that genuine Christian table fellowship requires a vegetarian table: rather, it 
is about proposing one potential act of genuine relationship771 with 
nonhuman animals, in recognition of our shared mutuality and the ethical, 
ecclesiological, and ontological implications of responding to them in love. 
Responding to concerns that the setting of a vegetarian table – as 
an act of solidarity with nonhuman animals – might seem excessive or 
outside the realms of acceptable Christian practice, Andrew Linzey 
emphasises both the creatureliness (and therefore physicality and 
situatedness) of table fellowship, and the reality that no element of our lives 
fall outside our relation to God: 
There is something distinctly odd, even perverse, about an 
incarnational spirituality that cannot celebrate our relations with 
other creatures. I am getting a little tired of theologians who are 
eager, sometimes over-eager, to see incarnational resonances 
within almost every area of human activity (art, music, poetry, 
dance) but who look with astonishment at the idea that our relations 
with animals might be an issue worthy of spiritual, nay incarnational, 
concern.772 
A vegetarian table fellowship not only radically includes our fellow 
animals,773 but emphasises commonality and serious engagement with 
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those human members of the community with divergent dietary ethics – it is 
both conducive to the transformation of our relationality and consistent with 
Paul’s exhortation in Romans 14:21.774 Eucharistic eating, in which the 
practice of self-giving relationship around the table invites Christ to abide in 
us (Jn. 6:53-56), “alters the relationships that make up our lives, gives them 
a self-offering character, and in doing so changes the practice of life 
itself.”775 Table fellowship, being a visible, communal, and embodied 
Christian practice, deserves to be taken as seriously by the churches as it 
is by Furnal. The implications for animals of such a shift in understanding 
are enormous, not least because they are fundamentally linked to a shift in 
the understanding of the animal other. 
Nonhuman animals are relational creature of God, with whom we 
are called to relate in a manner reflective of grace’s transformative power 
and the kingdom towards which we look and live and hope: their flourishing 
in creation is so intimately bound up with ours that destructive ways of 
relating to them are in fact destructive for our very humanity. If this 
theological truth is recognised and accepted, it follows that many of our 
current ways of relating to other animals – mostly notably the myriad 
perverse relationships that constitute the networks of factory farming – are 
open to serious and critical questioning. If, as I have argued in this thesis 
(and as has been substantiated via conversation with ordinary Christian 
vegetarians), human-animal relationships as are encapsulated in factory 
farming are improper and harmful for both human and animal flourishing, it 
follows that new ways of relating to our animal brothers and sisters are 
necessary. By engaging in eating practices that consciously exclude other 
animals from the list of acceptable foodstuffs, we enact a relationship that 
affirms the mutuality we share with other animals, and thus simultaneously 
work for their flourishing and (as disciples of Christ) our own. I now move to 
consider broader acts of radical inclusivity which seek to live out the 
transformation grace promises for our lives and relationality. 
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Radical Inclusivity: The Church and Nonhuman Animals 
Helen Waddell’s collection Beasts and Saints – a compendium of early 
Christian hagiographies detailing the relationships between saints and a 
wide variety of nonhuman animals – has already been cited and discussed, 
in chapter 3 of this thesis. The lives of the desert saints, and their 
transformed relationships with nonhuman animals, which Waddell collects 
and relays are neither “wanton anticipation”776 nor human innovation; they 
are a witness to the work of grace and Spirit in the world, and a looking 
ahead to the end to violence we will experience in the eschaton. 
 With this precedent for particular and relational engagement 
between the church and the animals of the world in mind, I intend to 
consider another source which emphasises human-animal relationship, 
concerned with discipleship in the present which looks to the future. This is 
Andrew Linzey’s Animal Rites, a project undertaken by the forefather of 
vegetarian theology to address what he perceives as a poverty of animal-
friendly liturgy and practice – primarily in his native Anglicanism, but more 
generally across Protestantism and most broadly across the church 
catholic. The purpose of turning to Animal Rites is not to highlight and 
comment on innovative liturgy, but to show one possible way in which 
church communities can take seriously the status of God’s nonhuman 
animals as relational individuals – a way which, it should be noted, does not 
necessarily require vegetarianism in any or all of the celebrants. 
Concerned that “prayers for animals appear an aberration,”777 
Linzey suggests that this perception on the part of the church indicates an 
excessive and hubristic anthropomonism, and the presence of a theology 
which either fails or refuses to apply the practical significance of creation, 
election, covenant, sin, Incarnation, and eschatology to those parts of 
creation which are not human.778 
Although animal blessings are not uncommon, there are sections of 
the church where they are still resisted or viewed with suspicion. It 
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is difficult to see the theological grounds for this resistance. Indeed, 
animals have a claim infinitely superior to many other current 
recipients. Only a very muddled church practice can entertain 
blessings for battleships or automobiles, not to mention whaling 
ships, but cavil about blessing animals who are God’s own 
creatures and whose Spirit gifts them the ‘breath of life’ (Gen. 
1:30).779 
Two examples from Animal Rites illustrate what Linzey believes the church 
to be missing. The first is an interesting parallel to the saints collected in 
Beasts and Saints: while the Desert Fathers and Mothers ate with and 
taught nonhuman animals, Linzey recounts the tale of “the unusual twelfth-
century cult of Saint Guinefort who was in fact a greyhound. According to 
legend, the dog saved a child from an attack by a serpent but was falsely 
accused and killed,”780 and a cult developed which venerated the 
greyhound as a saint who could protect children. Whether deemed 
apocryphal, heretical, both, or neither, Saint Guinefort stands as a marker 
of a time when the artificial dichotomy drawn today between humans and 
other animals – lamented by David Clough in his argument for species-
uniqueness781 – was not upheld by the church; a time when the diversity of 
creation was recognised and rejoiced in without collapsing the particularity 
of its nonhuman parts into an unrealistic monolith. 
 The second example is a prayer attributed to St Basil: 
Enlarge within us the sense of 
fellowship with all living things, 
our brothers the animals to whom you 
gave the earth as their home in 
common with us. 
We remember with shame that in the past 
we have exercised the high dominion 
of humans with ruthless cruelty 
so that the voice of the earth 
which should have gone up to you 
in song, has been a groan of travail. 
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May we realize that they live not for 
us alone but for themselves and for 
you, and that they love the 
sweetness of life.782 
Recognition of particularity and commonality underpins a prayer of 
confession and intercession, not on behalf of nonhuman animals – as if 
humans were the priest-stewards of creation Moltmann imagines them to 
be783 – but on behalf of humans, to the end that humans and other animals 
might be brought closer together, to more closely image the dynamic 
relationality of God, and more faithfully live out the covenant of Hosea 2 
(discussed in chapter 3). 
 Stressing the significance of liturgy in a distinctively Hauerwasian 
tone, Linzey writes that 
We ‘learn’ our faith through liturgy, that is, through the regular recital 
of words and the performance of actions which focus our deepest 
beliefs. Our beliefs also concern and affect our understanding of 
animals. To leave animals out of liturgy is to take them out of our 
spiritual cognizance of the world. It is to leave them where for the 
most part they still are: peripheral objects, marginal to our concerns, 
unrelated to our thinking about God the Creator. The old adage 
remains true: Christians are, what Christians pray.784 
In chapters 4-5, Stanley Hauerwas’ emphasis on narrative tradition and 
character formation – through internalising, understanding, discussing, and 
reflecting on the tradition in a community of faith – were drawn into the 
construction of dietary pacifism. In chapters 6-8, these elements of the 
Hauerwasian framework were brought into further conversation with the 
“ordinary theology” of Jeff Astley; in particular, with his argument that as 
individuals grow in faith, they move from learning the religion to embracing 
(i.e., internalising) it.785 The church’s responsibility is not merely to transmit 
the core of its narrative tradition to its individual members: if the church is 
truly to be the body of Christ in the world, how faith is taught and what is 
included in its practice and worship are of vital importance. Understood in 
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this way, Linzey’s astute observation that “To leave animals out of liturgy is 
to take them out of our spiritual cognizance of the world” is of paramount 
importance – not only for the sake of our animal brothers and sisters, but 
for the very being of the church. This much was implicitly recognised in 
chapter 8 by Fiona, one of my conversation partners, who spoke of trying to 
“slot animals in” whenever she had the chance to lead prayers; an action 
intended to bring nonhuman animals before the spiritual gaze of her fellow 
Christians. A liturgy lacking the majority population of creation is a liturgy 
which teaches that there are limits to God’s concern, to the efficacy of 
grace, and to the extent to which our sin-ridden lives require transformation. 
A liturgy devoid of animals is not anti-Christian; but is it Christian? 
 Beyond emphasising, in broad strokes, the extent to which we are 
intertwined with God’s other relational creatures, liturgies such as that 
written by Linzey for animal burial786 can perform this lesson in a way that 
expresses loving solidarity with grieving humans while simultaneously 
recognising our commonality with other animals. Linzey notes with regret 
that “The ‘religion of the flesh’, as Christianity has been described, is 
curiously unable to relate its incarnational theology to the real world of 
ordinary people who love their companion animals and who dare to think 
that a God of love might care for them too.”787 A memorial service for a 
dead pet witnesses to the value of the individual animal, while at the same 
time being a loving and compassionate act towards the animal’s erstwhile 
owner. If inter-human relationships are (potentially) the fullest realisation of 
what it means to be created imago Dei – are in fact how we learn to reflect 
Christ in the world – then animal memorial services make clear that inter-
human relationality is necessarily bound up with how we relate to other 
animals. To deny a memorial service in such a situation is not only to deny 
the value and individuality of a creature of God; is not only to neglect Paul’s 
ecclesiological advice in Romans 14:21; is not only to reject the pet-owner 
and their particular loss and sorrow – it is to deny the complex and 
embodied relationality which draws together humans, other animals, and 
our mutual Creator. 
In chapter 6, I quoted Robert Jones’ claim that churches will 
struggle to perform truthful discernment on disability issues if disabled 
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narratives are not present and told in the community;788 a claim supported 
by Wirzba’s argument that reconciliation depends upon people dwelling 
together “in ways that allow them to see and learn each other’s pains and 
joys, their limit and potential.”789 As I have argued throughout this thesis, 
there is no good theological reason to limit this truth to the merely human 
creation: animal stories need to be told in churches if Christian communities 
are to avoid animal and dietary ethics becoming casuistical blind spots. 
Animal liturgies are one way of bringing animal stories into conversation 
with mainstream and human Christian narratives. 
 To relate Animal Rites to Beasts and Saints it is worth reflecting on 
the way in which the relationships of the desert saints, with wild animals 
deemed not only dangerous but ritually unclean by many of their 
contemporaries, witnessed to the transformation of worldly relationships 
which we anticipate and work towards today. Near the end of Animal Rites, 
Linzey argues in favour of memorial services for those animals who suffer 
and die in the process of scientific experimentation. If we are to make the 
ultimately utilitarian argument that it is an unhappy necessity that some 
animals die for the benefit of a larger number of (human) animals – and it is 
not at all clear that Christians, called to accept the tragic in a fallen world,790 
should go even that far – then 
It is important that we should remember that we frequently live at 
the expense of other creatures and the nature of our debt to the 
animal world... It may be thought that the act of remembering is a 
small response to the daily crucifixion that animals have had to 
undergo at our hands. And in purely human terms, it surely is. But 
from a Christian perspective re-membering is not just the 
commemoration of the past but rather the bringing of the past into 
the present in such a way that the present is decisively transformed. 
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Remembrance is an inseparable part of the process of spiritual 
transformation.791 
Just as the lives of the desert saints were acts of anticipation which brought 
the future into the present in such a way that the present was decisively 
transformed, so do acts of remembrance of past misdeeds shape the 
present in such a way that we can view tomorrow’s choices with 
transformed eyes. This is character formation, internalising the virtues, and 
embracing the faith – this is discipleship, and it is sanctification. To exclude 
nonhuman animals from the group of those who can be affected by the 
transformation of our self-centred will, on the grounds of an archaically and 
unscientifically anthropomonist understanding of rationality and relationality 
(or some non-scriptural understanding of which creatures are valuable to 
God), is to decline transformation; to prefer the world as it is to creation as 
it will be. 
With the hope of the reconciliation of all things in mind, I turn now to 
consider ways in which stewardship theology might change with the 
recognition of other animals as relational individuals. Can stewardship, 
characterised in chapter 2 as problematically anthropocentric – if not 
anthropomonist – be redeemed? 
 
Redeeming Stewardship 
In the conclusion of chapter 2, traditional models of stewardship were 
criticised as being unduly anthropocentric; hubristic in their account of 
human capabilities; monodirectional in their depiction of responsibility and 
relationality (humans care for creation as an act of service to God, without 
needing or expecting to grow in their relationship with other creatures); and 
reductive in their account of divine relationality (God is so concerned with 
humans that God only cares about the wider creation to the extent which it 
serves as an exercise in stewarding for humanity). In the theology of 
human-animal relationality and ethic of dietary pacifism constructed over 
chapters 3-5, a move was made away from stewardship for these reasons. 
However, my conversations with ordinary Christian vegetarians, 
covered in chapters 7-8, reminded me that stewardship is a well-known and 
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commonly-referenced concept within ordinary theologies – not only those 
concerned with animal or dietary ethics, but also those whose primary 
concern is environmental. It would be severely amiss, given the argument 
of chapter 7 that ordinary theology is real theology which both church and 
academy should treat more seriously, to brush past these endorsements of 
stewardship. To hear such endorsements from Christian vegetarians 
concerned for individual animals suggests that dietary pacifism, and the 
theology of human-animal relationality underpinning it, need not sit at right 
angles to theologies which image human responsibility for creation as 
‘stewardship’. The possibility of ‘redeeming’ stewardship therefore needs to 
be revisited, in light of the work of this thesis thus far. In the process – and 
in light of the observation in chapter 8 that many ordinary theologians have 
not inherited the conceptual resources for reflection on relational theology 
and its ethical implications – I aim to take a preliminary step towards 
resourcing modern church communities to engage in casuistry along these 
lines, in order that a genuine and reflexive debate may take the place of 
what is currently too often an unreflective adherence to cultural norms. 
McFadyen writes that “The dynamics of God are oriented towards 
all humanity,”792 and it is the case that through communion with God and 
human communion before God we learn what it means to be fully human – 
that is, a life characterised by living for others in a way that acknowledges 
both their individuality and their involvement in the myriad relational 
networks which constitute the world. When we think about human 
communities – in particular the community we call church – the 
relationships and responsibilities we acquire are rarely seen only as 
spiritual training, or a yardstick against which we can measure how well we 
have been formed as disciples of Christ. These things are true; but those 
individuals with whom we share community, and our responsibilities to 
them, are valuable in their own right. We serve our fellow humans as an act 
of service to God, but also as an act of service to them. Traditional 
accounts of stewardship, as explored in chapter 2, remove this 
multidirectional responsibility from all creaturely networks except the inter-
human; and herein lies the move from anthropocentrism (unavoidable, to at 
least some extent, in any human construction) to anthropomonism. 
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So what has this chapter contributed to the work of moving 
stewardship in a relational direction? Thus far we have considered the 
radical inclusivity of table fellowship; the potential for the church to learn 
from animals in the world; and how churches might begin to make animal 
narratives part of their own story. All of these arose from the relational 
theology, dietary pacifism, and interview work of chapters 3-8: it follows 
naturally that they feed back into it. By approaching table fellowship with a 
mind open not only to those one sits around the table with, but also those 
involved in the production of the food on the table (which includes any 
animals or animal products, but also those who worked to produce and 
transport the food),793 one expands the radical inclusivity of Christian table 
fellowship into an even more radical commonality with all creatures. 
Situating concern for animals and concern for those who farm the 
animals together demonstrates how radical Christian commonality is 
attentive to the individuality of others. If one is concerned for dairy farmers, 
for example, one expresses commonality with them and in this way is 
concerned for them as individuals – the reality that one does not personally 
know each and every dairy farmer does not mean that one denies their 
particularity. So it is in a radically inclusive performance of table fellowship 
oriented towards nonhuman animals – by adjusting one’s eating habits out 
of concern for other animals (and for those involved in food production, the 
land farmed and grazed upon, and the environment damaged by mass 
transit), one can be a steward without being a domineer. A relational model 
of stewardship, redeemed from the corruption of anthropomonism and 
drawing on the argument made in this chapter that humans can learn from 
other animals, is attentive and responsible beyond species boundaries. 
‘Redeemed’ stewardship proceeds from the effort by human creatures to 
care and relate to the whole of God’s creation. 
That stewardship has served anthropomonist functions, and is often 
interpreted in such a way still, is irrelevant. The model of stewardship that 
proceeds from a theology of human-animal relationality – a stewardship 
which contains a call towards dietary pacifism – is a stewardship which 
calls humans to be kings and queens among equals.794 As “stewards of 
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God’s good grace” (1 Pet. 4:10), whose natural proclivities are transformed 
by that same grace, we are to attend to all animals as relational individuals. 
At the same time, we are to work for ecological justice, fully aware that we 
are unable to satisfactorily predict the long-term impact of our actions, and 
so never privileging ecosystems or biodiversity over the lives and concerns 
of individual animals. Dietary pacifism exhorts a stewardship which 
recognises the interconnectedness of human relationships with God, other 
humans, other animals, and the environment. Relational stewardship, put 
most simply, is redeemed stewardship: as to the question of whether 
stewardship remains too closely-tied to anthropomonist claims about 
human distinctiveness, and/or the disavowal of value in God’s other 
creatures, I leave the final word to Bauckham. 
It may be that the image of stewardship is still too freighted with the 
baggage of the modern project of technological domination of 
nature. Can we entirely free it of the implication that nature is 
always better off when managed by us, that nature needs our 
benevolent intrusions, that it is our job to turn the whole world into a 
well-tended garden inhabited by well-cared-for pets? The problem is 
in part that stewardship remains, like most interpretations of the 
Genesis ‘dominion’ and as we have already suggested, an image 
that depicts the human relationship to the rest of creation in an 
entirely ‘vertical’ way. It sets humans above the rest of creation, 
sharply differentiated from it, in God-given charge of it. As far as the 
resources of Christian history goes, it needs at least to be 
supplemented by the medieval Christian awareness, vividly 
expressed in many of the stories of saints and animals and never 
more fully realized than by Francis of Assisi, of mutuality, 
interdependence, friendliness and confraternity between human 
beings and the other creatures of God.795 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis’ first chapter, the question was asked: how should the church 
live and eat as a community which attends seriously to the all-
pervasiveness of sin in creation, in the hope of sanctification by grace and 
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the ultimate hope of the kingdom? In concluding this chapter – and, 
therefore, this thesis – I hope to answer this question. Throughout this 
work, I have attempted to apply relational theology beyond the narrow 
constraints of inter-human relational networks – with a particular view to 
nonhuman animals and how we relate to them – and to explore the 
theological, ethical, and ecclesiological implications that arise from doing 
so. Key to this exploration is the theological claim that our relationships with 
our fellow humans (both inside and outside the church) and our 
relationships with other relational creatures (that is, nonhuman animals) are 
intimately bound up together. This has been the case since the first human 
took the time to look at each animal, consider his relationship to them, and 
gift them with names (Gen. 2:19). And, just as it was in Eden, our 
relationships with each other and with other animals are themselves caught 
up in, subservient to, and shaped by our relationship with our common 
Creator. 
 Throughout this thesis, I have argued that humanity’s (church and 
world) most common ways of thinking about and relating to animals are 
problematically anthropocentric, if not anthropomonist. Systematic theology 
has largely avoided thinking about nonhuman animals, and what reflection 
there has been has too often been corrupted by the acceptance of 
sociocultural presumptions as theologically normative – acceptance which 
continues whenever church communities refuse or reject casuistry on 
animal and/or dietary matters. Being created alongside animals (Gen. 1:20-
27), who praise and cry out to God now and at the end of days (Isa. 43:20; 
Joel 1:20; Rev. 5:21); being brought into relationship with them (Gen. 2:18-
20, 9:8-17; Hos. 2:18); knowing they are subject to sin and death (Rom. 
8:20-23), but have the same hope of the kingdom we receive in Christ’s 
Incarnation and resurrection (Jn. 3:16; Col. 1:15-20) – all these call us to 
see that, whatever the difference between humans and other animals, there 
is sufficient commonality, and sufficient scriptural cause, to admit them to 
our theological and ethical thinking. My flourishing as a human being is 
coincident with the animal’s as an animal: if I ignore this theological truth, 
and so treat the animal other as a means to my ends only, I refuse the 
power of grace to transform my willing and relationality, and remain wholly 
beholden to sin in this aspect of my creaturely life. 
Once hope for redeemed human-animal relationality has been 
accepted, there is a strong theological argument in favour of extending 
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pacifist ethics to other animals; something Hauerwas and Berkman 
accepted, when they wrote that the ethical burden of proof lies on 
Christians who wish to eat animal flesh.796 The discussion and reflection 
necessary for truthful ethical decision-making may not be things all 
churches are open or resourced for, but they should be – and the need for 
deeper and more sustained engagement with dietary and/or animal ethics 
is clear. In short, I have argued in this thesis that the church needs to think 
seriously and prayerfully, with eyes and hearts open to change, about what 
it means to live and worship and eat together, as a community of fallen 
individuals called to live sanctified lives in the world. 
In this chapter, I first summarised and brought together the work of 
the thesis: the theology of human-animal relationality constructed over 
chapters 2-3; the dietary pacifism of chapters 4-5; and the exploration of 
church casuistry on animal and dietary ethics in chapters 6-8. Second, I 
have attempted to develop the thesis’ conclusions and put them into 
practice: I have done this by opening further avenues of exploration, and 
offering some preliminary observations and suggestions for further 
development. The end goal of this attempt, beyond highlighting areas 
where further research would be productive, is to resource church 
communities to think anew about other animals, and to bring animal ethics 
and dietary ethics into their acts of communal discernment. Through this, I 
hope that situated church communities might be able to better think through 
and discern God’s will in answer to the question, “How should we live and 
practice, as a community of human animals in the wider community of 
creation?” 
 In conversation with Furnal’s “Theology of the Table”, I proposed 
that, just as Christian table fellowship witnesses to the radical inclusivity of 
the eschaton – revealed and inaugurated in Jesus’ life and ministry – so 
might we think of Christian fellowship around a vegetarian table as 
witnessing to the same. This vegetarian witness makes explicit the end to 
violence, exploitation, and death prophesied by Isaiah: 
The wolf shall live with the lamb, 
the leopard shall lie down with the kid, 
the calf and the lion and the fatling together, 
and a little child shall lead them. 
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The cow and the bear shall graze, 
their young shall lie down together; 
and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. 
The nursing child shall play over the hole of the asp, 
and the weaned child shall put its hand on the adder’s den. 
They will not hurt or destroy on all my holy mountain; 
for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD as the waters 
cover the sea. 
(Isa. 11:6-9) 
Table fellowship understood in this way is not a direct act of relationship 
with nonhuman animals – it does not bring pigs to the table so much as 
ensure they never get near it! – but it does affirm their particularity,  and 
value. It also acknowledges our commonality with them: we are human, 
and at the same time animal; and we are elected, but at the same time as 
infinitely far from our Creator as the fruit fly. This commonality, this blurring 
of constructed species boundaries, witnesses to the reality that the work of 
the Spirit in the world is never done; that what is assumed to be normal and 
above question by one generation is questionable to the next; and that this 
is not a rejection of tradition but an affirmation of the worldly nature of the 
church. 
Considering Helen Waddell’s Beasts and Saints and Andrew 
Linzey’s Animal Rites in conversation with the work of this thesis, a 
conclusion was drawn which parallels Linzey’s own contention that 
the bringing of animals into church has a deep symbolic importance 
– one that is seldom lost on the human participants. It symbolizes 
the inclusion of the animal world into the very place where so much 
theology has excluded them. It also provides a practical glimpse of 
creation in praise.797 
Eucharistic prayers which acknowledge the commonality of creation, 
looking ahead to the eschaton “to regain an appreciation of the eucharist as 
a foretaste of the realized kingdom,”798 neatly mirror my extension of 
Furnal’s “Theology of the Table” to other animals. In this way, the 
interrelation of church and animal creation is shown to be more than an 
appropriate outliving of the transformed relationality which grace can bring. 
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Such interrelation witnesses to our commonality in the world as it is; to the 
myriad ways in which our human relational networks are bound up with the 
larger relational networks of creation, all of which are warped by sin; and 
beyond this, to God’s kingdom, as we work and pray for the future to shape 
the present. For Christians, animal liturgy is animal ethics. 
 Given the precedent for the church relating with nonhuman animals, 
it becomes clear that stewardship does not need to be problematically 
anthropomonist – neither does it need to be discarded as such. Rather, 
recognising other animals as relational individuals, recognising the power of 
grace and Spirit in creation, and admitting that we (and all our relationships) 
are compromised by sin and in need of grace, we have seen how a 
relational stewardship is scripturally faithful and relevant for discipleship 
today. 
Being transformed by God means being transformed in relationship; 
a reality which is true between humans (perhaps the most true between 
humans), but also in our relationships with other animals. This 
transformation, then, impacts upon how we think about other animals; from 
there, to how we think about food; and from there to how we eat as a 
community – which includes how we deal with ecclesiological and 
casuistical issues arising from divergent dietary practices. In this way, 
relational theology leads to radical inclusivity; a way of living in creation that 
might look strange to those inside and outside the church. But, to return to 
a predominant theme in Hauerwas’ work, the church is supposed to look to 
strange to the world.799 In its exhortation to individualism and selfishness – 
grounded in the sinful myth that we are self-made people who are only 
determined by that which we allow to determine us – the world already 
finds the Christian message of sin and grace to be weird and unpleasant. 
The call to recognise one’s own sinfulness, and resultant dependence on 
grace which we do not deserve, is both uncomfortable and scandalous. 
The church, if it is living as the body of Christ in the world, should 
already look strange to those outside its walls; for it is through the radical 
inclusivity of Christian fellowship that we witness to the world that the 
inversion of power dynamics inaugurated by Christ will be fulfilled for all 
time come the eschaton. Naturally, as a fallen institution made up of sinful 
individuals, the church is not always this radically inclusive in practice – the 
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experiences of my Christian vegetarian conversation partners testify to that 
much, if nothing else. But in the spirit of compromised idealism (see 
chapter 5), the reality that we will fall short should never be a reason to 
lower our standards: to do so would be to tacitly admit that there are areas 
of our lives which grace either does not need to, or cannot, transform. This 
is not the case; and so the radical inclusivity I have argued for should be 
considered joyful witness because of, not despite, its weirdness. 
Karen V. Guth’s analysis of Martin Luther King Jr’s political theology 
casts an interesting light on the calling of the church in relation to 
nonhuman animals. Referencing King’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 
Guth writes that, “King describes nonviolent direct action as creative 
because it participates in the creating, sustaining, and redeeming 
capacities of God that seek to lead creation to its proper fulfilment.”800 She 
is interested in “future reflection on what might constitute such practices of 
creativity and how churches might go about their roles as communities of 
creativity called to give birth to ever new forms of relationship rooted in love 
and justice.”801 The new relationships, “rooted in love and justice,” that King 
worked for through nonviolent resistance are certainly part of the church’s 
remit in the world. But the creative relational role of the church in creation – 
and the reality that today’s weird and unfamiliar is tomorrow’s normal and 
expected – should not be forgotten. The church is called to be 
supernaturally relational in its embodied existence; a community of 
character and of difference; and, in the words of Guth, a community of 
creativity. I have attempted to demonstrate that, in the same way, it is 
called to be a community of human animals, concerned for other humans 
and other animals, in and for the whole world because it is in and for God. 
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